FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONAL STAFFING IN PROPOSED FISCAL YEAR 1995 BUDGET

(103–48)

Y 4.P 96/11:103-48

Federal Aviation Administration Ope...

HEARINGS

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED THIRD CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MARCH 9 AND 17, 1994

Printed for the use of the
Committee on Public Works and Transportation

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U.S. House of Representatives
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS
AND TRANSPORTATION
SUITE 2165 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
(202) 225-4472

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Subcommittee on Aviation

FROM: Committee's Aviation Staff

DATE: March 4, 1994

RE: **SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER** for Aviation Subcommittee hearing of the **FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONAL STAFFING IN PROPOSED FY 1995 BUDGET,** March 9, 1994.

The Subcommittee will receive testimony on the effects of FY 1995 budget constraints and other policies on operational staffing at the Federal Aviation Administration. Of particular interest is the adequacy of staffing in the following areas:

- Air traffic control;
- Airway facility maintenance;
- Safety inspection;
- Aircraft certification; and
- Civil aviation security.

I. PRESIDENT'S FY 1995 BUDGET PROPOSAL FOR THE FAA

President Clinton's FY 1995 budget generally holds the FAA's Operations budget flat compared to FY 1994 and FY 1993. The FY 1995 proposal for FAA operations is $4.5809 billion. This budgetary proposal, as well as a government-wide reduction-in-force of 252,000 federal employees (as part of the Clinton

Administration's "Reinventing Government" program), will have a significant impact on staffing at the FAA. (There are also approximately 3,600 non-operational FAA employees who work in the Facilities and Equipment and Research areas, who are not the principle focus of this hearing.)

Total FAA operational staffing reached a peak in FY 1992, when there were 52,351 positions. Since then, staffing has declined 1,538 or 3% to 50,813 positions in the current year. This decline is due to the FAA's operations budget essentially being frozen beginning in FY 1993. That budget freeze would continue in FY 1995 under the President's budget, resulting in another 471 positions being eliminated. If the budget proposal is enacted, staffing in FY 1995 would be 2,009 positions, or 3.8% below FY 1992.

The following table shows the trend for FAA Operations funding since 1992.

FAA Operations
FY 1992 - FY 1995
(in $ millions)

FY 1992	FY 1993	FY 1994	FY 1995
$4,361.0	$4,530.7	$4,580.5	$4,580.9

The overall Administration budget plan is to keep FAA operations funding frozen through at least FY 1998, which will spell further staff reductions. Between the end of FY 1993 and FY 1999, the agency plans to reduce its operational staffing by

approximately 12.5%.

Because inflation, cost-of-living pay increases, locality pay in high cost-of-living areas, and other routine pay increases are all funded within a freeze, cuts in personnel are made to pay for those constant increases over which there is little control within the agency.

The following table provides the staffing levels for the specialized workforces at the FAA from 1988 to the 1995 estimated level in the President's budget.

FAA Specialized Workforce
End-of-Year Employment
1988 - 1995

	1988	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994 (est)	1995 proposed
Controller Workforce	16,436	16,832	17,226	17,721	17,982	17,688	17,523	17,300
Field Maintenance Workforce	8,646	8,687	8,904	8,994	8,995	8,756	8,348	8,200
Flight Standards Workforce	2,909	3,193	3,479	3,571	3,481	3,381	3,303	3,534
Aircraft Certification Workforce	733	751	806	854	837	845	826	900
Civil Aviation Security	478	511	627	810	852	831	812	812

Source: Federal Aviation Administration Budget in Brief, FY 1994 and FY 1995

These staffing levels can also be compared to what the agency

planned in last year's budget and what will actually be achieved. In all cases, the level of staff now predicted to be on board at the end of the year will actually turn out to be less than the prediction made a year ago. The following table illustrates how the reductions in staffing are even more pronounced when compared to what the agency was budgeting for a year ago. The reason for this is that, in developing the FY 1994 budget, locality pay differentials were not assumed because they had not been enacted by the Congress at that point. Enactment of the law establishing locality pay came late in FY 1993. This added approximately $80 million of new costs to the agency for the current fiscal year, and the Administration decided not to request supplemental appropriations to fund the increases associated with locality pay. To fund locality pay, the agency permitted attrition to occur in these workforce ranks without making replacements.

Comparison of Staffing Forecasts
FY 1994 vs FY 1995 Budgets
End-of-year Employment

	Feb. 1994 Forecast for FY 1994	Feb. 1993 Forecast for FY 1994	Feb. 1994 Forecast for FY 1995
Controller Workforce	17,523	17,871	17,300
Field Maintenance Workforce	8,348	8,923	8,200
Flight Standards Workforce	3,303	3,441	3,534
Aircraft Certification Workforce	826	848	900
Civil Aviation Security	812	852	812

If unanticipated new costs are visited upon the agency while its overall budget is frozen by Administration and Congressional budget policies, staffing for FY 1995 can be expected to be lower than now predicted or budgeted for.

II. AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER WORKFORCE

The air traffic control workforce are FAA personnel responsible for controlling air traffic and making sure that traffic moves as safely and efficiently as possible. The workforce is made up of full performance level controllers who are checked out on all positions; controllers who are checked out on some, but not all positions; and first line supervisors. Of the total controller workforce, 72% are full performance controllers.

The air traffic control workforce level would decline by 223 positions under the FY 1995 budget proposal from the level anticipated for the end of the current fiscal year. The FY 1995 level would be 682 below the 1992 peak employment of 17,982.

Most of the proposed reduction in FY 1995 would come about through a program initiated this year to contract with private air traffic control companies to provide air traffic services at the smallest airports with towers (Level 1 towers). Twenty-five towers will be contracted out in 1994. The Administration proposes to contract out 25 in FY 1995; 25 in FY 1996; and another 15-25 in FY 1997. Each tower that is contracted out will save the government $200,000 annually, after personnel moves are made. FAA controllers in these Level 1 towers would either be moved to larger facilities to fill vacancies, go to work for the private contractors, or retire. By 1998, the FAA expects to eliminate 900 in-house air traffic controller positions through contracting out Level I towers.

As a general proposition, the FAA believes it has enough air traffic controllers to meet traffic demands and has no plans to expand the workforce significantly in the foreseeable future. FAA justifies the current level of staffing as follows:

- The air traffic control workforce is at approximately the level prescribed by internal staffing standards. Staffing

standards are the level of staffing the agency has determined to be the optimal level needed, based on the workload placed on the workforce by such demands as aircraft movements. The air traffic workforce is at or above the staffing standard at virtually all major air traffic facilities. All en route centers, except for Oakland and Kansas City, are above the staffing standard, and Oakland is barely below it.

The 72 TRACONS and large towers with radar are also virtually all above, at, or within 10% of the staffing standard. There are a few exceptions (Pensacola TRACON, Sacramento TRACON, Los Vegas Tower, Honolulu Tower, Oklahoma County Tower and Fresno Tower). For some of these, the FAA offers explanations of special circumstances that skewed the standard which are not expected to recur.

Overtime can be an indicator of lack of personnel. Overtime for controllers is at an all-time low and has been on the decline since the 1981 air traffic controller strike/firing. In 1983, there were approximately 3.5 million hours of overtime worked in the ATC system. In 1993, the level of overtime was approximately 1/10 of that (357,000). FAA expects to stay at that level, believing that some overtime is beneficial to morale and a cost effective way to manage the system without adding personnel.

When examined facility by facility, overtime, when measured in controller work years, appears to be low. At nearly one-half the en route centers, which employ 250-400 controllers, overtime is less than one controller work year annually. At the remainder of the en route centers, it is measured in terms of 1 - 4 controller work years. At the 72 Level 4 and 5 towers and TRACONS, only six facilities have more than one controller work year in overtime. The facility with the most overtime, Chicago O'Hare TRACON/Tower, had six controller work-years of overtime with 77 controllers.

- Air traffic delays are at a relatively low level compared to 1989 - 1990. During those years, annual delays of 15 minutes or more ran 392,000 - 393,000. In 1992 - 1993, delays ran at an annual level of 280,000. FAA attributes the vast preponderance of these to weather and lack of airport capacity. FAA does not see lack of controllers contributing to delays.

Finally, with regard to air traffic controllers, in June of this year a five-year program to provide a pay differential in order to retain and attract personnel at hard-to-staff facilities in New York, Chicago, and California will expire. The President's budget does not contemplate a renewal. (In fact, the Administration attempted to eliminate the program early in 1994, but Congress overrode that in the FY 1994 DOT Appropriations bill.)

An evaluation of the FAA pay demonstration project by the Office of Personnel Management concluded,

> "The demonstration project has provided the FAA with otherwise unavailable flexibility to deal with specific, critical staffing problems in a limited number of facilities. The demonstration retention allowances have been effective in producing the desired staffing improvements."

Without a renewal of this pay differential, personnel at these facilities will experience approximately a 12% pay reduction, which could have an adverse staffing impact at these facilities.

III. AIRWAY FACILITY MAINTENANCE WORKFORCE

The FAA plans to reduce its airway facility maintenance workforce from the anticipated FY 1994 end-of-year level of 8,348 to 8,200 at the end of FY 1995, a 1.8% reduction. The FAA expects to make further reductions to approximately 7,900 employees over the next 3-4 years.

This function of FAA is also undergoing a major reorganization in order to improve efficiency, reduce costs, and reduce the need for personnel. Presently, this workforce is organized geographically into 80 units or sectors. By 1998, the FAA plans to consolidate into 40 units to reduce overhead and management costs.

The agency is also eliminating 24 hour maintenance coverage of some facilities and using "on-call" personnel to provide maintenance coverage. Also, analyses are underway to extend the periods of preventative maintenance for equipment that has a demonstrated reliability.

In spite of the personnel cuts and program changes, the agency believes air traffic control and navigation equipment remains highly reliable and expects this high reliability and availability to continue. Statistically, equipment is operationally available 98.85% of the time. This percentage has been steady for the past three years.

IV. AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTORS

The FAA is responsible for certifying and inspecting all aspects of aviation operations from a safety standpoint. Inspectors are typically assigned to one of four broad areas: 1) general aviation maintenance; 2) general aviation operations (flying); 3) airline maintenance; and 4) airline operations.

Inspectors are organized in field offices, with particular field offices being responsible for the aviation activity of the above four types in a specific geographic area. Field offices are also responsible for "managing" the certificates of particular airlines. In addition, airlines are subjected to special in-depth inspections periodically. When inspectors discover poor safety

practices, the FAA takes steps to see that the problems are corrected, including the levying of significant civil penalties and even revoking operating certificates (curtailing operations) in serious cases.

Since the mid-1980s, the FAA has been steadily enlarging its inspection workforce. In the early 1980s, the inspector ranks were significantly cut just at a time when economic deregulation was imposing expanded duties and responsibilities on FAA inspectors. Investigations and hearings by the Subcommittee on Aviation reversed this beginning in 1983 and 1984.

The Administration proposes to continue expansion of the inspection workforce as it continues to lag behind the agency's internal staffing standards. The agency is increasingly expanding its activities overseas with regard to safety inspection and surveillance. Also, a recent spate of small, new entrant airlines requiring certification and inspection are expanding FAA's responsibilities. FY 1994 end-of-the-year employment is expected to be approximately 3,300 inspectors, or 79% of the staffing standard of 4,168. FAA's proposed budget would add 231 inspectors in FY 1995, bringing it up to 85% of the standard.

V. AIRCRAFT CERTIFICATION WORKFORCE

The FAA is responsible for certifying all aircraft designs and individual aircraft as being safe and airworthy. FAA employs 826

engineers and other aeronautical specialists to ensure that aircraft meet FAA standards. The FAA aircraft certification workforce would increase by 74, or 9%, to 900 by the end of FY 1995.

Hearings held by the Subcommittee last October on Advanced Aircraft Technology and Federal Aviation Administration Aircraft Certification (Committee publication #103-38), indicated that in order to keep up with rapidly advancing aircraft technology and new design and production processes, the FAA would have to augment its staff significantly, as well as manage its resources more effectively.

The FAA also justifies the proposed increase because of the increased emphasis on harmonizing certification regulations with foreign aeronautical authorities.

VI. CIVIL AVIATION SECURITY STAFFING

The FAA employs 812 aviation security specialists who are deployed around the world to ensure that security requirements at domestic and foreign airports are being met by both airports and airlines. These specialists also manage explosive detection security programs and determine whether changes to security are required due to terrorism.

While the civil aviation security workforce has virtually

doubled since the December 1988 bombing of the Pan American 747 over Scotland, security specialists believe the current threat level to civil aviation from terrorists does not warrant a continued expansion of the workforce. The FY 1995 budget proposes to keep this workforce level in FY 1995 with the FY 1994 end-of-year anticipated employment.

VII. OTHER FAA WORKFORCES

Since the specialized workforces are being held flat or even erased in some cases, the remaining FAA employees will be where the brunt of the personnel reductions would be felt under the 1995 budget proposal and "Reinventing Government" policies. Staffing of the non-specialized workforces (such as flight inspection pilots, logisticians, procurement and contract specialists, public affairs, congressional liaisons, instructors, and attorneys) is currently in a hiring freeze and this would continue in FY 1995 under the President's proposals.

The Administration's budget assumes a 7.5% reduction in the non-specialized staffing or 1,225 positions. Specifically, the FAA plans to:

- Reduce senior management (Senior Executive Service, GS-15, GS-14) by 10%, or 1,058 positions, during FY 1994 and 1995.

- Reduce other managerial and administrative positions by up to 25% in FY 1995 in Washington headquarters and field offices up to 50% by FY 1999.

- Generally cut by half supervisor/employee ratios from approximately 1:6 to 1:12 by FY 1999.

These reductions include management, supervisory, and administrative positions for the specialized workforces.

VI. ANTICIPATED WITNESSES

Witnesses from the following organizations are expected to present testimony:

- Federal Aviation Administration
- National Air Traffic Controllers Association
- Professional Airways System Specialists
- Federal Managers Association
- Air Transport Association
- Controllers United (Represents controllers fired in 1981 who wish to rejoin FAA).

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONAL STAFFING IN PROPOSED FISCAL YEAR 1995 BUDGET

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 9, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:50 p.m., in room 2167, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James L. Oberstar [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Subcommittee on Aviation will please come to order.

I apologize for the delay in starting due to the unanticipated recorded vote on the House Floor a few moments ago, but we are gathered and ready to take testimony.

Our hearing today focuses on the implications for FAA staffing in the fiscal year 1995 and beyond budget freeze of FAA operations. The Agency is operating under the administration's Reinventing Government scheme to reduce the Federal work force by a quarter of a million plus employees over the next four years.

Since 1993, the operations budget for the FAA has remained essentially flat. It is anticipated to have no growth, no growth even for inflation for the foreseeable future because of the budget priorities set by the administration and departmental claims that they need to comply with budget priorities set by the Congress and OMB.

Last summer, the subcommittee held a hearing on this very same subject, took testimony from the Deputy Secretary of Transportation and the Acting Administrator of FAA who indicated that planning to accommodate the budgetary approach was in its infancy, and that the top echelon of the Agency at the time only knew in broad general terms that simply they had to reduce personnel, were not in a position to respond more specifically to questions about personnel implications of the staffing reductions, budget cuts, and Reinventing Government scheme.

The approach FAA has taken to preserve the staffing level of its specialized work forces will be at question in this hearing. We expect to have specific testimony today and not general words. And the key specialized work forces that we are inquiring into today are air traffic control, safety, aircraft certification, airways facilities, and civil aviation security.

The work forces of those five areas comprise a little over half of the personnel at FAA. If you preserve those work forces in the overall context of the budget constraints, an agency-wide freeze, if you protect those five, then you have a very severe disproportionate effect agency-wide in a hard freeze and a hard freeze of current services baseline on all the other staffing in the FAA, which is, roughly, 52,000 personnel.

In the short run, for example, that means that the Agency would reduce managerial, supervisory, administrative and other personnel in its field, regional and headquarters offices by 25 percent, and over the long haul, over the four-year period, by 50 percent in those managerial and supervisory positions.

I am not confident that with that much of a reduction in management personnel that the Agency can run itself properly. I am not an enthusiast about freezing and cutting the operations budget. Too loudly does the statement of an FAA administrator ring in my ears, who, in 1981 said, "We can do more with less," referring to the inspections staffing of FAA in inspecting maintenance conducted by airlines. "We can do more with less" was applied also to the reduced air traffic control work force in the wake of the strike.

Well, we found that at the very time that the inspection staff on maintenance was being reduced, airline operations were beginning to increase and putting in very significant pressure on that work force to do more work with fewer people. And I will always remember a witness from the FAA Miami FSDO testifying at a hearing of the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, and Mr. Clinger, I am sure, will recall his saying, we are so short of personnel that we are inspecting paperwork, not engine work. And that is not a good signal for safety.

Given the safety mission of the FAA and the day-in and day-out responsibilities of managing the air traffic control system, and certification of aircraft and inspection and maintenance operations, cuts of the magnitude contemplated for this Agency can well and severely, as we have seen in the past, impact on the effectiveness of the Agency to carry out its primary responsibilities.

Now, the FAA is going to tell us that the specialized work force being preserved, being held harmless, or whatever language you want to use, that this is a policy goal and one that is being achieved in practice in critical areas. Show me; I have to be convinced. I approach this hearing with a great deal of skepticism on those FAA claims.

The FAA air traffic control work force is being held in place, and we will hear testimony from a colleague about failure of FAA to hire people from a training center in his district. FAA says we are fine, we do not need to add more air traffic controllers. And yet, if you look at the performance of the economy and growth in air traffic, they are holding air traffic controllers level at a time when traffic is increasing, and that will, in a year or two, put the Agency in a position of having to play catchup all over again.

Another puzzlement that we are going to be looking to FAA to answer is why, at the very time that there is a need for differential pay, is the Agency allowing the program to expire. Rather than reinvent government by letting a good thing go by the wayside, we ought to stay with something that works and continue it.

Those who know this technical aspect know that we are in the fifth year of what was initiated, very wisely and appropriately by the FAA internally, as a differential pay program to attract the best personnel at hard-to-staff facilities in California, Chicago and New York.

As we will see, that program has worked well and effectively in attracting the quality of personnel needed at those facilities. An OPM, Office of Personnel Management, review team found this FAA experiment to be an effective management tool in giving the Agency the flexibility it needs to manage its resources and improving staffing in those key facilities.

Why should we let it go at the very time when it has proven to be effective? I have to question whether maybe this is part of the overall scheme to create this corporate entity to operate air traffic.

I just don't think, I say to my colleagues on the committee, that we can be comfortable with having the Agency say that all is being done to ensure that management supervision will be effective, there will be enough people in key positions to manage the central core responsibilities of this Agency, and we need to know what its specific plans are, and they will have to be very specifically persuasive about it, and we look forward to that testimony.

Mr. Clinger.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and you have, I think, very clearly outlined the concerns that we have about some of the proposals before us. The FAA is unique among almost all Federal agencies. It exclusively serves one of the largest and most dynamic transportation sectors in our Nation's economy.

It works in close contact with carriers and airports on a 24-hour basis, and, obviously, without a smooth-running Agency, a system that is efficient, productive and safe, we would have serious problems with aviation and air travel in this country.

To draw a trite analogy, the relationship between the FAA and the industry is so intertwined when FAA catches cold, the industry sneezes.

Unfortunately, like most every Federal entity, FAA is required to abide by the same general, and I might say cumbersome, personnel and procurement policies as, for example, the Corps of Engineers.

If I might digress for a moment, Mr. Chairman. In my mind, FAA's uniqueness clearly should set it apart from virtually every other Federal Agency, to the point it should be accorded its own personnel and procurement practices because of the unique elements in that Agency. There is a world of difference between contracting for a flood control levy versus an advanced computer system. And in this instance, the air carrier industry, the traveling public and the taxpayers are indeed paying a heavy penalty, which is part of the reason we are here today.

This afternoon's hearing will be exploring FAA's operations and what effect, if any, the administration's personnel reduction goals will have upon the Agency's safety mission. And I think that obviously has to be the principle thrust of our hearing today.

I would question the appropriateness of treating FAA as though it were just another generic agency because we do have the safety factor here which is so critical. FAA's personnel standards should be driven more by the industry it oversees and regulates and by

the traffic it moves through our domestic system, and not by some arbitrarily derived number. Its principal goal is to move planes safely and efficiently through our skies, but the effect of their mission does not really stop there.

Other industries have come to rely on convenient, affordable aviation services as an integral part of their business. Whether it is moving packages or commodities or people, more and more of our industries now rely on aviation to serve their markets.

As you have indicated, the concern we have is that with the market ever expanding, we are talking about reducing or at the very best, maintaining static personnel in the area. Thus, I worry when forces outside the Agency dictate how it shall conduct its business without any appreciation of the breadth or complexity of its mission.

So I am looking forward to this hearing, which as you have indicated, is the second we have held this year on this same issue and, hopefully, we will get some answers to our concerns.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Clinger. At this time I would like to enter into the record the statements of Mr. Blackwell of Pennsylvania and Mr. Costello of Illinois.

[Statements referred to follow:]

STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN LUCIEN E. BLACKWELL
BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION

IMPLICATIONS OF PROPOSED CLINTON BUDGET FREEZE ON FAA OPERATIONS

MARCH 9, 1994

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am pleased to be able to join you and my Colleagues this afternoon as we review the implications of the Clinton Administration's proposed budget freeze on the FAA's operations.

As we ponder the issues today, we must encourage hope for the future. We must be realistic, though, because to achieve the goal of a hard freeze on discretionary spending requires that both Congress and

the Administration accept the fact that all programs will face severe budget constraints. Operational programs like FAA's are of special concern because of their high outlay rate and their drive toward growth by factors beyond the Department of Transportation's control. In addition, efforts to support the President's investment initiatives will require reductions in the base to make room within the caps.

At the same time, however, there are signs that the economy is improving. One can only hope that this growth will continue and expand, because a growing economy will have workload implications for

operational agencies like the FAA. The challenge then becomes to manage effectively deficit reduction while at the same time operating to ensure workload efficiency and economic growth.

I know that we will hear this afternoon many suggestions for creative resolutions to the much talked about potential impact of the proposed budget freeze on the FAA's operations. At the same time, however, there has been a consistent call for expeditious action. While I share this same sense of urgency, I believe we must make sure every reasoned approach is considered. Given the very difficult budget climate the FAA faces,

we must work together to assess the way the FAA conducts its business and to enact the needed changes which will guarantee its effective operation in a thin budget environment.

Mr. Chairman, in light of the gravity of the circumstances surrounding the FAA's operations budget, I welcome the witnesses who will appear before us this afternoon and look forward to hearing their testimony.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

JERRY F. COSTELLO
12TH DISTRICT, ILLINOIS

PLEASE RESPOND TO THE OFFICE CHECKED BELOW:

COMMITTEES
BUDGET
PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY
(ON LEAVE)

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-1312

OPENING STATEMENT

HONORABLE JERRY F. COSTELLO

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION

HEARING ON FY 1995 FAA OPERATING BUDGET

MARCH 9, 1994

Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank you for calling this hearing to discuss the effects of FY 95 FAA operating budget constraints. I would also like to welcome our distinguished witnesses who will testify today.

I am concerned about how cutting staff levels could impact the safety of the air traffic system. A few areas come to mind: air traffic control, safety inspection, airway facilities, security, and aircraft certification. With the FAA facing these cuts, the most important concern in all areas of FAA operations should be safety. Given the advances in technology the FAA is pursuing, I believe it is feasible that cuts can be made safely, but I am pleased our Subcommittee will be taking a close look at the impact of the cuts.

I look forward to hearing our witnesses testify and again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership on this issue.

☐ 119 CANNON BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515
TEL. (202) 225-5661
FAX: (202) 225-0285

☐ 327 W MAIN ST
BELLEVILLE, IL 62220
TEL. (618) 233-8026
FAX: (618) 233-8766

☐ 1363 NIEDRINGHAUS AVE.
GRANITE CITY, IL 62040
TEL. (618) 451-7065
FAX. (618) 451-2128

☐ 250 W CHERRY ST.
CARBONDALE, IL 62901
TEL: (618) 529-3791
FAX: (618) 549-3768

☐ 8767 STATE ST
EAST ST. LOUIS, IL 62203
TEL: (618) 397-8833

☐ 1330 SWANWICK ST
CHESTER, IL 62233
TEL. (618) 826-3043

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Inhofe.

Mr. INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

You got through the first seven minutes of your opening statement before you mentioned the proposed government corporation, and I think you and I have both been waiting for the shoe to drop to find out what they are really talking about. I guess that will not be addressed in this hearing, although I have to get on record in saying that it has been a year now since they have been talking about it and I want to know a few more details. Because from what I have heard, I am going to have some pretty strong objections to it.

I agree with Mr. Clinger when he talks about the uniqueness. I think we have to treat it that way and that is the reason that we have the concern for this hearing today and I am looking forward to it.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. No thanks, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Levy.

Mr. LEVY. No opening statement, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Poshard.

Mr. POSHARD. Mr. Chairman, just thank you for inviting me to be on the committee today.

I think you expressed all of our concerns very well in your opening statement. I do have some written questions that I would like to give to the FAA later, if that would be allowed.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You may ask them, remain here, join with us and put those questions directly.

Mr. POSHARD. Thank you, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Our first witness is our colleague, the Honorable Ron Klink of Pennsylvania.

Welcome, Ron. Glad to have you here.

TESTIMONY OF HON. RON KLINK, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM PENNSYLVANIA

Mr. KLINK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for allowing me to testify today, this is a subject you and I have discussed on numerous occasions, and I really, Mr. Chairman, want to start by saying I appreciated your opening comments and realize how serious this is.

Mr. Chairman and my colleague from Pennsylvania, the Ranking Member, Bill Clinger, it is good to see you here also today. Thank you for the opportunity to speak at this hearing on the Federal Aviation Administration's budget for fiscal year 1995. This afternoon, I want to discuss my concerns about the air traffic controller training program, and I would start off by saying, imagine, if you will, that this country's best medical schools kept instructing and graduating physicians and two years later not a single doctor had been hired nor was there any prospect that this new pool of health care professionals could find work in their chosen professions.

Soon the schools would have to close because fewer and fewer medical students would enroll. It would be a waste of training and also a waste of human resources. Well, I believe a similar scenario is in store for our schools that train air traffic controllers; that is, unless the FAA makes a greater commitment to hiring them.

The consequences of not having a strong network of training schools jeopardizes the future safety of the air traffic control system. Last year, 300 air traffic controllers were expected to retire, and the FAA has maintained its hiring freeze on controllers for some time. I believe that the timely placement of skilled air traffic controllers is the best way to keep our air traffic control system the safest in the world.

I came here today to express my concerns that the FAA has a responsibility to ensure that there are enough new air traffic controllers to replace the retiring controllers and to meet the demands of the expanding air traffic control system. I think the Chairman was absolutely correct when you talked about the fact at a time when air traffic is increasing, we see not only a push to not keep up with the hiring levels, but to allow them to be depleted through attrition.

The FAA, in my view, has an obligation to honor the cooperative agreements that have been made with training facilities such as one in my district, the Community College of Beaver County, which, as I say, is in my Western Pennsylvania District. The college's program is rigorous and it has been successful in placing graduates within the air traffic control system.

The Community College of Beaver County signed a cooperative agreement with the FAA in 1990, which set forth the hiring and placement of 14 graduates per semester. I might add, that the CCBC, as we call it, the Community College of Beaver County, is the only community college I know of, perhaps the only college in this Nation, that has its own air traffic control tower, working tower. It is very unusual.

Since they promised back in 1990—that is the FAA promised—they were going to hire 14 graduates per semester, only 33 graduates have ever been placed in field facilities. These figures are well below the goal that was set in the college's agreement with the FAA.

Currently, there is a two-year backlog of approximately 70 of the college's graduates who, though fully qualified, have not been hired nor placed in the FAA system.

The agreement—I will just digress for a moment to tell you the agreement was made because of the success they had with these graduates. They really liked them. The Community College of Beaver County initiated its training program as a cost-effective alternative way to other training programs which are dependent on Federal funding.

The objective of the Community College of Beaver County has been to graduate controllers with the skills equal to or greater than those that are being graduated from the FAA Academy in Oklahoma.

The college's success rate speaks for itself. The college's 33 graduates who have been placed with the FAA all continue to be air traffic controllers and the majority have been promoted as full performance controllers. The program is administered exclusively through funding from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, the college, and tuition. And unlike the FAA Academy and other programs, no FAA money is being spent on the college in Beaver County. In fact, Vice President Gore has cited the college's program

and others like it as excellent examples of his Reinventing Government. It is my understanding the FAA soon is going to be hiring some new air traffic controllers.

Mr. Chairman, you will recall I brought this matter to your attention last year, and I certainly have appreciated your help and your guidance in this matter. I urge you and the subcommittee to hold the FAA to the task of integrating the Community College of Beaver County's graduates, and others who are similarly qualified, and that we can expand the air traffic controller system to keep up with the air traffic needs of this Nation and really continue to have a safe air traffic system.

I thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much, Ron, for bringing this matter to our attention in the hearing and individually in your capacity as representing this very fine school.

I would like to know, how long has Beaver College had the air traffic controller training program?

Mr. KLINK. I first became aware of it back in 1978 when I first started working in Pittsburgh. So how long before that, I am not sure, but I can find that out for you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. But at least since 1978.

Mr. KLINK. Since 1978.

Mr. OBERSTAR. At least since deregulation.

Mr. KLINK. Yes. They have been in business out there—and, in fact, they were cited very early on for a lot of their work. It was just so unusual that a college would have its own working air traffic control tower.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And who in FAA gave the commitment to the college and in what form was the commitment made?

Mr. KLINK. Again, oddly enough, in my previous life as a television newscaster, I happened to be there that day covering the story. The FAA came in, they brought people in from Washington, D.C. and from Oklahoma, and it was a full-blown news conference with all the TV stations and everything, and they signed the document and said that this was great. They wanted to have this cooperative venture.

Again, I don't have the complete names of everybody that was present but that is something we could have available to you. But it was, as we called it in the news business, it was a "full-blown dog and pony show."

They had all the local elected officials there, county commissioners, people there representing the governor, Governor Casey. So this was no secret. This was something done very publicly. They made a very strong commitment.

Mr. OBERSTAR. What has the Agency specifically told Beaver College about air traffic controllers who are now graduates?

Mr. KLINK. You are talking about those who graduated from Beaver County Community College?

Mr. OBERSTAR. What has the Agency said to the school about its plans for hiring future controllers?

Mr. KLINK. At this point——

Mr. OBERSTAR. Have they given any encouragement?

Mr. KLINK. No, they are talking about the fact there is a hiring freeze. It came to the attention of Beaver County Community Col-

lege, I understand from another source, that there were going to be some hirings take place. They asked my office if we would investigate because at that time we had still been told and the college had still been told, and I am not sure that they have specifically found out anything differently at this point, but they had been told there was a hiring freeze on and the prospects were not good for any hiring.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, if the budget proposal of the Department which incorporates the FAA's programs is enacted in the appropriation process as submitted by the administration, there would be a 3.8 percent reduction below fiscal year 1992 for fiscal year 1995.

Mr. KLINK. Correct.

I would just tell you that we have had communication with the FAA in the past couple of weeks and they tell us that there are going to be 75 new hires nationwide. That certainly does not seem to be keeping with the need.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And, again how many graduates?

Mr. KLINK. They were promising 14 per semester, so it would be 28 per year. That was as of——

Mr. OBERSTAR. It would be helpful for us if you could determine whether the number 14 was a number agreed upon or worked up between FAA and the college.

Mr. KLINK. That was when the agreement was made—I have the cooperative agreement in front of me. It says hiring goals. The FAA will seek to achieve the hiring and placement of up to 14 CCBC graduates per semester. And this was in the agreement. I only anticipate since it was signed——

Mr. OBERSTAR. It was a goal?

Mr. KLINK. It was a goal. This was signed by William Pollard, the Associate Administrator for Air Traffic.

Mr. OBERSTAR. He is seated here in the front row. He raised his hand.

Mr. KLINK. That is good, he happens to be present, and the then president and still President Margaret Williams Betlam of the Community College of Beaver County.

Mr. OBERSTAR. There are what I would call—I shouldn't use the term—I will say it affectionately—"weasel" words in the contract. Weasel words such as "goal of" and "up to." Those are standard words inserted into contracts like that by very adept attorneys.

Mr. KLINK. Some of which later run for office.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, Mr. Clinger, do you have some questions?

Mr. CLINGER. As one who ran for office, yes.

Well, Ron, I really appreciate——

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Clinger has never negotiated contracts with words like that.

Mr. CLINGER. Certainly not. Very lucid, very direct.

This would seem to me to have had kind of a chilling impact on the ability of the college to keep that program alive. If you have basically one employer, one-pot employer or very limited employer and this thing has been going on and on and on, even though you had some sort of assurance there was going to be hiring, how is the program faring given that?

Mr. KLINK. That is a very good point, and let me give you this as a backdrop, and I know many of us come from rust-belt areas,

this agreement—you know, you say it was up to 14 people per semester. But you have to understand this was a bright spot in Beaver County at a time when there were very few bright spots.

A six-county area of southwestern Pennsylvania had lost 160,000 good-paying manufacturing jobs over a two-decade period, and here was a bright, shining moment where something looked like it was going to work, and in fact it has not.

So the school has had to say—it got a lot of attention. As I say, we called it a "dog and pony show," but it was a full-blown media event when this occurred. And so now the school is saying, well, look, it looked like we were going to be able to train and hire these people and we are asking these kids, because it is not a federally funded program, unless they get student loans, we are asking them to pay their own money and the county and the State to kick in, because it is a community college, and we cannot keep carrying this load if these people cannot get jobs. It just does not make sense.

So the school really, at this moment, as we are sitting here, is analyzing what in fact they are going to do. That was the purpose of my testimony. If and when the FAA would decide that they need these air traffic controllers, schools like this that do not depend on great amounts of Federal dollars will not be there because they cannot continue to provide training in something where there is not going to be a job at the end of the training.

Mr. CLINGER. Are there others besides Beaver County College that are involved in this kind of training program?

Mr. KLINK. There is. In fact, there is a wonderful school in Minnesota—the Chairman is probably aware of it—and they have had a good success rate and I think similarly they are probably disappointed at the hiring rate of their students.

Mr. CLINGER. This would bring me to my last question. Given the fact that this, as you say, costs no Federal money and you are training fully-qualified controllers and fully-qualified people to move into these jobs, why do we need to have a facility at Oklahoma which is a fairly costly facility? Could we not basically rely upon the private sector?

Mr. KLINK. We could, and my understanding, again in my previous life as a news reporter, was that that was the purpose of this training program; that they were going to try to hire these people with the eventual thought we could phase out Oklahoma and that CCBC and others of that ilk would be able to—so we were thinking back in 1990 about Reinventing Government.

Mr. CLINGER. Because a graduate of your institution, I assume, has to take the FAA test, but does not go on to further training at Oklahoma City?

Mr. KLINK. Correct. And the point is these people could be trained and then, I guess the best way it was explained to me, in my limited layman's knowledge, is that they then go into something similar to what we use as a baseball analogy, they play triple "A" ball at the smaller airports, like Youngstown or something like that, and eventually would be able to work themselves up to play major league at a place like Greater Pitt., or Cleveland or O'Hare, or something like that.

Mr. CLINGER. I don't want to put you on the spot but we do have another reservoir of the air traffic controllers and those were the ones fired after the PATCO strike, who should be given preference when we get to a hiring phase.

Mr. KLINK. My belief is that those PATCO people should be given equal opportunities. I think they should be able to compete on equal footing based on their abilities.

I don't think that preference should be—the point is this. I share the Chairman's concern that no hiring is being done, or very limited hiring is being done at a time when air traffic controllers are retiring, others are leaving for other reasons, and certainly there is an increase in air traffic.

So I think there are jobs out there, we just need to replenish what is out there now.

Mr. CLINGER. That is our concern whether this maintenance of existing levels or reduction in levels is driven by the economics of the thing or whether in fact they can really justify the reductions of the level and not impairing safety by doing so. I think that is what we are going to try to determine today.

Thank you very much for your testimony.

Mr. KLINK. Good luck.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. My understanding is that at Beaver College and at other facilities, other college training centers that do air traffic training, that provide a generic level of skill and that, from there, a controller can be sent to Oklahoma City for further specialized training, tower control or TRACON or approach control or centers, that might be the situation.

Mr. KLINK. My belief, and I am just consulting with my staff member who has been dealing with this, I don't think that is necessary. I think if they need to specialize, they could then receive——

Mr. OBERSTAR. You can go and be a developmental controller at a tower, for example, and go through a very long period, but FAA may also choose to send personnel to other facilities.

Mr. KLINK. Right.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Poshard.

Mr. POSHARD. I don't have any questions, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. My questions would really be for the FAA.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Levy.

Mr. LEVY. Just out of curiosity, what has happened to the 70 people who in your testimony have graduated fully qualified but have not been placed in the air traffic control system?

Mr. KLINK. Some are waiting tables and some are sitting home waiting to see what else they will do with their lives. Some work in car washes. They are out doing whatever they can to make ends meet.

Mr. LEVY. Are there still people entering the program knowing this is the track record in placement?

Mr. KLINK. There are currently. This is something that has just happened over the last brief period. The belief is that we can correct this logjam. They still have some faith that this program can continue to work and can work well.

They believed from what they heard from the FAA that this hiring freeze was temporary and that eventually there is going to be an opening of the floodgates and some of these people are going to be hired. They will be watching to see what happens. But I think we are really at an impact point here where it is really make or break for schools like CCBC.

Mr. LEVY. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, the gates may be open, but there is no flood behind them, I assure you, given the FAA testimony we are about to hear. The only encouragement of any realistic sort might be in FAA testimony to come, that over a period of the next three years they plan to close 25 towers a year and contract them out, and that, over time, some 900 in-house FAA air traffic controllers will be moved out of the system, that is they will be moved out of those towers, and they may be the ones who replace controllers elsewhere in the country who retire.

The contractor is something we will explore with Mr. Broderick, Pollard and others in later testimony. Then those towers that are contracted out are going to have to hire air traffic controllers.

If the FAA will not leave their people in place, they will have to hire them from someplace. The contractor is going to have to hire them probably from Beaver College.

A couple of quick questions. How many jobs have been lost to Beaver County with the shutdown of the steel facilities and the pump manufacturing plant and the others?

Mr. KLINK. Off the top of my head, I can tell you in the Town of Aliquippa alone, when LTV shut down, there were 13,000 jobs lost at one mill. This was a seven-mile-long mill. Quickly rounding up in my head the other large mills that I know about, somewhere in the area of at least, at least 20,000 jobs.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And when 20,000 steel workers are laid off in Pennsylvania, thousands more iron ore miners in northern Minnesota are laid off.

Mr. KLINK. That is correct.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Because if you are not making steel, we are not mining iron ore. And I understand the effort in the rust belt because we are part of it in northern Minnesota, linked by the lakes and the shipment of taconite to the steel mills, and the job that every community has faced in replacing those high-quality, high-paying, high-skilled jobs is something.

You have tried it in your community there—not you, but I mean the community that you represent—has tried to give people an opportunity to be part of something bigger than themselves, air traffic, aviation, a $600 billion sector of the national economy. And when people give of themselves and train for skills that they expect to find work after the training and do not find it, that is the worst injustice of all.

Mr. KLINK. And the infrastructure, then, Mr. Chairman, that supports that air traffic control system would begin to melt away. That is the sadness of this all, that the CCBC's and the school in Minnesota and others will not be there if and when they are needed, and that is the problem.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much for your testimony. And I want you to know I understand and I feel the same sentiments that you experience and the people you represent experience.

Mr. KLINK. I know you do, thank you, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Our next witnesses are the durable and dependable and ever-ready Mr. Broderick, Associate Administrator for Regulation and Certification, Mr. William Pollard, Associate Administrator for Air Traffic; Mr. Joaquin Archilla, Acting Associate Administrator for Airway Facilities; and this is his first appearance before our committee.

We hope you feel comfortable here and come back often.

And Ms. Ruth Leverenz, Director of the Office of Budget at FAA.

Ms. Leverenz, this is your first time before our committee, and we hope you feel comfortable here and feel welcome to come back.

Mr. Broderick, always good to have you before our committee.

TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY J. BRODERICK, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, ACCOMPANIED BY WILLIAM H. POLLARD, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIR TRAFFIC; RUTH A. LEVERENZ, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF BUDGET; AND JOAQUIN ARCHILLA, ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIRWAY FACILITIES

Mr. BRODERICK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members of the subcommittee. I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the FAA's Operations budget and associated staffing plans for fiscal year 1995. You have already introduced the people accompanying me.

The budget agreement enacted last summer essentially freezes domestic spending for the entire Federal Government. In general, this means that spending increases on priority programs are balanced by decreases in unnecessary spending on lower-priority programs. For example, the Vice President's National Performance Review highlighted how the Federal Government can be streamlined and made more efficient in its current operations to allow for necessary spending increases.

The proposed FAA Operations budget for fiscal year 1995 reflects this overall fiscal constraint. The requested operations funding level of $4,580,900,000 is slightly above the enacted 1994 level. A part of the Administration's effort to make the government more efficient is the proposal to reduce Federal employment by 252,000 positions by fiscal year 1999.

The fiscal year 1995 funding and staffing level will require FAA management to continue its efforts to operate in a more business-like manner. It requires us to rethink the traditional ways we have operated in the past and to achieve new efficiencies. And, of course, we will continue the high level of safety services we provide to the aviation community and the traveling public. Our plans for fiscal year 1995, as I will describe, will result in no reduction in those safety services.

Today's focus is on our proposed safety work force staffing levels for fiscal year 1995. Before addressing the specifics of those staffing levels, let me first discuss the 1995 staffing targets that we plan to achieve.

At the end of fiscal year 1993, the FAA's work force totaled 53,148 full-time equivalents, or FTEs. By 1995, the FAA will streamline its work force, resulting in a reduction of 2,015 FTEs from the 1993 actual FTE expenditures. To achieve that result, we have instituted a hard freeze on hiring throughout the Agency, except for safety-related workforces.

Also, we have obtained authority from the Office of Personnel Management to offer early-out retirements, but we still need very much the buyout authority sought by the Administration to help us meet our necessary staffing targets.

Regarding staffing in 1996 through 1999, FAA's staffing will be reevaluated annually within the target provided to the Secretary for the Department as a whole.

Our approach to achieving staffing reductions within the Agency has been to target nonsafety work forces, as the Chairman has already indicated. As proposed by the NPR, most of our reductions will come from positions made unnecessary through changes underway in how the Federal Government will operate in the future.

As I noted earlier, our primary consideration in meeting our targeted budget and staffing levels has been on achieving our safety mission. For that reason, in our fiscal 1995 Operations budget request, we are asking for an additional 305 in employment—or an increase of over 7 percent—in our aircraft certification and aviation safety inspection work force. This increase is intended in part to help us meet growing international obligations and an increasing aircraft manufacturing workload. We will maintain our security work force level of 812 in fiscal 1995.

We are seeking a slight reduction in our request for air traffic controllers, from 17,523 in fiscal 1994 to 17,300 in fiscal 1995. This adjustment in controller staffing results from our contract tower program. We plan to contract out approximately 25 Level I VFR towers in 1995, consistent with NPR recommendations.

The change in fiscal 1995 air traffic control staffing does not reflect an actual reduction in air traffic control service in the system, but the reduction in total staffing needs by the FAA because of this program. We have worked with the controllers' union, NATCA, on this program to identify candidate towers for it.

In fiscal 1995, the contract tower program will free up approximately 250 controllers for reassignment to other facilities. This will assist us in balancing controller staffing in the system. Furthermore, it will give controllers an opportunity to advance into higher-level towers. Reassignment of Level-I controllers will be our primary method of replacing attrition in the controller work force and will limit the need to hire additional controllers.

The fiscal year 1995 Operations budget also shows a slight reduction in the overall field maintenance work force to 8,200 from 8,406 in fiscal year 1994. It is important to stress, however, that the reductions will not affect the number of maintenance technicians in the work force. We plan to continue the same number of maintenance technicians as before. We will be able to achieve this reduction in staffing, without compromising our ability to maintain FAA facilities and equipment, because of an effort we began several years ago to change our approach to field maintenance.

In 1991, our Airway Facilities organization began a major strategic planning effort, in partnership with PASS, the technician's union. Our goal was to restructure and consolidate the organization, and to prepare for the transition from a ground-based infrastructure to a hybrid system composed of both space- and ground-based components.

Incorporating the Administration's goals into this strategic plan, we began to identify ways to reorganize and consolidate functions without lessening our ability to perform and maintain functions. As a result of this planning, the reductions in our field maintenance work force will come from administrative support and management positions. None of the reductions will come from the safety-related positions that actually perform field maintenance.

For fiscal 1995, we are currently ahead of schedule in meeting the targeted reduction in Federal employment. At the end of fiscal 1995, Agency staffing will be a full 6 percent below the fiscal year 1993 level. This represents a reduction of 3,079 FTEs since the enacted 1993 budget.

Restructuring efforts, such as the one underway in our Airway Facilities organization, have shown us that there are ways in which we can continue to provide key safety-related services at a lower cost. That will be the focus of our efforts during the remainder of this fiscal year and during fiscal year 1995 as well.

I can assure you that safety will remain our foremost consideration as we adapt to the challenge of the increased efforts to achieve fiscal restraint throughout the Federal sector.

That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman, and we will be pleased to answer questions of the subcommittee at this time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is an appropriate point break for the recorded vote in progress on the House Floor. We will return as quickly as possible.

[Recess.]

The subcommittee will resume its sitting.

Mr. Broderick, describe for us how the FAA sets its staffing standards, first for air traffic controllers.

Mr. BRODERICK. What I would prefer is to have Bill Pollard respond.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You may pass off any of these questions to whomever you choose.

Mr. BRODERICK. Thank you, sir. Bill is an expert in air traffic control and I can talk about other disciplines.

Mr. POLLARD. We have staffing standards that are under revision now and quite honestly have been for a number of years. Our staffing standards give us an aggregate number of controllers we expect to need in the system.

Basically, this starts by determining an aggregate number for each of our regions, and from that a cumulative number for the system is determined. Those staffing standards include allocation for controller training, including sick leave and working weekends. They are based on a five-day week and then we allot more people to that because it is obviously a seven-day-a-week operation.

It is basically derived from the number of positions that must be staffed in the facility times the number of shifts that they work.

Then we multiply by a factor of 1.7 to give us the additional coverage in staffing so that people could take leave and receive training, those types of things that are normal in the day-to-day operation.

Mr. OBERSTAR. But how do you determine the number of people you need at a particular tower or at a particular en route center. Let's start with an en route center and a controller working, talking to traffic.

Mr. POLLARD. Right.

Mr. OBERSTAR. On average, a controller works 27, 28 aircraft maximum in a sector. And the question is, is that the maximum number and the number of aircraft per hour at a particular center at particular times of the day? How do you get to the number of controllers? What says that at a center, X number of controllers is the standard? What says at O'Hare tower, X number of controllers is how many you should have? What drives that?

Mr. POLLARD. The number of airplanes, for instance, in an en route facility would basically determine the number of positions that we are required to staff on a daily basis. In other words, we break the area of control up into sectors which would be a position of operation. There may be two or three positions of operation associated with each sector. If the traffic increases in that area, then we would establsih more sectors.

So you start out with a known number of sectors and positions that you must operate on a 24-hour-a-day basis. Some of the sectors you only operate two shifts a day, depending on the traffic volumes in that particular area.

From the number of positions and the number of shifts that you operate, you determine a staffing number. In other words, if you have 10 positions and two shifts a day, that is 20 positions that you need to staff. Ultimately, it is then rolled into a weekly requirement that would give you X number of positions and shifts that you need to cover per week.

It is not as simple as it sounds because these are basically engineered performance standards. Years ago, there were time and motion studies done on what controllers do. You would take that number and multiply it by the factor that I mentioned earlier which is 1.7. The additional staffing from the 1.7 factor is required to cover for breaks, training, and weekend staffing.

That is generally how it is done. They are not the most accurate staffing standards, although, from a technological standpoint, I think they are state of the art.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You said that is now under review, now under reconsideration?

Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir. The staffing standard that we have now calculates some supervision into the staffing standard. It also calculates in a large pipeline because it was based on a lot of new employees when we were hiring two to three thousand controllers a year. It has a pipeline of over 1,500 which is unreal in today's environment where we are only hiring a couple hundred of people a year and our training needs are diminished considerably.

Mr. OBERSTAR. There are some discrepancies in the numbers here. Your numbers that you provided for the committee indicate that for 1993, end-of-year employment was controller work force,

17,688. Mr. Krasner in his testimony later on will say that there are 14,387 air traffic controllers. Who are you counting that he is not counting? First-line supervisors?

Mr. POLLARD. Right. The first-line supervisor is the difference. There are some 2,200 first-line supervisors in centers and towers. Those are people who are the immediate supervisors for the controllers. They maintain currency and do work traffic.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Last time I asked this question, we were trying to figure out what the—how the FAA counted people at the controller work force. We had quite a division of viewpoint about this and FAA went back and finally established a standard that they did not count air traffic assistants because they were not talking to traffic but they would count first-line supervisors or others if there are others who talk to traffic at least 10 percent of the time.

Is that the standard you are still using?

Mr. POLLARD. That is basically it. The definition we have now is the one that was agreed on several years ago. In 1987, if I recall, controller work force was defined as controllers, first-line supervisors and traffic management coordinators. There are about 300 traffic management coordinators in the entire system. The definition today is basically the same.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Okay. What is the optimum number of aircraft a controller at a center should work?

Mr. POLLARD. Well, Mr. Chairman, that is really a difficult question. I don't mean to be trite about this, but sometimes one is enough. It depends on the experience of the pilot, the conditions, and the weather. Other times it depends on what type of sector you are working.

For instance, if you are working a high altitude sector, flight level 350 and above and most of the traffic is en route, established at altitude and separated, you can handle a much larger number of aircraft. You are still controlling and ensuring separation, but you don't have as much activity, so it is hard to come up with a number there as to what is adequate.

I think under normal circumstances, again, in a high altitude, our controllers out there frequently work 15, 20 airplanes, sometimes even more than that depending on if they have assistance. At low altitude, if it is little closer in, if it is in the terminal, then obviously the numbers diminish. So it is really difficult to give a generic answer.

Mr. OBERSTAR. At an en route center, I have generally seen 27, 28 aircraft per sector.

Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have not seen it higher than that.

Mr. POLLARD. Right.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have been to almost every center, not all, but I try to get at the rush hour times and that seems to be fairly common. I understand that conditions and all may vary and there may be one aircraft, particularly one instance that I did observe, one aircraft was about all that a controller ought to have handled at that point because it was KC–147—what is that?

Mr. BRODERICK. 135.

Mr. OBERSTAR [continuing]. KC–135 tanker with a fire in the tail section and the pilot needed room to dump fuel before the thing ex-

ploded and that was about all that anybody could have, but that controller had 28 aircraft including the tanker in her sector at the time.

All right. I am going to pursue in a moment, but I am going to ask Mr. Clinger to take over for the moment.

Mr. CLINGER [presiding]. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

With regard to contractors, FAA has a lot of contractors, and apparently are going to have some more. GAO last week issued a report and an article appeared in The Post about it.

And I guess the question I have is: What is driving this need to have the contractors? Is it an effort to get the numbers down and, if so, is it really going to be cost-effective?

Mr. BRODERICK. Well, I can tell you from a lot of experience, Mr. Clinger, working on the specific issue of what it really costs to have an FAA employee do a job, that just looking at the salary of the employee or even the salary plus the 30 percent overhead or whatever is not really a fair depiction of the true costs.

There is a fairly substantial overhead that we do not capture in our current way of budgeting and doing that kind of cost accounting. What we are doing to try and capture more fairly is develop a cost accounting system, cost performance system, we call it, that will not only tell us what the cost of doing a particular job is by the people, but measure the performance per dollar.

But I would——

Mr. CLINGER. You can't give us that information now.

Mr. BRODERICK. You can't do it now on any individual thing, but you can look at the kinds of supervisory ratios we have and administrative support people that we have and recognize that it is a fairly large number of what private sector organization would call overhead or general administrative expense.

But we do look—we try very hard to look at the cost to Government when we are doing contracts and compare that to what we could have done in-house, but there is another very important thing I think that we have got to look at and that is the ability to get a particular kind of talent immediately that we may not have in the Agency, or some other kind of capability.

Sometimes it is a surge capability, hire a lot of people for a short period of time to do a job. So cost is a very important factor, one that we are acutely aware of and with the budget situation being what it is, we will try to save money wherever we can without cutting corners on safety.

Mr. CLINGER. Do you keep records of contractor hours at the present time so we would have an opportunity to track whether the FAA contractors are increasing while the number of employees decrease.

Mr. BRODERICK. Each individual contract of course tracks those areas, but we don't have any kind of central system that keeps track of contractor hours. We don't have a central system to do that.

Mr. CLINGER. There are approximately 3,000 contractors, we understand, based in FAA facilities and in some cases these contractors are, as I understand it, performing the same duties as FAA employees.

And I guess the question is: Is it fair to fire an FAA employee and not affect the contractor simply because one counts against your totals and the other does not?

Mr. BRODERICK. Well, I think not, but I also think that the issue of people doing exactly the same job is something that I would have to look at very closely. I know that, for example, we have some contract support people in my organization in headquarters that are computer software experts. We simply don't have those kind of people in the FAA in-house, so we went to a contract source to get those people. They are not doing exactly the same thing as the person at the next desk. They are seated at the next desk, so they can quickly come in and perform work for us.

Arch, in the Airway Facilities area, I am sure you have contract support that also performs unique capability; is that right?

Mr. ARCHILLA. That is correct, Mr. Clinger. We have—the first thing that gets done on any system that gets deployed is a cost benefit analysis on whether it would be—depending on the life cycle of the equipment, whether it is going to be in the system for a very long time or it is going to be in the system for a certain period of time, to see whether it is more beneficial for the government to maintain it in-house or have the work contracted out.

In the majority of the instances, the cost benefit analysis indicates that doing the work in-house is much cheaper than contracting the work out. We are also failed with the deployment of new systems that has not given us in the Airways Facilities organization the time to adequately train our technicians and staff appropriately for certain equipment that gets deployed, so we end up getting support for one to two years from contractor sources while we have the time to train our technicians at the FAA academy in Oklahoma City or through contractor provided training. We bring the maintenance in-house as quickly as we can.

Mr. BRODERICK. Air traffic has some contract support that is somewhat similar, too.

Bill.

Mr. POLLARD. We have a couple of contracts. I think our training contract in en route facilities is very cost-effective—and so much of that depends on the management of the contract. I would like to take the opportunity to talk a little bit about the contract towers.

When we staff these low-level activity VFR facilities, we usually assign people that are coming right out of the College Training Initiatives Program, or out of the Academy. They check out rather quickly at these low-level facilities, usually within a year. They are beginning a career so they have a desire to go somewhere else so that they want to bid out to more complex facilities because that gives them additional money.

The bottom line is that they are promoted out of those facilities. If we operate these towers, we backfill, so we have kind of a perpetual cost for moving employees in, training them, and moving them out.

Even though those contract controllers would be paid approximately the same as ours, as Tony mentioned, the overhead would not be as high because they wouldn't have the same benefits as government employee. So that would be less.

Contract employees are not there to train and get checked out so they can compete for other jobs. So that continuous cycle is not there, so they don't have to allow for any training resources or anticipate any attrition. It does save us a considerable amount of money per site and a considerable amount of money overall in the program.

Mr. CLINGER. You are taking a position, basically, that contractors are primarily those that bring unique skills or ability to the system, and that would not be available in-house for economic or cost savings purposes.

Mr. BRODERICK. That is generally true although, as Arch mentioned, the fact is that sometimes we have to bring contractors in because we need a capability today that we can't build in-house, so we bring them in for a short period of time.

Mr. CLINGER. I think Mr. Pollard is saying, with regard to the air traffic controllers, that the level one towers, it is going to be a cost savings for you.

Mr. POLLARD. That is correct.

Mr. CLINGER. They are not unique skills that you are training over?

Mr. POLLARD. No, sir. They are unique, but they are readily available on the market now.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR [presiding]. Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me go back to Representative Klink's comments on Beaver County Community College. Mr. Pollard, you are probably the best one to answer this. What obligation does the FAA feel it has toward Beaver County Community College?

Mr. POLLARD. Well, let me say that we have four other schools providing services similar to Beaver. Beaver is a little bit unique, as Congressman Klink said, since they specifically train for the terminals. Some of the others do both options. The MARC program that Minnesota has does specifically en route. All the schools give us a very good product.

We have no quarrels at all with their training program. We feel that we have a commitment. By the way, I would like to state for the record, I only signed it, I didn't write it, with relevance to the earlier discussion.

Mr. HORN. But you take full responsibility for it?

Mr. POLLARD. I take responsibility, yes, for that. We have tried to employ as many of those people as we could because, again, as the Congressman said, all the schools turn out excellent employees. They are trained equally as well as the people we send through the Academy and, in some cases, they are more specifically trained in just one option.

Our commitment to those is to employ as many of those people as we possibly can. Our problem is, as I said, we have schools whose capacity far exceeds any hiring that we are doing. These schools started when we were hiring a couple thousand people a year. Now we are talking about a couple of hundred. And Beaver alone could turn out that many. MARC alone could turn out that many. University of Alaska, University of North Dakota and Hampton, any of those. That is our problem.

We have a commitment to try to be fair in our hiring and we have, I might just add, committed to hiring around 15 of the Beaver students prior to the end of this year. We have gone out to these schools telling them that the employment opportunities are going to be extremely limited over the next several years. We have given them notice that they are going to continue to build a backlog if they continue to have mass input.

Mr. HORN. Now you have an FAA academy; that is correct?

Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HORN. And they educate and train how many students a year?

Mr. POLLARD. Let me say this: The only people that we have sent through the FAA Academy in, say, the past year would be people that were already our employees. We have not gone to the street to hire people and send them through.

We have sent through some people that came out of the cooperative education program where they work for the FAA for six months and go to school—about 84 of those in the past 15 to 16 months. We converted about 30 of the air traffic assistants to controllers, those that were eligible, and that is basically the people that have been through the Academy.

Mr. HORN. As I remember Mr. Klink's statistics, the Beaver trains at the rate of 14 a semester and there were about 70 people that had various jobs in the community because they were not hired by the FAA.

What I would like you to file for the record are the data from both your academy in terms of number that you have had complete the course successfully in the last four years and the five institutions or six that includes Beaver County Community College by name of institution as to how many have they completed.

Do they take an examination after they get out before you consider them for the controllership?

Mr. POLLARD. They take the OPM written exam which is basically just a written exam. They do not take anything other than that. They are employed by us.

Mr. HORN. Okay. Then we need to know how many have satisfactory completed the academic program. How many took the examination. How many passed it. How many were hired by the FAA.

Mr. POLLARD. If I might just clarify one thing, sir. They are not—I understand where you are coming from and I will fulfill your requirement, but they are not even eligible for us to hire unless they pass their exams. So when Beaver says there are 70 available, they have gone through all that process. Those that couldn't pass it have been screened out. But we will get that data.

Mr. HORN. Give us the data that is comparable because, obviously, the obvious next question is: Is the FAA trying to protect its academy against the one that is complete from the five or six institutions. And just, simply, let's take a look at it see what that is.

[The following was received from Mr. Pollard:]

The following is a breakdown of persons who have successfully completed the ATC course, taken the OPM exam and been hired since 1990:

	Completed	Took Exam	Passed	Hired
FAA Academy	2674*	2674**	2674	2672
Mid America Aviation Resource Consortium (MARC)	205	205	205	163
Community College of Beaver County (CCBC)	101	96	96	34
Hampton University	35	35	35	1
University of Alaska	10	10	9	5
University of North Dakota	10	10	10	0

* of 4912 persons who entered

** Only individuals who have already passed the OPM exam are hired by the FAA to enter the FAA Academy

Notes on Collegiate Training Initiative Institutions.

- Several students from various schools did not meet the medical and security requirements.
- Only MARC and CCBC graduated students prior to May 1993.

Mr. HORN. Let me move to one more question, Mr. Chairman, if I might, and that is the idea of this locality pay. Now, as I understand it, the program expires in June of this year.

Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. HORN. And the President did not request a renewal this year or last year. And last year, I believe the Appropriations Committee did provide the money; was that correct?

Mr. POLLARD. We were going to terminate the program early and the Appropriations Committee did provide the funding to carry us through the five-year period, which ends in June of this year.

Mr. HORN. Now, is there any intent of the FAA to seek that money? Does it wish to have it and was it simply turned down at OMB or what?

Mr. POLLARD. Well, I can't address the OMB part. I will say that we did not request that within the FAA. Ruth may want to talk about that some, but we feel like it cost us $20 to $22 million a year. The bottom line is it has not been cost-effective. I can show you numbers of people that we have that were there when we initiated the program. In some ways, it has been beneficial, but it hasn't done for us everything that we expected for that amount of money.

In addition to that, I think there are other things that come into play here a little bit. You mentioned the locality pay there, not the 20 percent level, but in certain areas, 8 percent, 5 percent. There has been legislation passed. We have the authority now to pay the locality pay which softens the impact of the termination. Obviously, there is a lot of difference between 20 percent and 8 percent, if employees actually lose that.

Going back to the discussion we had earlier, they are not necessarily at these types of facilities, but we have a lot of applicants out there now, not necessarily from the CTI, but with former controllers. Some former controllers have worked in these facilities, so that if we actually had a staffing problem, we could reach out to those people for those facilities.

Mr. HORN. So the reason it was initiated, originally, is because it was hard to keep the work force you had given the salaries, given the cost of living in the local; is that the rationale?

Mr. POLLARD. I would say generally, yes, that is accurate. The cost of living, although it wasn't a cost of living adjustment, certainly was a factor in making the facility hard to staff as it was classified at the beginning of the demo.

Mr. HORN. Now you find yourself with a surplus of people interested in working even if it is a high cost of living; is that it?

Mr. POLLARD. I would only debate the surplus but I guess I would have to agree with that, yes, sir. We have 4,500 people out there that are former controllers and I think they would be interested in employment in almost any location.

Mr. HORN. Okay. If you could give us your best shot as to what would the lack of that do. That must be why you are saying it isn't necessary to your retention versus the cost of training when you get new people in, and I assume you considered that originally when this was advocated that you could save on quality work force, not have them leave for other jobs out of sheer frustration or move

away from the area when these are usually expensive urban areas that have heavy traffic.

Am I missing something here?

Mr. POLLARD. No, sir. I think you are right there and we can provide that data. The people impacted the most, obviously, weren't those that already lived there when we implemented. It was a lot of our newer employees going in that just simply couldn't afford to live in some of those areas on the beginning salary.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman's time has expired. There will be another round of questioning for Members.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Levy.

Mr. LEVY. If I might, I guess I am going to pick up where Congressman Horn left off. The district that I represent, depending on which survey you look at, is represented as the most expensive part of the country in which you can live, or the second. It is also home to New York TRACON, and up the road, not in the district, although it affects all of our people, is the New York Air Route Traffic Control Center.

Maybe you could elaborate for us because I am at a loss. And I can tell you that there are some morale problems associated with the elimination of this payroll demonstration project.

Maybe you could elaborate on your earlier statement that the program, for what it cost, didn't do some of the things that you thought it would do. What are some of the things that it doesn't do that you thought it would do which would warrant eliminating the program.

Mr. POLLARD. These numbers are fairly accurate, but they may not be exact, not just as to air traffic employees but others in those areas that receive pay demo. In air traffic initially when the program was implemented, there were some 2,100 or so of those people that actually received a 20 percent.

Now, in spite of the 20 percent from pay demo, we have still assigned people there as their first assignment, so the 20 percent doesn't necessarily attract people, say, from Atlanta to go to Chicago or to go to New York TRACON and work. We hope that we would get some of that movement, as you said, a highly trained controller that would be wanting to go there.

Mr. LEVY. What about keeping the people you have?

Mr. POLLARD. Well, we didn't lose that many people before, Congressman. Obviously there was some retention as far as people that perhaps were going to retire, not only in the controller work force, but in the management and supervisory and support staff that chose to stay because of the 20 percent.

And I agree fully that, obviously, it will have a morale impact because it is a considerable reduction in salary.

Mr. LEVY. It sounds to me—it sounds like some of the employees there, what you are saying, when we needed you, we were willing to pay you. And now that there is a glut of you, if you don't like taking the cut in pay, too bad.

What don't I understand about what you are saying?

Mr. POLLARD. Well, not to debate that issue, but it was a five-year program going in, and I think most everyone knew that.

Mr. LEVY. I would be very interested in some of the statistics that you have already agreed to provide to Congressman Horn. It is hard to imagine for me, and maybe you can prove me wrong, that you can retrain new people and get them in as people leave the system because the pay is inadequate in that region.

There also is an element of fairness, I think, to be paying folks in that community and in some of the other communities like Chicago and the other areas that were targeted under the pay demonstration program, the same thing that is being paid for similar work in areas where it really is much less expensive to live.

Mr. POLLARD. Fine.

Mr. LEVY. Thank you.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Inhofe.

Mr. INHOFE. Mr. Chairman, I don't have any questions other than just one. And I had to be gone for a few minutes, maybe you discussed this. Getting back just for a moment to the suggestion of the government corporation in the air traffic controllers, but what I have been attempting to do is get some budget figures to see so I could anticipate what recommendations are going to come up on that.

I have noticed that even in the Republican budget proposal, Mr. Kasich also has a very similar proposal and yet while they talk about effecting certain savings, when we call over to get figures, we are not able to get them because they don't come by that line.

Are figures available that would be affected by those functions that would be transferred to a government corporation and the cost of those so we could start looking at those anticipating receiving the recommendation of the FAA?

Mr. BRODERICK. Mr. Inhofe, they are not available yet. All of the decisions haven't been made, even on exactly how to structure the program by the working group that is doing that, and I expect by April they will be available sometime.

Mr. INHOFE. I noticed that I believe it was in the Vice President's proposal, he did actually have some numbers that he anticipated a savings that would be affected. Then today I saw the figure $12 billion being used over a period of five years as to savings that could be affected, and I don't know where that figure came from.

If I gave you that stuff, could you at least give me your analysis as to how would you think that was calculated?

Mr. BRODERICK. We could only speculate on it. I don't know what the source of the figures is and, as I say, we don't even have yet all of the information available on how the corporation or organization might be structured so that we could run those calculations. But as soon as the work group does it, we will have that.

Mr. INHOFE. Of what has been proposed so far, it is my understanding that would be those personnel involved in air traffic control in the FAA that would be transferred to the corporation.

Now, if that were true, those figures would be available, wouldn't they, because we would be talking about payroll figures?

Mr. BRODERICK. Well, actually, not really, because it turns out that it is a lot more difficult than you might think to define what you mean by air traffic control. Does that include R&D? Does it include all the systems development people? Does it include all of

Airway Facilities? Does it include flight inspection? Those are the kinds of debates that are going on to literally draw those lines.

Mr. INHOFE. To answer that question, then, we would have to know what they have in mind so we have the cart before the horse. I am not saying in this criticism, but I want to get some figures so I can at least examine some of the proposals that are anticipating the cost savings.

Mr. BRODERICK. You are exactly right, so we haven't made a decision.

Mr. INHOFE. Sometime in April or so.

Mr. BRODERICK. It is my understanding that the work group will be finished in April and make the recommendations to the Secretary. Yes, sir.

Mr. INHOFE. Fine. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. We hope it proceeds with as much due speed and deliberation as some. Appointments have proceeded, maybe we will get it after this Congress.

Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

A couple of quick questions. I noticed that one of your missions here is to reduce senior management and hopefully to reach a level, a ratio of one—well, are you at one-to-six right now as far as the supervisory employer ratio?

Mr. BRODERICK. Approximately overall, that is correct, sir.

Mr. MICA. Has there been any progress since last year in changing that?

Mr. BRODERICK. Yes, there has.

Mr. MICA. Are you at one-to-seven now? Because in order to get this one-to-twelve by 1999, it looks like you are going to have to add a couple of—actually lose a significant number of supervisors-to-employee ratios.

Mr. BRODERICK. Yes. Likely either through attrition or the buyout that we hope is going to be passed by the Congress to be reducing the number of managers and we hope to reassign them to nonmanagement, nonsupervisory positions if they are still with the Agency.

Mr. MICA. One of the things that disturbs me in the proposal is that the Washington headquarters and field offices, up to 50 percent reduction by 1999, also reaching these supervisor-employee ratios by 1999. Didn't it seem like you should be cutting from the top first?

Mr. BRODERICK. I am sorry. You said does it seem?

Mr. MICA. Wouldn't it seem that we should be reversing this order, that we should be slicing from the administrative fat first?

Mr. BRODERICK. That is actually what we are doing. All of us, as I mentioned in my prepared testimony, the Airway Facilities organization has worked for several years on a complete restructuring of their organization.

Mr. MICA. Well, how many will be gone by when?

Mr. BRODERICK. Arch, do you have the numbers on Airway Facilities?

Mr. ARCHILLA. Mr. Mica, we just completed, as you suggested, a realignment of our headquarters functional areas, and the intent is

to reach a supervisory ratio by the end of 1995 of ten-to-one and by 1999 of fifteen-to-one.

Mr. MICA. Do we have with us like the staff, by all the GSA?

Mr. ARCHILLA. By different grades?

Mr. MICA. Yes.

Mr. ARCHILLA. Yes.

Mr. MICA. We have that here so we can track that to see if you are performing?

Mr. ARCHILLA. Yes, sir.

Mr. MICA. One of the other questions I have real quickly, I guess there has been previous testimony relating to the large number of maintenance technicians that are eligible to retire. I am wondering, we also have before us a buyout provision which I hadn't at least initially supported.

I am concerned about the impact of a buyout provision passing and also a potential shortage, an existing shortage, and even more acute shortage as a result of a measure like that.

Does anyone want to respond?

Mr. BRODERICK. Let me try that. As a general rule, the buyout is going to be targeted at management, supervisors, and administrative support. We are not going to offer buyouts to the safety work force. We are not going to offer it to air traffic controllers or flight standards inspectors, certificate engineers or Airway Facilities technicians the opportunity to retire. Those are the work forces that we are protecting and preserving so that we can perform our most essential mission.

Mr. MICA. Well, the only other thing, Mr. Chairman, and something that concerns me is, you know, I favor looking at the privatization of FAA, but I am a little bit concerned that in the process, that there may not be some protections for eliminating some of the overhead and bulk that that mission may get lost as far as the high administrative staff.

Usually in the process of any of these conversions or government cutting, the poor guy that is down there doing the work is the first one out the door. And then the guys at the top were usually feathering and saving their own nest, so I am a little bit concerned about that, Mr. Chairman. I don't know what you are looking towards if we go in that direction.

Mr. BRODERICK. We would see exactly that kind of concern in our offices as well, and that is why, as I testified earlier today, we are protecting those work forces and targeting exactly the work force elements that you highlight for the reductions so that we will not only reduce the number of employees, but improve the supervisor-to-work force ratios.

Mr. MICA. I would love to ask about the FAA air controller thing, but that would take the rest of the hearing.

Mr. Chairman. I yield back. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, it doesn't exist yet, so they probably can't answer the question that you might want to ask, thankfully. How much——

Mr. MICA. Mr. Chairman, the problem, I am developing an institutional memory due to your ability to educate us on some of these issues previously.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

How many ATAs are there—air traffic assistants are there in the system?

Mr. POLLARD. We have slightly over 600 now.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And you are indicating some of those are moving on to air traffic controller training?

Mr. POLLARD. In the past few months, we have had about 28 that were selected and went on to be air traffic controllers.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Generally at en route centers, how many controllers do you have side by side today? Two, three?

Mr. POLLARD. Well——

Mr. OBERSTAR. You have two controllers and an ATA?

Mr. POLLARD. No, sir. The center is one of the places where we would retain some ATA's. They basically work with flight data and the flight data strips coming off the printers. They stuff them in the strip holders and take them to the appropriate sectors, and they usually work flight data for several sectors.

They are not actually plugged in doing anything with airplanes. In some of our terminal facilities, they work a clearance delivery position where they relay clearances to pilots.

Mr. OBERSTAR. All right. How long do you calculate it takes for a controller to reach PFL standing today from the time you take a developmental on board?

Mr. POLLARD. I will give you a couple of answers to that question. For instance, in the smaller facilities, from the time they leave the training facility—say that is Oklahoma City or Beaver—it is just a matter of months, generally four to six months.

If we put people into an en route facility, it can take three, three-and-a-half years. Some people do it much quicker. When we had a large training backlog and we were doing a lot of hiring these people had to compete for training time because the way we teach these people to be controllers, is to have an experienced controller training a developmental one. It is a one-on-one training.

If you are competing for training on those positions, it extends the training time. Today we don't have a huge backlog. I would say our en route facilities, someone that is capable has the opportunity to probably do it in three years.

We don't do much direct assignment into our large terminal facilities because we can select from the various levels of facilities, and bring them into the busier facilities.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Over time, it is down as compared to the mid-1980s?

Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. What is the total amount of overtime being worked today?

Mr. POLLARD. In, 1992, in the centers and towers, it was about 286,000 hours. In 1993, it decreased to around 220,000 hours. If you want to equate that to work years, that is in the neighborhood of 120 work years with which we are supplementing a 17,000-plus work force.

We expect that in 1995, as we start to get some of our new equipment delivery and training, we may have to use some overtime. It might go up to about the 1992 levels, but it has been reduced by about 45 percent in the past five years. In fact, I guess if we were

to be criticized, we may be criticized from a systems standpoint of using too little overtime.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That raises the question of how many hours are controllers working continuously at controls without a break?

Mr. POLLARD. Well, we have——

Mr. OBERSTAR. Let's take centers first.

Mr. POLLARD. We have an agreement with our union, unless unusual circumstances occur, that we rotate them every two hours and usually there is some type of a break between that.

Generally speaking, controllers in this environment spend about five hours out of their shift on position. In the terminal environment it is about the same, about 4.8, 4.9. Smaller facilities, obviously, because of the lack of flexibility that some of the larger facilities have, generally spend more time on position.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are you reaching a point of overload, of controllers working too many hours continuously at controls?

Mr. POLLARD. No, sir. As I said earlier, even with that five hours time on position, we have adequate staffing. If you look at the system in general, you can see overtime is down and delays are down at 125,000 since a couple of years ago. The work force is stabilized.

Overtime, as I mentioned, is down considerably. In addition to that, we have been able to afford to permit employees in a lot of the facilities to work alternate work schedules, which should be resource neutral but often isn't. Sometimes it is a benefit to us as well as a detriment because it has staffing implications and we have been able to do other things, for instance, working with our union and the Quality Through Partnership Employee Involvement Program, getting people to participate in that and help us in our decision-making process and help us determine what their future is.

Mr. OBERSTAR. How many operational errors reported for 1998?

Mr. POLLARD. For fiscal year 1993, I believe that number was 742 versus 741 the previous year. If you looked at calendar 1993 versus calendar 1992, it would show more of an increase because in the last quarter of calendar year 1993, there was kind of a rise for a few weeks there.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are you counting as operational errors those situations where a controller pulled him or herself off the board and/or was pulled off the board by a supervisor?

Mr. POLLARD. If I am following that question, sir, we are talking operations, where our separation criteria was violated and there are certain conditions when that happens. If you have a controller that has less than an 80 percent separation, then for the most part, the controller would be pulled off, go through a recertification and examination of the error, what caused the error. In some cases, that would not occur if it was less or if you had more than 80 percent of the separation.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If I go back to hearings held in 1989 and the Survey Feedback Action Program comment sheets, at that time, there were reports from controllers that there were operational errors occurring that were not being reported. Of course, that was the subject of our hearing. You came back and reported to us in the hearing and you were taking measures then.

Mr. POLLARD. We haven't come back to inquire of this program, principally because we haven't had a large number of complaints about it, but your question is, what steps were taken, and are they still in place, to assure that operational errors are being accurately reported and appropriate action being taken and a controller taken from position, retrained, and put back in position.

I think there are a couple of answers and I would just like to clarify the meaning of "operational error". I don't want to cause terror in the hearts of people listening to this. If we require five-mile separation and the controller permits that separation to diminish to, say, 4.8 or 4.7, that is technically an operational error.

What we have in our en route facilities, is a computer-assisted operational detection program where a controller could look and not realize that they had a 4.8 or a 4.7 mile separation, but think they had five mile separation. The computer can detect that so we basically get—for lack of a better word—an alarm. And it is almost impossible to not report or cover those up.

In the terminal environment, we don't have that same capacity in our software, but occasionally we do discover an incident through a complaint from a pilot where something wasn't reported. When that happens, we go back and investigate it. It becomes part of the system and we take appropriate disciplinary action, whether it is against a controller or a supervisor.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are there any centers that you would characterize as having a greater number of operational errors than others?

Mr. POLLARD. I just don't have that data in front of me.

Mr. OBERSTAR. We have the report by month throughout the system, but I would like to have that by unit, by center.

[The following was received from Mr. Pollard:]

Listed below are the operational errors by center (ARTCC) for 1993 and 1994:

Facility	CY 1993	CY 1994 (as of 3/23/94
Albuqueque	10	6
Anchorage	6	0
Chicago	22	6
Boston	20	3
Washington	57	17
Denver	16	3
Fort Worth	22	11
Honolulu	0	1
Houston	13	2
Indianapolis	26	7
Jacksonville	23	6
Kansas City	13	2
Los Angeles	22	5
Salt Lake City	8	1
Miami	8	5
Memphis	19	3
Minneapolis	12	0
New York	45	5
Oakland	14	5
Cleveland	30	2
Seattle	8	0
Atlanta	36	7
Total	430	97

Mr. POLLARD. I can get you that information, sir, and I can tell you in the past that, normally, it doesn't stay with one facility, a facility may have three or four for whatever reason and then it would kind of move on. It is not something where there is a historical trend. If there are facilities like that we will certainly identify that.

[The following was received from Mr. Pollard:]

The following reflects the details of a telephone conversation between Mr. Bill F. Jeffers, Deputy Associate Administrator for Air Traffic, and Subcommittee staff, during the week following the hearing.

Full performance level staffing at both the New York (ZNY) and Washington Center (ZDC) Air Route Traffic Control Centers is at an all-time post-strike high. New York is 9 controllers below its 357 controller work force (CWF) authorized level, or at 97 percent of its authorized CWF staffing. Washington Center is at 100+ percent of its authorized CWF staffing, with one person more than its authorized level of 431.

In examining the last six months of leave use at both centers, ZNY was found to have isolated instances of traumatic leave not considered to be problematic. Leave use at ZDC is of concern because of 26 separate requests for trauma leave. Sixty-one percent, or 16 of these requests, were related to operational errors. Management has initiated plans that include assigning additional personnel to its quality assurance office, conducting an airspace study to evaluate options and procedures, and assessing the impact of the current transition from seven areas to six areas in the ARTCC.

Operational error reduction and quality assurance are always a top priority. FAA is currently using its Quality Through Partnership (QTP) processes in the facility for a team-centered approach, involving management, the controllers' union, and employees, to identify problems, causes, and solutions to the leave and operational error issues. This will involve additional QTP and quality assurance resources, which have been committed to this effort.

Mr. OBERSTAR. We have a report from a source which is not to be identified that Washington Center has seen service deteriorate over the last two years and a significant percentage of work force either medically disqualified or controllers on traumatic leave due to system errors.

Mr. POLLARD. Without knowing specifically the data that is alluded to there, sir, I can tell you that——

Mr. OBERSTAR. Can you provide us a report on Washington Center.

Mr. POLLARD. Sir?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Provide us a report.

Mr. POLLARD. I sure can, but I would also like to say, we monitor these facilities, and I have no apprehension at all about what is happening at Washington Center from a safety standpoint. There may be other issues there that would cause someone to be disgruntled.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Over the next two to three years, as the economy improves, we will see air traffic growing in response to more confidence, more business travel, more leisure travel. I don't think we will experience a 20 percent growth which was the question we asked a few years ago. Which of your facilities could experience a growth of up to 20 percent without a change in traffic growth and without a change in numbers of controllers? What will happen with a 5 or 6 percent growth in traffic?

Can the system handle that with the planned level of controllers?

Mr. POLLARD. I think what we have proposed would at least at this point, looking ahead as best we can, handle the anticipated growth. It is anticipated from an operational standpoint that traffic

would be substantially the same as fiscal year 1990; initially contracting out and reassigning those people to busier facilities.

In 1996 and 1997, we are proposing hiring 100 additional people and then that is what we think it would take, actually, to accommodate the growth and we are comfortable with those initial proposals.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I will stop at that point and go back to Mr. Inhofe.

Mr. INHOFE. I will pass.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. I will pass.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Mica.

Mr. MICA. I just had a quick question. I noticed the staffing level charts that are prepared. I guess these are prepared by our staff. But those don't seem to reflect what is really going on and maybe—and staff told me that the employment figures or staffing levels don't reflect the contracted positions; is that correct?

Mr. BRODERICK. They do, sir. If you look at the 1994 versus 1995 air traffic controller line, you will see a reduction from 1994 to 1995, and that does take into account the contract tower program.

Mr. MICA. Then the full number you have in 1995 would that be 13—17,300?

Mr. BRODERICK. Air traffic controllers; that is correct.

Mr. MICA. Don't you have another one, 165 you contracted out in 1994, and 223.

Mr. POLLARD. That is right if you want to look at the overall number of controllers in the system as we count them today. In other words, an equivalent of that 17,523 would be 17,488.

Mr. MICA. But to look at these figures, you really need to look at any of the positions that are also contracted out.

Mr. POLLARD. That is FAA work force plus the contract work force would have to be added.

Mr. MICA. I understand that is going to come into us by April, so we would be able to look at contracted—the people who are performing the function that are full-time equivalent or whatever it is and the contracted folks.

Mr. BRODERICK. Yes. Your staff has asked for that. We are going to provide that.

[The following was received from Mr. Broderick:]

The FAA does not maintain information on specific staffing levels at contract towers. However, there are 30 contract towers, with approximately four to five controllers per tower. We, therefore, estimate that there are approximately 165 workers staffing these towers, including managers. FAA periodically evaluates each contract tower to ensure that staffing levels are adequate to maitain a safe air traffic system.

Mr. MICA. You are going to provide that. Okay. The other item is also these charts. You know that I am not sure what the—this is staffing levels proposed in the President's budget. This 15.4 percent, it says other. It is a big others. Can you explain that?

Mr. BRODERICK. Well, you are looking at the air traffic control maintenance, aviation. Others include things like security, the airports office, policy office, international office, environmental quality office. They are all relatively small but they add up to that number there.

Mr. MICA. Also, are we getting percentages or will we get percentages to show where the proposed cuts or as far as administrative staff to staff employee staff ratios in, I guess, some kind of a proposal to go along with this——

Mr. BRODERICK. Okay. We can——

Mr. MICA [continuing]. In each of these areas?

Mr. BRODERICK. We can certainly provide that. We have provided gross numbers in the testimony, but we can certainly provide that. What you are looking at there is the overall agency number.

Mr. MICA. Okay.

[The following was received from Mr. Broderick:]

Changes in staffing levels for the different work forces comprising the Operations Appropriation are as follows:

Work force	Fiscal year—		Change from 1994 to 1995 (in percent)
	1994 proposed [1]	1995 estimate	
Controller work force	17,523	17,300	−1.3
Field maintenance	8,406	8,200	−2.5
Aircraft certification	826	900	+9.0
Flight standards	3,303	3,534	+7.0
Civil aviation security	812	812	0
Airports	496	496	0
Subtotal special interest workforce	31,366	31,242	−0.4
Air traffic (non-CWF)	8,178	8,011	−2.0
Airways facilities (non field maint.)	1,123	1,074	−4.4
NAS logistics	1,267	1,221	−3.6
Aviation certification and regulation PD&E	39	38	−2.5
Aviation standards	1,165	1,138	−2.3
NAS design and management	535	524	−2.1
Direction staff and support services	1,283	1,243	−3.1
Human resource management	1,339	1,291	−3.6
Headquarters administration	503	493	−2.0
Subtotal "other"	15,432	15,033	−2.6
Total operations appropriation	46,798	46,275	−1.1

[1] As far as FTE's are concerned, the agency will be a full 6 percent below the fiscal year 1993 enacted level at the end of fiscal year 1995. This represents a reduction of 3,079 FTE. Regarding staffing in 1996–1999, FAA's staffing will be reevaluated annually within the target provided to the Secretary for the Department as a whole.

Mr. MICA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Kim.

Mr. KIM. Yes. I have just a couple of simple questions. I heard a while ago that you have—you have reduced your staff by 45 percent in the last five years?

Mr. POLLARD. No, sir. That was an overtime reduction of 45 percent.

Mr. KIM. And all the tables that I have seen here were primarily for the specialized work force, right?

Mr. BRODERICK. That is correct, sir.

Mr. KIM. Your reduction is primarily management: 10 percent managerial and 25 percent upper management level.

Mr. BRODERICK. Yes. The long-term staffing reductions will be taken in management and administrative support staff, not in those special work forces that provide safety and security functions, sir.

Mr. KIM. And you tried to cut by half, I guess, the supervisor and employee ratio up to one-to-twelve. Is that a normal ratio at other agencies?

Mr. BRODERICK. It is more of a ratio that, according to the National Performance Review, is typical of a business operation. Of course, there is a wide spectrum of government agency ratios. Ours is relatively high or low—a lot of supervisors and managers—in the FAA compared to what can be achieved with streamlining. As we have seen in the Airway Facilities restructuring, it is a good example for the rest of us to follow.

Mr. KIM. This cut wouldn't hurt your operations?

Mr. BRODERICK. Not the delivery of safety services, no, sir. That is exactly what we are aiming to do.

Mr. KIM. My last question is: Why have you been operating at a one-to-six ratio all this time?

Mr. BRODERICK. That is a very good question and I think it is because we hadn't focused on the way that government services could be delivered. We also hadn't had, frankly, the opportunities to think in different terms that were presented by, for example, the Office of Personnel Management chopping, literally, thousands of pages of personnel regulations out.

That means that the personnel staff in the FAA doesn't have to deal with those personnel regulations and it means that administrative support staff in organizations like people that are represented at this table don't have to deal with the personnel people who were dealing with the Office of Personnel Management. And it is complete, large-scale government restructuring that is going to help achieve this. It is not just one simple thing in the FAA.

Mr. KIM. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Kim.

You have cited 25 Towers that are selected for contracting out. Do you have those tower—those cities available?

Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir.

Mr. BRODERICK. We can provide those for the record if you would like, sir.

[The following was received from Mr. Broderick:]

The 25 FAA Level 1 VFR Towers to be contracted in FY 1994 are:

1. Tuscaloosa, Alabama; 2. Texarkana, Arkansas; 3. Palmdale, California; 4. Salinas, California; 5. Groton, Connecticut; 6. Hartford-Brainard, Connecticut; 7. New Haven, Connecticut; 8. Panama City, Florida; 9. Molokai, Hawaii; 10. Lewiston, Idaho; 11. Pocatello, Idaho; 12. Alton, St. Louis, Illinois; 13. Salina, Kansas; 14. Alexandria-Esler, Louisiana; 15. Hagerstown, Maryland; 16. Westfield-Barnes, Massachusetts; 17. Detroit City, Michigan; 18. Meridian, Mississippi; 19. Cincinnati-Lunken, Ohio; 20. Salem, Oregon; 21. Isla Grande, Puerto Rico; 22. Greenville, South Carolina; 23. Brownsville, Texas; 24. Stinson, Texas; and 25. Charlottesville-Albermarle, Virginia.

Mr. OBERSTAR. On what basis was that decision made?

Mr. POLLARD. We have over 100 Level I facilities. We actually formed a committee working with NATCA, the controller union, to go out and survey the employees in these facilities. We asked them when they would want to move, and we gave consideration to selecting those facilities where most of them said they wanted to move in fiscal year 1994. We considered where we could basically satisfy the desires to some extent of the employees, because not

only are we moving them out—I would say as we are promoting them out, since they all get a promotion of at least one grade. Some will be promoted multiple grades, and a lot of those folks want to leave.

So we took that into consideration, along with the amount of the traffic, and identified the first 25, which I think you may have for the record but, if not, we will certainly send it.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You are giving me information that is important, but I am not—I don't think you are answering my question——

Mr. POLLARD. I will try again.

Mr. OBERSTAR [continuing]. Which is on what basis were those towers selected, why those 25 and not some other 25? Was it the level of traffic? Is it the nature of the tower?

Mr. POLLARD. Okay. Well, first of all, all of the towers that we looked at are low activity VFR towers. They have the lowest density of traffic that we have in our system. We surveyed all of those and then we selected the 25 based on, to some extent, the amount of traffic, but primarily the employees' desires to go ahead and get out.

We wanted to have a program that would contract out those facilities and one where our employees would support the contracting out of those facilities. Those are a couple of factors that we used.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Some of these have as many as 130,000 operations a year. Those are fairly busy towers.

Mr. POLLARD. Right.

Mr. OBERSTAR. In that program, you have encouraged the contractors to seek out and hire former PATCO controllers and I was wondering since the President did the right, decent, honorable and courageous thing to lift the hiring ban and FAA is not planning to hire former controllers, wouldn't it make sense to go further and require those contractors to hire these people in order to validate the President's commitment to provide a meaningful opportunity for those controllers?

Mr. POLLARD. In the 31 contract towers that we already have out there, the contractors have employed the former controllers, i.e., PATCO controllers. We certainly will take that back and look at it. It is something that we have not really focused on. I think, as far as us requiring it, that is something we would have to explore. We would certainly be willing to do that.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think there is a responsibility to act in that manner. We have a 15-minute vote which is down for four minutes now followed by a series of five-minute recorded votes.

So we will have a fairly long interlude during which time we will relocate and resume as soon as we can. That will be in the main committee hearing room 2167.

The subcommittee will stand in recess. We are also going to reshuffle the witness schedule a bit in light of the late hour here and the unanticipated number of votes.

[Recess.]

The subcommittee will resume its sitting in anticipation of further votes. We have significantly changed the order of procedure here.

When we broke, I was asking questions about the contracting out and I would like to follow that earlier question with inquiry about

where those controllers will go when they are removed from towers that are to be contracted out, and apparently from your testimony, those 900 positions over the next several years are going to be fed back into the system to elsewhere in FAA to replace retiring controllers so that you do not have to hire new people.

Mr. POLLARD. Yes, sir, that is correct. And I would not want to present this as a done deal, but we are working with NATCA, the same committee I mentioned earlier that worked with us, in identifying these sites to determine how this process will work.

We have received some approvals from OPM, where normally we would have to advertise a job and select these people because all of the reassignments will have promotional potential, to where we can do a direct placement. We are working with NATCA and those affected employees asking them to identify four locations of desired employment and then we will work that with each of our regions, both our air traffic divisions and the regional vice president for NATCA.

Our objective, overall, is to assign those people where we can utilize them in the system, giving them meaningful work, and also making every attempt possible to satisfy the individual employee's needs and circumstances.

Mr. OBERSTAR. How will OMB score what you are proposing to do here for budget purposes?

Mr. BRODERICK. Why don't I let Ms. Leverenz answer that.

Ms. LEVERENZ. The positions will just be filling in behind attrition. So there is not really any financial scoring.

Mr. OBERSTAR. They will score this as freeze—they will score that as a hard freeze.

Ms. LEVERENZ. Not a hard freeze in the safety work force because we are backfilling in the safety work force with those people who are being contracted out.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If it stays at whatever the number is, 17,688——

Ms. LEVERENZ. Well, that is because the requirement for the Level I controllers offsets that. We will not be backfilling in level ones. Those will be contracted out.

Mr. OBERSTAR. As you contract stations out, OMB would score that as a savings?

Ms. LEVERENZ. Yes.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And you take those FAA controllers who choose not to remain at the station or do not want to be hired by a contractor and move them to another position. You are not losing; you are staying even. For budget purposes that is a no growth.

Ms. LEVERENZ. Well, ultimately, though, after the four years are up, after four years of contracting out 25 each year, you have a reduced overall requirement of about 900 controllers. So it is a savings and that is offset by the cost of the contract.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Not dollar for dollar, though.

Ms. LEVERENZ. Not dollar for dollar, no. It is cheaper to contract it out.

Mr. OBERSTAR. How much would you save on a tower?

Ms. LEVERENZ. I think it is in the neighborhood of $200,000 per tower per year.

Mr. OBERSTAR. $200,000 per year more or less depending on the size of the tower, number of operations, number of controllers.

Ms. LEVERENZ. Right, that is an average figure.

Mr. OBERSTAR. All right. We are going to have to suspend here at this point and—I am told on the Floor there are going to be additional recorded votes yet this afternoon. There are other witnesses from out of town that I would like to hear tonight and my staff will work with you on a time when we can come back and convene again, tomorrow hopefully, or next week. But we need to pursue a number of areas that we have not been able to cover here today.

But before you go, there was a matter, Mr. Broderick, of some very big concern to me and that is the report from the Inspector General concerning unapproved parts in the inventory foreign and domestic repair stations. That, I consider to be a serious matter of great concern, and I would like to know what actions are being taken to deal with this problem.

Mr. BRODERICK. Mr. Chairman, we consider the use of unapproved parts that cause safety problems a very serious matter. But as we have discussed, from time to time in the past, the issue of whether a part is technically unapproved or unsafe is two very different questions. There were three fundamental things that the Inspector General cited in the major report on certification and surveillance of domestic and foreign repair stations.

One of them was a list that was presented by the auditors of standard part numbers that were acquired from unknown manufacturing sources.

The reason that we have a practice of allowing the use of standard parts in the industry is so that you do not have to validate the source of those parts. The part numbers are labeled and the mechanics are able to tell them apart.

The second issue was parts not listed in the current manufacturer's maintenance manual. And, of course, there are other ways to get parts approved into a product without it being listed in the maintenance manual.

And the third was subcontract work that was to unapproved repair stations. But generally, when you look at the details of the report that was done, it was testing. And testing does not necessarily have to be done at an unapproved station.

So we have analyzed that report and are working with the Inspector General's staff to try to come to an agreement on appropriate actions to take. But the one thing I can assure you is that it does not reflect a reduction in safety in any specific instance that we have been able to determine and, of course, we would not allow that kind of situation to develop.

We have a problem with unapproved parts, but our problem is really in definitions and in documentation. We have investigated——

Mr. OBERSTAR. Will you say categorically that there are no unsafe parts?

Mr. BRODERICK. I can tell you there has never been an accident in all the years in commercial aviation, either commuters or airliners, that resulted from an unapproved part. I can tell you of the almost 900 cases we have investigated in the last four years on this program, less than 1 percent of those cases required mandatory

corrective action. And I don't believe that there was any part in an airplane that presented an immediate hazard.

We do not have a safety problem with these parts, what we have is two things: a documentation problem, which is going to require some substantial effort on the part of ourselves and industry to straighten out; and, in addition to the documentation problem, we have some policy differences on what should be done between yourself and the staff of the Inspector General.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I understand the distinction between unapproved unsafe parts, and what I want to be reassured through further inquiry on your part is that these inventories do not include unsafe parts.

We will have to break at this point. I have four minutes now to get to the Floor now and vote, and our next witness will be Mr. Robert Harris for Controllers United, and we will meet with FAA perhaps next week or as soon as we can.

Mr. BRODERICK. Thank you, sir.

[Recess.]

Mr. OBERSTAR. The subcommittee will resume its sitting with the reasonable prospect of getting through this next panel of witnesses without a recorded vote, at least so I have been informed by the Floor manager of the bill.

Mr. Harris, would you identify your associates, please, and welcome to the witness stand. Thank you for your patience. I did not anticipate this many votes and this much interruption today.

TESTIMONY OF BOB HARRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CONTROLLERS UNITED, ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN F. LEYDEN, SECRETARY TREASURER, PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DEPARTMENT, AFL–CIO; STUART G. MORSE, AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLER; ARCHER BAILEY; DAVE ROBERTSON; AND ALFONSO DIAZ DEL CASTILLO

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On my left I have Alfonso Diaz Del Castillo, Archer Bailey, Stu Morse; on my right is John Leyden, Secretary-Treasurer of the PED of the AFL–CIO; Dave Robertson to his right. I thank you for holding over for us and I will try to be brief.

Good afternoon, Chairman Oberstar and Members of the subcommittee. My name is Bob Harris and I am the Director of Controllers United, an organization representing the interests of 11,400 PATCO members fired in 1981. We are pleased to have this opportunity to address this committee hearing on FAA controller staffing for fiscal 1995.

Our members are ready, willing, and able to help restore the air traffic control system. The track record of rehired controllers gives us the confidence to tell you that our expertise can quickly be put to productive use by the FAA. Returned controllers have requalified on an average in four to six weeks instead of the two to three years it normally takes a person without experience. The 1994 ATC system and equipment have changed little since 1981.

Rehiring former controllers will save the American taxpayer in excess of $100,000 per returned full performance level controller and help reduce air traffic delays that are robbing our economy. The opportunity our group presents, Mr. Chairman, to the FAA,

should not be missed. We are, in fact, a wasting asset. Our training was paid for by the American people. We should be put to work because controllers are a vital component of air traffic system capacity and we are needed.

We believe a perverse attitude still exists within segments of the FAA that fired controllers should not be returned to duty. FAA actions to date, despite the smoke screen of openness to rehire, speak louder than their words. We are concerned that the FAA decision not to rehire fired controllers this fiscal year is driven by FAA budget considerations to the detriment of air traffic or manpower needs.

We ask this committee to lead the FAA to action, overcoming what we perceive is a pervasive attitude against rehire by agency bureaucrats.

Chairman Norman Mineta has expressed his view that funding for hiring more controllers "ought to come out of the Aviation Trust Fund," unquote. Once the need for more controllers is established, we ask that you, Mr. Chairman, and the committees of Congress, consider expanding the usage of the trust fund to fund the rehire of controllers that are necessary to improve the ATC system.

Our group, with a median age of 47 years, can bridge the ATC system capacity gap that currently exists and we can do it quickly, with immediate benefits to the flying public, the air transport industry and the American people.

The Aviation Subcommittee on Appropriations has requested the FAA provide an updated staffing standard report, since 1991, without success to date. Our resources allowed us a view of only two air route traffic control centers, Washington and New York. Mr. Chairman, the FAA provided your committee staffing spread sheets in December of 1993 that indicated both Washington and New York centers were staffed above funded standards. However, internal documents that I provided to the committee for both facilities indicate the following:

The funded staffing standard for FPL controllers in New York ARTCC is currently 305 people, while the actual on board number is 228 FPL controllers, plus nine operational controllers as of February 1994. We found a similar situation at Washington center, where the funded standard for FPL controllers is 382 people, while the actual number is 300 as of December 1993.

Our concern is that former controllers are being denied an opportunity to redeem their profession because the FAA has minimized or understated the need for additional controllers based on facility staffing data presented to the committee and the public that can best be described as unclear or may be, in fact, misleading.

We request this committee direct the GAO to revisit the issue of FPL controller staffing levels and staffing standards within the FAA.

We further request that you consider, Mr. Chairman, scheduling a hearing on FAA operations upon receipt of a GAO report to that effect. And in the interest of brevity, we will skip the two charts that we had wanted to go over, and thank you for your demonstrated leadership in seeking to provide the ATC system the country deserves.

We ask that you allow us to add to the record and at the conclusion of our statements we would be happy to answer questions by Members of your committee. Thank you, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much and we certainly will continue to follow up on the questions you have raised with GAO and ascertain all the details that we possibly can add to this aspect of air traffic control staffing.

How long do you think it would take for a former controller, out of the work force as long as all of you have been, which is now going on 13 years, to get back up to full performance level; to check out at all three positions.

Mr. HARRIS. I would say, without being flip, approximately four weeks on the outside and possibly less time for some people that have the ability.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Has there been experience with that already?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, and I provided the Chairman, for the record a document from New York center which indicates, on average, four to six weeks of checkout time to return to full performance standards.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I know a number of controllers fired in 1981 found employment in Canada. How has that worked out for them? Were they able to check out in a short period of time and remain in the work force without difficulties?

Mr. HARRIS. I believe so. I have limited knowledge, but those that have gone to Canada, the few I have known of, have checked out very quickly. On top of that, people that have gone to the Middle East and operated in Desert Storm, operated with great efficiency and dispatch.

The following was received from Mr. Harris:]

Regarding the experience former PATCO controllers had working in Canada; my contract with several former controllers indicated that they had assimilated well and that was my response to you at the hearing. Chairman Oberstar because you raised the question I have inquired of others so that I could better rpresent to you how well the former controllers adapted to the Canadian ATC system. In order to provide you the most accurate material we can, I have enclosed a statement from an American who is currently working as a Canadian air traffic controller. In speaking with Mike Matrone and several other former controllers, we can report the following: The Canadian Government actively recruited Americans in 1988, sending Chief Campbell of Toronto Center to New York to interview several former PATCO controllers. While the Canadian Government viewed fired controllers as a good resource, they had additional reasons for looking to the United States for controllers. Beyond need, Transport Canada apparently wanted to utilize the Americans to straighten their work force out, thereby setting th stage for a hostile work environment for former controllers. Initial problems with the American controllers acceptance in Canada were mainly caused by how Canadian controllers viewed them. Over time and with changing attitudes, the PATCO controllers working in Canada prospered. The Chief volunteered to one person he had interviewed, his opinion that the US Government was leaving the gates to Fort Knox open by not rehiring fired controllers. The number of American controllers involved in the Canadian ATC system was less than thirty-five people with eleven (ten at Toronto) remaining on duty today.

Mr. OBERSTAR. How many applications were submitted to FAA by former controllers when the President lifted the ban last year.

Mr. HARRIS. Four thousand nine hundred forty-two, to be exact. And out of that they discounted 399 for various reasons, either being late filed or career conditional, or, in some cases, not being part of the announcement.

The exact breakdown of ineligibles are as follow: 157 people applied for a grade level above the announcement grade level of GS–9; 101 people termed career conditional were not eligible for reinstatement or transfer; 81 people were not covered by announcement; 41 people filed applications after the 10/15/93 deadeline; 19 people are in hold status, still awaiting further information. We ask the committee, in the spirit of fairness, to seek to have the 101 career conditionals and 157 applicants asking for higher grade declared eligible for purposes of the announcement. So, that left a net total that they considered eligible of 4,543.

Mr. OBERSTAR. How many of those do you think would like to get back into the system, all 4,942?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. No matter what they are doing now.

Mr. HARRIS. In some cases some of these people are professionals, doctors, chiropractors, dentists and they have expressed the view they would like to return.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is really remarkable.

Mr. HARRIS. That is the love of the job.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That is right. It is an incredible story. I will yield at this point to Mr. Clinger.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony. Is it your position that the FAA is now presently understaffed or that it is going to be understaffed at some point in the future because of increasing traffic?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, I believe so, and we brought a person from an active facility, Stu Morse, that can answer that even better than I.

Mr. CLINGER. Do you think it is understaffed now or is this prospective? Do you believe it will be understaffed?

Mr. HARRIS. I believe it is now, but he can answer more fully.

Mr. MORSE. Yes, I work in New York center. I did have testimony that I have submitted here for the record, and I will just go over it real quickly.

For example, last Friday night was March 4th. The area I work in New York center, we include all the departures heading South, Southwest bound out of the New York metropolitan area; all the departures out of the Philadelphia Northeast bound; all the arrivals in the Washington-Baltimore metropolitan area; and the arrivals South into Kennedy and the Boston area.

That is just the area I work. It is normally staffed with 16 controllers. Last Friday night we only had 10 controllers to work the positions. Two people had been granted annual leave and two people called in sick so we were starting two short to begin with.

We had to call in a supervisor from another area to come down and rip strips, because the FAA has eliminated the air traffic, the ATA positions—well, they eliminated a body, but they did not eliminate the position. You still have to get the strips out of the printer and in front of the controller. This was being done by a GS–15 last Friday night.

There is no overtime. They will not call in overtime for staffing. So we have to restrict the traffic. And by restricting that last Friday night we put in 15 miles of trail restrictions on all the depar-

tures, and I don't know how much that cost the airlines because of the excessive restricting that had to be done.

That is the situation down in front of the scopes. Whatever the numbers the FAA puts out and says we are meeting their staffing standards, they are way, way off. That is not the reality of the situation.

Mr. CLINGER. So the fact that overtime is down is not, in your view, any indication that there is adequate staffing?

Mr. MORSE. Overtime is down for one reason and one reason only. New York center, for example again, last year our budget for overtime was $275,000, give or take a few dollars. This year it is $160,000. They just cut it. It is not that we can utilize less, they just cut it so they will not use it at all. They are holding out $160,000 in order to try to accommodate the summer leave they anticipate, which they are not able to do. They are not able to meet the contractual obligations they have in the NATCA contract for two weeks summer leave.

Mr. CLINGER. The GAO in their study has indicated that overall staffing may be adequate, but that there are disparities, in other words, that some are worse off than others and some they are not properly distributed. Some centers might be overstaffed, others understaffed.

Would you accept as a condition of employment assignment to an understaffed facility?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes, sir. And I think we made that point. Chairman Mineta and Chairman Oberstar. We believe that we would be a ready resource and an asset the FAA should be putting to use today. That imbalance they speak of.

Mr. CLINGER. And you would be willing to participate and be assigned to those that are understaffed as a condition.

Mr. HARRIS. Yes.

[The following was received from Mr. Harris:]

Mr. Chairman, since there is a need for additional controllers, particularly in the hard to staff facilities, we ask that you consider the formation of a pilot program composed of rehired controllers mandated by your Committee for placement in the high density, difficult to staff FAA facilities. We recommend rehiring 50 people, on average, in each of the 9 air traffic facilities that are hard to staff. This suggested first step of directing the FAA to action will quickly benefit the ATC system.

Mr. CLINGER. There have been some allegations that FAA has established a quota for the rehiring of former PATCO controllers. Do you believe that or if you do, do you have any evidence that would suggest that is the case?

Mr. HARRIS. They do not call it a quota. They call it a range of values, but the old saying, if it sounds like a duck, walks like a duck, it must be a duck. And in this case that is very appropriate.

The range of values, as I understand it, was to protect the fact that when they do hire, that they would afford the opportunity to some PATCO controllers. It was explained to me had they not put this into place that they would have little-likelihood of anybody that was former PATCO being rehired.

Because of the animus that I mentioned, the pervasive animus inside the Agency—and this was told to me by Herb McClore and Deputy Administrator George Caudill. In fact, the range of values

is there to protect your interests. We were saying why should we be restricted to that and he said actually it is there to protect you.

By instituting 30 to 40 percent, you will at least get that. If we let it go on another basis, nobody would be rehired. And this is right from Herb McClore.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, when you say there is, or quote FAA saying—no, it was your statement, there is animus toward us from the Agency, and then you quoted FAA saying we are doing these things to protect you. Who is that animus coming from? Certainly not the new controllers.

Mr. HARRIS. No, we do not believe so.

Mr. OBERSTAR. They had nothing to do with that era.

Mr. HARRIS. We called attention back in December to one particular regional director named Gary Tucker. He was regional, he is still regional director, and he had made a statement at an open meeting with NATCA that given the choice he would not hire a PATCO controller. In fact, he would have to be ordered to rehire a PATCO controller.

We thought that was so egregious we brought it to the attention of both the administration at the White House level and also FAA, and he has since been transferred. But that was the type of animus that we felt was prevalent and was voiced at an open meeting, and we felt it was not correct.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Let me recognize the Chair of the full committee, Mr. Mineta, former Chair of this subcommittee.

THE CHAIR. Well, first of all, let me thank you for holding these hearings on the FAA budget. I think it is really timely and it makes sure that we have the visibility of the issues involving not only the President's submission, but what the Budget Committee is looking at right now.

I have had a chance on a number of occasions to see this very fine group in my office and I have heard the story, and working with you, Mr. Oberstar, we are trying to see what can be done. But I just want to thank all of you for your past service, your continued forbearance and patience on this issue. There is a valuable resource that is laying there that is unutilized and somehow we have to get you back to the scope.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIR. So, again, thank you very much for taking time from your own busy schedules to be here and to make your presentation. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, we appreciate your being here with us.

You heard the FAA testimony earlier today in response to my question how long it takes to check out a developmental to FPL status: through the range of 18 months to three years. What is your response to that? Do you feel they are on track? Do you feel they are pushing these new trainees too fast or is that number in the ballpark, do you think?

Mr. HARRIS. It is a judgment I can't make, being on the outside. However, when we were working, that would be appropriate. Three years would be an appropriate time. We make the point we could

check out in four to six weeks, which could save the Government and taxpayer $100,000 per returned full performance controller.

And, in fact, looking at 4,942 controllers, if you multiply that by 100,000, we have a half billion dollars of assets that are not being used, in training alone, with former controllers. And so we feel we are a very useful asset that should be utilized and we should be utilized very shortly.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Have any contract towers hired former controllers?

Mr. HARRIS. Yes. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And FAA did not intercede as they have done on other instances where even a contractor for the Federal Government wanted to hire the controller for a program training new controllers and the FAA refused to allow the contractor to hire a former controller.

Mr. HARRIS. Right, that is correct. In fact, when the FAA would take over contract towers, which has happened over the years, they would actually fire the former fired controller. They would refire him rather than let him stay on duty. They would find the need to dispatch him.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That certainly is a level of vindictiveness that is unnecessary. It is inappropriate and it is inhumane, is my attitude.

Well, I am glad you were able to bring action in the case you cited about a regional director who had such an animus, as you put it, toward former controllers. There is no place for that in this Agency.

Mr. HARRIS. Right. Well, we feel he was just voicing what is a prevalent opinion.

Mr. OBERSTAR. At a managerial level.

Mr. HARRIS. He was the eastern regional director. He denied it, but we had a source on two occasions. It was made to NATCA representatives and it was something that was just said. But he was expressing the viewpoint that is very prevalent below the deputy level in the FAA.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, certainly with this contracting out of towers there ought to be—it presents a great opportunity for hiring back controllers, and we will press them on that score and we will press them on other aspects. Because I am not satisfied, despite the testimony, that we have a sufficient level of controllers today to meet not only the demands of today, but the anticipated growth in the system.

We have learned from experience that all too often there has been a downsizing at a very time when demand is on the upswing. Mr. Chairman, while we were encouraged and appreciate your idea of mandating or directing the FAA to action in staffing contract towers with fired controllers, our value to the Air Traffic Control system is primarily our ability to work at the hard to staff, higher density centers and towers. The savings to the taxpayer is maximized if former controllers are placed where they can truly make a difference.

Mr. HARRIS. Mr. Chairman, I would like, if you could take a few moments to listen to John Layden, he has a prepared brief statement.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Fine, and then we will proceed to the next panel.

[Subsequent to the hearing, the following was received from Mr. Harris:]

For Fair Treatment of Former ATC's

Controllers United

Bob Harris
Executive Director

Ross Klecka
National Coordinator

Arch Bailey
Great Lakes Region

Bob Yanda, MN
Dave Parker, WI
Bob Holochar, IN
Jim Pasquales, IL
Alan Thorn, MI

Jim Clarry
Eastern Region

Al Spath, NJ
John Carr, MD
Ron Artis, VA
Jack Anderson, DE
Bill Cipolla, PA

Nils Moberg
Western Pacific Region

John Palmeri, CA
Don Foore, CA
John Lachnowsky, HI
Tom Gandolph, NV
Dan Duffrane, AZ

John Sliwa
Northwest Region

Mike Dubesa, OR
Tom Billings, OR
Tom Thompson, CO
Larry Hagen, UT

Ken Lancaster
Southern Region

Bob DeVaub, FL
Max Boyer, GA
Roy Slanaker, TN
Chuck Thackery, KY
Doug Lester, AL
Vic Cordero, NC

Sam Scales
New England Region

Paul Carmon, MA
Carl Kerns, ME

Bob Ernst
Alaskan Region

Southwest Region

Marge & Floyd Pryor, OK
Carl Henry, AR
Shirley Hiatt, NM
Sal Catalone Sr., LA

Roger Thomas,
Central Region

Rolan Nelson, MO
Norb Strucker, MO

March 15, 1994

The Honorable Jim Oberstar
Chairman
SubCommittee on Aviation
2236 Rayburn HOB
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Oberstar:

Chairman Oberstar on behalf of fired controllers from across the United States I thank you for your generous welcome to testify before the Aviation SubCommittee this past Wednesday. Your statement and supportive manner gave our people a sense of value and the hope they could redeem their profession. Words always seems inadequate for good works but your consistent efforts to obtain a just resolution for our people is deeply appreciated.

For the record, Mr. Chairman since there is a need for additional controllers, particularly in the hard to staff facilities, we ask that you consider the formation of a pilot program composed of rehired controllers mandated by your Committee for placement in the high density, difficult to staff FAA facilities. We recommend rehiring 50 people, on average, in each of the 9 air traffic facilities that will be impacted when the current pay demonstration program (PDP) expires on June 17, 1994. This suggested first step of directing the FAA to action will not only benefit the ATC system but it will break down the logjam of prejudice against rehire within the agency.

While we were encouraged by your idea of mandating or directing the FAA to action in staffing contract towers with fired controllers, our value to the ATC system is that the majority of our group have the ability to work at the hard to staff, higher density centers and towers.

Your question to Mr. Pollard regarding closing towers with 130,000 operations indicated that you were not totally convinced that all the proposed towers should be contracted. The savings of $200,000 per tower Ms. Leverenz testified to may not be realized if even several towers have to be re-certified as FAA facilities because of economic changes. Ms. Leverenz told the Committee that the contracting of the towers would provide 900 people over four years to satisfy or offset attrition needs of the FAA controller work force. How does the FAA know this result, have they surveyed the work force? How many of the people in the targeted towers are eligible to retire? How many would take a transfer or decline a move? Would towers staffed by employees of private firms erode the seamless nature of the ATC system that NATCA calls attention to and thus have safety implications? Did the FAA represent the NATCA position correctly when they testified that the union collaborated in the

decision to contract the towers? There seems to be many questions yet to be answered by an agency that has a history of assertions unsupported by facts (GAO/RCED-93-55).

For the record, we have requested from the FAA a list by facility of controllers eligible to retire. We have been told such records are not maintained at FAA headquarters, but more recently have been advised that projections of controller retirement are available but require the approval of the Administrator before they are released. The GAO has provided us a document that lists the numbers of controllers that have retired in the past 5 years (enclosed).

Controllers United

Bob Harris
Executive Director

Russ Klecka
National Coordinator

Aron Bauey
Great Lakes Region

Bob Yanda, MN
Dave Parker, WI
Bob Holocher, IN
Jim Passiales, IL
Alan Thiem, MI

Jim Clarry
Eastern Region

Al Spath, NJ
John Carr, MD
Ron Artis, VA
Jack Anderson, DE
Bill Cipolla, PA

Nils Moberg
Western-Pacific Region

John Palmieri, CA
Don Poore, CA
John Lichnovsky, HI
Tom Gandolph, NV
Dan Dufresne, AZ

John Shwa
Northwest Region

Mike Dubesa, OR
Tom Billings, OR
Tom Thompson, CO
Larry Hagen, UT

Ken Lancaster
Southern Region

Bob DeVault, FL
Max Boyer, GA
Roy Slanaker, TN
Chuck Thackery, KY
Doug Lesser, AL
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Bob Ernst
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Southwest Region

Marge & Floyd Pryor, OK
Carl Henry, AR
Shirley Hiatt, NM
Sal Catalono Sr., LA

Roger Thomas,
Central Region

Robin Nelson, MO
Norb Stracker, MO

Regarding the Canadian experience of former PATCO controllers; my contact with several former controllers indicated that they had assimilated well and that was my response to you at the hearing. Chairman Oberstar because you raised the question I have inquired of others so that I could better understand how well the former controllers adapted to the Canadian ATC system. In order to provide you the best heads-up material we can, **I have enclosed a statement from an American who is currently working as a Canadian air traffic controller.** In speaking with Mike Matrone and several other former controllers, we can report the following: The Canadian Government actively recruited Americans in 1989, sending Chief Campbell of Toronto Center to New York to interview several former PATCO controllers While the Canadian Government viewed us as a good resource they had multiple reasons for looking to the United States for controllers. Beyond need, they apparently wanted to straighten their work force out, setting the stage for a hostile work environment. There were some problems with the American controllers acceptance in Canada because they were used as a wedge by management and consequently resented by Canadian controllers. The Chief volunteered, to one person he had interviewed, his opinion that the US Government was leaving the gates to Fort Knox open by not rehiring fired controllers. The number of American controllers involved in the Canadian ATC system was less than fifty people with eleven (ten at Toronto) remaining on duty today.

Rather than give you a self serving response to the question of whether a lesson had been learned by fired controllers I let our historical experience speak for itself. In retrospect and not for the record you should personally know how we generally view our experience: Even though many within our group believed they had taken a principled stand, the damage done to our families by our actions in 1981, have been and continues to be a powerful lesson learned. The fired controller would be among the least likely of any American worker to cross a picket line or to strike against the law. Binding arbitration or as former President Nixon suggested in the 1970's, a final best offer arrangement to resolve public sector disputes affecting the public welfare would offer a smart alternative to the devastation created by our experience.

For the record, in the interest of brevity I did not discuss the two charts listed in our statement but will offer the reports to the Committee when it reconvenes on March 17, 1994. The first chart while self-explanatory is based on an extensive report (included as resource material) that I requested be done on the official airline guide (OAG). The conclusion of this report is that airline flights between 10 cities have increased an average of 49% between 1980 and 1993. The report further indicated that flights between identical sets of airports generally take longer in 1993 than in 1980. The second chart based on FAA approved software (NASPAC) requires further information. The NASPAC study examined three days in the ATC system in 1989 and projected delays to be expected at 58 airports in the next 10 years. This

study of a metroplex plan for Dallas / Fort Worth was represented by the FAA as a computer projection of system wide delays both in operational and passenger terms. The chart given to the Committee represented passenger delays at 58 major airports in terms that relate to a 1989 baseline. For example, using the columns under the year 1995, if you had a 15 minute delay in 1989, you could project a 19 min. delay in 1995 if the system was VFR (VMC), 26 min. if the system was heavy IFR (IMC-1, 17hrs. IFR), and 20 min. in moderate IFR (IMC-2, 6 hrs. IFR). The reason for the disparity in delay times between heavy IFR (IMC-1) and moderate IFR (IMC-2) is the heavy IFR will reduce the VFR aircraft component demand on the ATC system. The computer model this study is based on has factored all system modifications planned for the ATC system, such as new runways, and new equipment being completed on schedule. One variable that can reduce the projected increases in system wide delays is additional capacity that would come from adding to the controller work force.

The FAA has developed another computer software package called AIRNET that can provide the cost of delays by airline for each and every in trail flow control restriction employed by the FAA. According to George Caudill, the FAA acting Deputy Administrator for Governmental Affairs, the AIRNET software is not ready for public dissemination. We respectfully request the Chairman seek access to this important information that will bring to light the true costs of the inefficient air traffic system that can be fixed by increasing capacity.

Mr. Chairman in several recent discussions with Administration officials I have been told, point blank, that you are one of the few people that can change the current FAA position on rehire. Your leadership as an advocate of rehire could provide the spark that can gets the FAA off the dime. When we met with David Hinson on November 16, 1993, he mentioned he was being lobbied by Members of Congress and within the FAA on both sides of the rehire issue. We viewed Mr. Hinson as an honest broker after our meeting, but his current position is being influenced by an attorney heavily involved in the 1981 firing. The FAA Administrator is reported to believe that the FAA will not benefit by rehiring former controllers because so much has changed in ATC. This information came to us after a recent meeting between David Hinson and a member of the aviation community and was given to us simply to provide our group heads up on what is driving FAA policy. It is provided to you for the same purpose and not in a malicious way. Unfortunately, little has changed in ATC since 1981 and we have submitted for the record the time taken to check-out by named individual controllers working in NY Center. Despite the position taken by the FAA, we have confidence that your leadership joined by Chairman Mineta and others can resolve the FAA rehire situation in the best interest of the American People.

We hope to return for your reconvened hearing on March 17, 1994, and if the you feel it helpful we will be available to briefly discuss chart #2 that is referenced above.

Sincerely,

Bob Harris

Enclosure

Controllers United

Bob Harris
Executive Director

Russ Klocke
National Coordinator

Arch Bailey
Great Lakes Region

Bob Yanda, MN
Dave Pedrat, WI
Bob Holocher, IN
Jim Pasmales, IL
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Bill Cipolla, PA

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Don Poore, CA
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Dan Dufresne, AZ

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Tom Thompson, CO
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Vic Cordero, NC

Sam Scales
New England Region

Paul Cannon, MA
Carl Kartz, ME

Bob Ernst
Alaskan Region

Southwest Region

Marge & Floyd Pryor, OK
Carl Harry, AR
Shirley Hart, NM
Sal Catalono Sr., LA

Roger Thomas,
Central Region

Robin Nelson, MO
Norb Strecker, MO

155-17 84th Street
Howard Beach, NY 11414
March 13, 1994

Controllers United
Bob Harris
P.O. Box 287
Selden, NY 11784-0287

Dear Bob:

I am a full performance Air Traffic Controller based at Toronto Area Control Center and have been employed by Transport Canada for over four years. I am also a former PATCO Controller with seven years experience at New York ARTCC. At Toronto, nine other PATCO Controllers from across the USA are similarly employed. Total American involvement - less than 35 Controllers.

There has been some discussion over the success/failure rate of PATCO applicants for Transport Canada positions. Here is brief synopsis of its history.

In 1988, Transport Canada decided to go ahead with its "Offshore Program", in an effort to compliment staffing with experienced PATCO Controllers. There existed some strong opposition from CATCA (Canadian Air Traffic Controllers Association). CATCA had conceded to go along with the "Offshore Program", however, a good percentage of CATCA members were vehement about the program's failure. The reason for this sentiment are varied. The natural tendencies we all possess as patriots of our respective countries, in addition to the everyday management-CATCA rhetoric, created most of the atmosphere.

The first and second classes were met with a truly different set of circumstances which resulted in many applicants leaving the program and others being deemed not qualified. Speaking with co-workers now, I have learned that only two of these PATCO controllers were unworthy of positions due to a lack of ability and/or experience. It was an unfortunate combination of dispute and mindset, too difficult to overcome.

Subsequent classes, with the advantage of the passing of time, prove successful. Presently PATCO Controllers are making contributions in all areas. PATCO Controllers are classroom instructors. PATCO Controllers are OJI's (on the job trainers), including yours truly. Two PATCO Controllers have been appointed to supervisory positions.

Finally, with the recent hope instilled in all PATCO Controllers of once again contributing their experience/skills to the Federal Aviation Administration, the impact PATCO has made to Canada's Air Traffic Control System is a true example of the impact we could make upon our reinstatement.

Very truly yours,

Michael F. Matrone

RETIREMENT DATA - GS-2152
RETIREMENTS - TOWER & CENTER

MONTH	TOWER	CENTER	TOTAL
JAN 90	7	12	19
FEB	3	3	6
MAR	10	7	17
APR	7	3	10
MAY	9	5	14
JUN	24	12	36
JUL	8	12	20
AUG	18	21	39
SEP	59	30	89
OCT	28	12	40
NOV	73	44	117
DEC	16	14	30
JAN 91	8	6	14
FEB	1	4	5
MAR	7	3	10
APR	3	2	5
MAY	11	6	17
JUN	14	7	21
JUL	9	6	15
AUG	3	3	6
SEP	2	4	6
OCT	4	4	8
NOV	7	3	10
DEC	11	5	16
JAN 92	19	26	45
FEB	3	7	10
MAR	4	4	8
APR	8	8	16
MAY	16	11	27
JUN	8	7	15
JUL	6	10	16
AUG	6	11	17
SEP	1	5	6
OCT	8	6	14
NOV	5	1	6
DEC	13	5	18
JAN 93	36	33	69
FEB	5	4	9
MAR	8	3	11
APR	9	8	17
MAY	9	7	16
JUN	12	15	27
JUL	17	11	28
AUG	8	4	12
SEP	20	7	27
OCT	6	5	11
NOV	4	1	5
DEC	11	10	21
FY-89	245	191	436
FY-90	245	181	426
FY-91	175	111	286
FY-92	93	101	194
FY-93	130	104	254
FY-94	21	16	37
CY-89*	264	198	462
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CY-93	145	108	253

EXCLUDES DISABILITY RETIREMENTS

*CY figures are year end actuals produced for use in Air Traffic's annual budget submission. These figures will vary slightly from roll-up figures derived from the chart above due to retirement submission(s) and subsequent retraction(s).

Revised: January 15, 1994

Source: Weaver, ATZ-320

Support Is Seldom Provided

Nevertheless, many of the 25 mission need statements we examined—which identified the need for FAA to spend up to $5 billion on new systems—contained only assertions of need that were unsupported by facts.[2] For example, one statement asserted that "catastrophic consequences" could result and maintenance costs would "escalate" if a new communications system was not acquired, but the statement did not provide any supporting information. Other statements did contain qualitative or quantitative support. Qualitative support consisted of some nonquantitative analysis or documentation. For example, one statement included a memorandum from a field airway facilities manager verifying that the current radar display systems were becoming difficult to maintain. Quantitative support described a problem in measurable terms. For example, one statement cited the projected financial costs to the flying public from delays and reduced safety if a new weather system was not installed. Quantitative support was usually the strongest because it was the least subjective, the easiest to validate, and the least vulnerable to conflicting interpretation.

Figure 1: Level of Support in 25 Mission Need Statements



[a]Current problems are those described in the "Deficiencies of Current Assets" section of the mission need statements

[b]Projected problems are those described in the "Impacts of Disapproving Acquisition" section of the mission need statements

Figure 1 also shows a serious absence of support for projected problems described in the "Impacts of Disapproving Acquisition" section of the statements, which describes potential problems in ATC system performance and cost if no action is taken. The 25 mission need statements we reviewed listed 104 potential problems. Eighty-four (81 percent) of these problems were not supported with either quantitative or qualitative evidence. Only five (5 percent) were supported by quantitative evidence.

Mr. LEYDEN. Mr. Chairman and Mr. Clinger, my name is John Leyden. I am Secretary-Treasurer of the Public Employee Department of the AFL–CIO. I represent 33 international organizations with a membership of over four-and-a-half million public employees. I am pleased to have the opportunity to address the committee and I will submit my full testimony for the record.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Without objection so ordered.

Mr. LEYDEN. This will be rather brief.

All of organized labor, including the former PATCO members, NATCA, the Airline Pilots Association and the Air Transport Association, representing the Nation's major air carriers, all applauded President Clinton's August 12, 1993, Executive order lifting former President Ronald Reagan's ban on rehiring controllers who struck the Federal Aviation Administration in August of 1981.

By his order, President Clinton explicitly invited the 11,500 former air traffic controllers to reapply for their jobs by October 15, 1993, and as you have heard, to date approximately 5,000 have done so.

Since 1981, FAA has continually painted a rosy picture of full recovery of the air traffic control system. I formerly served as president of PATCO from 1970 until 1980. This is not a new scene for me. I presented testimony before Congressman Mineta, who then chaired the committee, and the same recantations by FAA officials about sufficient staffing I heard again today.

I can simply state for you during the course of my tenure as president from 1970 to 1980, we effectively doubled the number of air traffic controller positions in the system. Not with the help of FAA, but in spite of FAA. I see the same problems and the same recantations being made today.

The previous conclusion that the ATC system was overstaffed and thus could be returned to normal, as was made in 1981 after the strike, and that the system would be back in full stead in three years was as erroneous as the current FAA projection and promises to Congress for delivery of a completely automated and new air traffic control system they made to you that was to be completed at first by 1993, then 1995, then 1997, and now sometime after the year 2000.

Currently, air traffic controller delays in the system cost passengers using the system $7 billion, and an additional $3 billion to the cost of operating the aircraft in the system. Yet the FAA, despite its own projection that air traffic will grow 60 percent over the next ten years, and the fact that our air traffic control system currently employs 1,500 fewer controllers than in 1981, even though the volume of air traffic is up 30 percent since that time, all of those protestations are making President Clinton's order meaningless because they have refused to hire any fired controllers.

They have set a quota of rehiring a minimum of 50 fired controllers per year. If only 2,000 of those who have applied for recertification, indeed, meet the stringent qualifications demanded of journeyman controllers, the FAA's policy means President Clinton's order would take 40 years to realize.

The FAA has capped the reentry grade for fired controllers at GS–9. The Department of Defense controllers are currently work-

ing as GS–12s and GS–13s fully certified. If they were to take the offer of FAA to be returned, they would have to come back as GS–9s. This is ludicrous, and would mean significant pay cuts for them, even for controllers who were found working in Desert Storm and have been managing air traffic all during the period of the Reagan ban.

Former PATCO members, and, indeed, all of organized labor were relieved and pleased when President Clinton reversed his predecessor's unfair ban. But if the FAA persists in its policy of foot dragging, the Clinton order will remain what it is today, a hollow empty gesture.

At the time of the announcement of lifting the ban, Secretary of Transportation Pena said the move will help to keep this Nation's air traffic control system the safest in the world, clearly implying a number of former controllers would be returning shortly to the air traffic control profession. Eight months later not one single controller has been rehired. Not one.

Historically, FAA has underprojected the number of air traffic controllers required to operate a safe and efficient air traffic control system. So it is not surprising to me and to others that they would use budgetary constraint to thwart the intention clearly enunciated by the President when he lifted the ban.

I urge you, sir, to carefully review any FAA present and future air traffic controller staffing requirements contained in their budget submissions. Thank you very much.

Mr. OBERSTAR. All right. Thank you very, very much. And contrary to what the Floor managers of the bill have told us, there is another vote in progress on the Floor. Thankfully, we have just about come to the conclusion of your testimony, and my staff has talked with other witnesses and we will carry those witnesses over to next week or the soonest opportunity that we can to resume. I don't think it will be later than next week.

I just want to say that you have heard these rumblings about a corporatizing of the air traffic control system. If those proposals were to be formulated by the administration, would you want to see included in it the right to bargain collectively and to withhold services in point of dispute?

Mr. HARRIS. I don't think that would be appropriate even to comment on based on our historical perspective.

Mr. LEYDEN. I will comment, if I can.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Mr. Leyden.

Mr. LEYDEN. We represent public employees, postal employees, and if they have a corporation set up as the United States Post Office does, and have third party binding arbitration in lieu of the right to strike, that would be a progressive step forward. And I envision something like that coming out of a corporatized or privatized air traffic control system.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Very interesting. Thank you very, very much. Greatly appreciate your participation here today and, rest assured, we will do all we can on your behalf to restore your dignity and, more important, your skills in the work force.

Mr. HARRIS. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The subcommittee stands in recess.

[Whereupon, at 5:20 p.m., the subcommittee was recessed.]

STATEMENT OF ANTHONY J. BRODERICK, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION, SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION, CONCERNING THE FY 1995 FAA OPERATIONS BUDGET AND ASSOCIATED STAFFING. MARCH 9, 1994.

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I welcome the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee today to discuss the FAA's Operations budget and associated staffing plans for FY 1995. With me today are William H. Pollard, Associate Administrator for Air Traffic, Joaquin Archilla, Acting Associate Administrator for Airway Facilities, and Ruth A. Leverenz, Director of the Office of Budget.

As you know, the budget agreement enacted last summer essentially freezes domestic spending for the entire Federal government. In general, this means that spending increases on priority programs are balanced by decreases in unnecessary spending on low priority programs. For example, the Vice President's National Performance Review highlighted how the Federal government can be streamlined and made more efficient in its current operations to allow for necessary spending increases. The proposed FAA Operations budget for FY 95 reflects this overall fiscal constraint. The requested Operations funding level of $4,580,900,000 is slightly above the enacted 1994 level. A part of the Administration's effort to make the government more efficient is the proposal to reduce Federal employment by 252,000 positions by FY 99.

The FY 95 funding and staffing level will require FAA management to continue its efforts to operate in a more business-like manner. It requires us to rethink the traditional ways we have operated in the past and to achieve new efficiencies. And, of course, we will continue the high level of safety services we provide to the aviation community and the traveling public. Our plans for FY 95, as I will describe, will result in no reduction in those safety services.

Today's focus is on our proposed safety workforce staffing levels for FY 95. Before addressing the specifics of those staffing levels for FY 95, let me first discuss the 1995 staffing targets that we plan to achieve.

At the end of FY 93, the FAA's workforce totalled 53,148 full time equivalents (FTE). By 1995, the FAA will streamline its workforce, resulting in a reduction of 2,015 FTE. To achieve that result, we have instituted a hard freeze on hiring throughout the agency except for safety-related workforces. Also, we have obtained authority from the Office of Personnel Management to offer early-out retirements, but need very much the buy-out authority sought by the Administration to help us meet our necessary staffing targets. Regarding staffing in 1996-1999, FAA's staffing will be reevaluated annually within the target provided to the Secretary for the Department as a whole.

Our approach to achieving staffing reductions within the agency has been to target non-safety workforces. As proposed by the NPR, most of our reductions will come from positions made unnecessary through changes underway in how the Federal government will operate in the future.

As I noted earlier, our primary consideration in meeting our targetted budget and staffing levels has been on achieving our safety mission. For that reason, in our FY 95 Operations budget request, we are asking for an additional 305 in employment--or an increase of over 7%--in our aircraft certification and aviation safety inspection workforce. This increase is intended to help us meet growing international obligations and an increasing aircraft manufacturing workload. We will maintain our security workforce level of 812 in FY 95.

We are seeking a slight reduction in our request for air traffic controllers, from 17,523 in FY 94 to 17,300 in FY 95. This adjustment in controller staffing results from our contract tower program. We plan to contract out approximately 25 Level I VFR towers in FY 95, consistent with NPR recommendations. The change in FY 95 air traffic control staffing does not reflect an actual reduction in air traffic control service in the system, but the reduction in total staffing needed by the FAA. We have worked with the controllers' union, NATCA, on this program to identify candidate towers for the program.

In FY 95, the contract tower program will free up approximately 250 controllers for reassignment to other facilities. This will assist us in balancing controller staffing in the system. Furthermore, it will give controllers an opportunity to advance into higher level towers. Reassignment of Level I controllers will be our primary method of replacing attrition in the controller workforce, and will limit the need to hire additional controllers.

The FY 95 Operations budget also shows a slight reduction in the overall field maintenance workforce to 8,200 from 8,406 in FY 94. It is important to stress, however, that the reductions will not affect the number of maintenance technicians in the workforce. We plan to continue the same number of maintenance technicians as before. We will be able to achieve this reduction in staffing, without compromising our ability to maintain FAA facilities and equipment, because of an effort we began several years ago to change our approach to field maintenance.

In 1991, our Airway Facilities organization began a major strategic planning effort, in partnership with PASS, the technician's union. Our goal was to restructure and consolidate the organization, and to prepare for the transition from a ground-based infrastructure to a hybrid system composed of both space- and ground-based components.

Incorporating the Administration's goals into this strategic plan, we began to identify ways to reorganize and consolidate functions without lessening our ability to perform our maintenance functions. As a result of this planning, the reductions in our field maintenance workforce will come from administrative support and management positions. None of the reductions will come from the safety-related positions that actually perform field maintenance.

For FY 95, we are currently ahead of schedule in meeting the targetted reduction of Federal employment. At the end of FY 95, agency staffing will be a full 6% below the FY 1993 level. This represents a reduction of 3,079 FTE since 1993.

Restructuring efforts, such as the one underway in our Airway Facilities organization, have shown us that there are ways in which we can continue to provide key safety-related services at less cost. That will be the focus of our efforts during the remainder of this fiscal year, and during FY 95, as well. I can assure you that safety will remain our foremost consideration as we adapt to the challenge of the increased effort to achieve fiscal restraint throughout the Federal sector.

That concludes my prepared statement, Mr. Chairman. We will pleased to answer any questions you may have at this time.

TESTIMONY OF BOB HARRIS
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CONTROLLERS UNITED
BEFORE
THE AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE
MARCH 9, 1994

Good afternoon Chairman Oberstar, Vice- Chairman De Lugo and Members of the Subcommittee. My name is Bob Harris and I am the Executive Director of Controllers United, an organization representing the interests of the 11,400 Professional Air Traffic Control Organization (PATCO) members fired in 1981. We are pleased to have this opportunity to address this Committee hearing on Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) controller staffing for fiscal '95.

Our members are ready, willing and able to help restore the Air Traffic Control (ATC) system. The track record of rehired controllers gives us the confidence to tell you that our expertise can quickly be put to productive use by the FAA Returned controllers have re-qualified, on average in 4 to 6 weeks, instead of the 2-3 years it normally takes a person without experience The 1994 ATC system and equipment have changed little since 1981 Change has come but the formula of less controllers working increased traffic equaling greater delays is not the solution the flying public deserves. Rehiring former controllers will save the American taxpayer in excess of $100,000 per returned Full Performance Level (FPL) controller, and help reduce air traffic delays that are robbing our economy. General Accounting Office (GAO) studies indicate it takes 100 applications to make one FPL controller, while the rehire of 100 former controllers will produce 100 FPL controllers **The opportunity our group presents to the FAA should not be missed, we are in fact a wasting asset, our training paid for by the American People. We should be put to work because controllers are a vital component of air traffic system capacity and we are needed.**

Unfortunately, our topic is rooted in emotions that go beyond rationale argument, becoming instead an issue of winners/losers, strikers/non-strikers, and right/wrong. We believe a perverse attitude exists, within segments of the FAA, that fired controllers should not be returned to duty. FAA actions to date, despite the smoke-screen of openness to rehire, speak louder than their words.

We are concerned that the FAA decision not to rehire controllers this fiscal year is driven by FAA budget considerations to the detriment of air traffic or manpower needs While budgetary constraints are real and the FAA is attempting to protect their core safety work-force by targeted buy-out proposals, they have yet to acknowledge any staffing shortcomings We believe the FAA position on rehire will become more untenable as the general economy improves and attrition of the current work-force becomes more obvious. We ask this Committee lead the FAA to action, overcoming what we perceive as a pervasive attitude against rehire by agency bureaucrats Chairman Norman Mineta has expressed his view that funding for hiring more air controllers "ought to come out of the Aviation Trust Fund " Once the need for more controllers is established, we ask that you Mr Chairman and the Committees of Congress, consider expanding the usage of the trust fund to fund the rehire of controllers that are necessary to improve the ATC system.

Mr. Chairman since there is a need for additional controllers, particularly in the hard to staff facilities, we ask that you consider the formation of a pilot program composed of rehired controllers mandated by your Committee for placement in the high density, difficult to staff FAA facilities. We recommend rehiring 50 people, on average, in each of the 9 air traffic facilities that will be impacted when the current pay demonstration program (PDP) expires on June 17, 1994. This suggested first step of directing the FAA to action will not only benefit the ATC system but it will break down the logjam of prejudice against rehire within the agency.

The FAA record in manpower development, equipment modernization and meeting their mission needs is legend. FAA Administrator, David Hinson's recent decision to change direction on equipment procurement (AAS) should be extended to the flow control program. This program evolved beyond it's original purpose to a means of restricting demand to meet capacity. Flow control is an abused program that seeks to make up for the lack of system capacity by the daily restriction of demand. While most business decisions are predicated on meeting demand, increasing capacity to meet the need, the FAA continues to get away with policies that stifle the aviation lifeline. The daily practice of flow control that goes beyond severe weather avoidance is a tacit admission of a shortage of runway and / or air traffic system capacity. Our group (with a median age of 47 years) can bridge the ATC system capacity gap that currently exists and do it quickly with immediate benefits to the flying public, the air transport industry and the American People.

The Aviation Sub-Committee on Appropriations has requested the FAA provide an updated staffing standard report, since 1991, without success to date. Our resources allowed us a view of only two Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC), Washington and New York. Mr. Chairman, the FAA provided your Committee staffing spread-sheets in December, 1993, that indicated both Washington and New York centers were staffed above funded standards, however internal documents from both facilities indicate the following: The funded staffing standard for FPL controllers in New York ARTCC is 305, while the actual on board number is 228 FPL controllers (plus 9 operational controllers) as of 2/5/94; we found a similar situation at Washington ARTCC, where the funded standard for FPL controllers is 382, while the actual number is 300, as of 12/21/93. FAA records relied on for the above will be submitted to the Chairman.

Our concern is that former controllers are being denied an opportunity to redeem their profession because the FAA has minimized or under stated the need for additional controllers based on facility staffing data presented to this Committee and the public, that can best be described as unclear or mis-leading. Low attrition has been mentioned by the FAA as further reason for minimal hiring, yet when we sought the list of controllers eligible for retirement by facility, we were told after several weeks of review by FAA headquarters staff that they did not maintain such records. The FAA represents attrition as one of the three factors for not hiring controllers, traffic count and funding are the other stated factors. We are aware that NY Center began 1994 with 66 people eligible to retire this year

The GAO has provided us with a document that lists the numbers of controllers that have retired in the past 5 years (enclosed) and since the close of the hearing we have been informed by the FAA that the controller work force retirement eligibility projections through January 1, 1994 totaled 1,989 people (1,192 non-supervisory, 797 supervisory) (see enclosed).

We request this Committee direct the GAO to re-visit the issue of FPL controller staffing levels and staffing standards within the FAA. We further request that you consider scheduling a hearing on FAA operations upon receipt of the GAO report.

Dispatchers from three major air carriers indicate an air traffic system in need of more controllers and their statements are included for the record Mr Bob Iverson, CEO of KIWI airline has asked me to offer his letter for the record One major carrier has provided monthly delay figures attributable to ATC for the past year, it ranges from 21 to 35% of their total delays per month (in minutes). This same carrier experienced ATC delays in January, 1994, that were double the delays of January, 1993, with an average ATC monthly delay of 27% Bottom line, this airline lost $39 6 million in the past 12 months due to ATC caused delays.

We have two charts, the first (Attachment 1) illustrates airline growth at 11 major cities based on data from official airline guides (OAG 1980-thru-1993). The second chart (Attachment 2) represents system wide delays to be expected in 58 major cities based on a FAA funded study (NASPAC). The base period for the FAA study is three days in the life of the ATC system in1989, with projections to the year 2005.
For the record, in the interest of brevity I did not discuss the two charts listed in our statement but will offer the reports to the Committee when it reconvenes on March 17, 1994. The first chart while self-explanatory is based on an examination of the official airline guide (OAG) by Ray Irizarry, a fired controller living in Texas and included as resource material for the committee file record. The report concludes that the number of airline flights between 10 major cities selected have increased an average of 49% between 1980 and 1993. The report further indicated that flights between identical sets of airports generally take longer in 1993 than in 1980. The second chart based on a FAA approved study called NASPAC, examined three days in the life of the ATC system in 1989 and projected delays expected at 58 airports over the next 10 years. This study of a metroplex plan for Dallas / Fort Worth was represented by the FAA as a computer projection of system wide delays both in operational and passenger terms. The chart given to the Committee represented passenger delays at 58 major airports in terms that relate to a 1989 baseline. For example, using the columns under the year 1995, if you had a 15 minute delay in 1989, you could project a 19 min. delay in 1995 if the system was VFR (VMC), 26 min. if the system was heavy IFR (IMC-1, 17hrs. IFR), and 20 min. in moderate IFR (IMC-2, 6 hrs. IFR). The reason for the disparity in delay times between heavy IFR (IMC-1) and moderate IFR (IMC-2) is the heavy IFR will reduce the VFR aircraft component demand on the ATC system. The computer model this study is based on has factored all system modifications planned for the ATC system, such as new runways, and new equipment being completed on schedule. One variable that can reduce the projected increases in system wide delays is additional capacity that would come from adding to the controller work force.

Mr Chairman, I thank you for your demonstrated leadership in seeking to provide the ATC system the Country deserves We ask that you allow us to add to the record and at the conclusion of our statements we would be happy to answer questions from Members of the Committee.

Selected Responses to the 1993 Presidential Commission on Aviation

On June 29, 1993, the Chief Executive Officer of KIWI Airlines, Mr Bob Iverson said the following If you will indulge me, I would like to make a comment on the FAA question I spent most of my career as a pilot, operating in the highest density environment in the United States, which was in and out of this airport, Washington National, and La Guardia I tell you that the single most important component in the air traffic control system is the controller himself Happy, motivated, enjoyably challenged controllers, can make a difference Much more so than imposing technology out there When you go in to and operate in and out of La Guardia, you are absolutely astounded at how good the controllers are When you operate in and out of Newark, when they are in a bad mood, you can not believe how long it takes to move a quarter of the same aircraft

On June 16, 1993, Chairman Norman Mineta said the following It is correct. I've always opposed the increasing percentage of the trust fund that go to operating purposes To me, whether it's the Highway Trust Fund or the Aviation Trust Fund, those have not been operations and maintenance funds. The automobile that is going to be bought for the Regional Administrator for FAA, ought not to be coming out of the Aviation Trust Funds. **On the other hand, if it is for more air traffic controllers, for those who are on line, then they ought to be, that expense. As we increase the number of air traffic controllers, that ought to come out of the Aviation Trust Fund.** But I have always objected to the increasing percentage of funds being taken out of the Aviation Trust Fund

In another response, the Chairman said But the problem there is multi-fault. Part of it is the air traffic control system. Part of it is air traffic controller. I mean, as I recall the numbers, on August 3, 1981, at the time of the strike, we had something like 16,700 air traffic controllers Eighty-five percent of them were full performance level. Today, we probably have, I don't know, 17,500 or 18,000. Maybe two-thirds of them are full performance level

Mr. Joseph Del Balzo on May 27, 1993, before the commission said Our latest aviation forecasts tell us that over the next 10 years, the number of passengers in the system will increase from an average of about 1.3 million a day to over 2 million a day If our forecasts are accurate, we can look forward to a 25 percent increase in air carrier operations to meet the demand. Today I would tell you that the top 100 of the nation's busiest airports account for 95 percent of all air carrier passengers and 92 percent of all air carrier operations And when you think about that kind of concentration, I think you can readily appreciate the fact it will inevitably lead to system delays because, even with the present economic slowdown, 23 of our country's largest airports experience more than 20,000 hours of delay every year. And over the next five years, we expect serious delays will effect 13 more of our airports

Mr. Del Balzo continued, I don't think there's any question that **we are operating today an inefficient air traffic control system that is costing the carriers money.** I can't quantify for you how much that is, but there's no question that we have a system today that is not as flexible as it can be

At another point before the commission, Mr. Del Balzo stated that one of the **principal contributors to system capacity will be an adequately staffed, well-trained, highly activated workforce.**

SYSTEM WIDE PASSENGER DELAY IN YEARS 1995, 2000, 2005



Where the delays are



Airline Traffic - Volume Increase (1980 - 1993)



Airline traffic increase averaged 49% (1980 - 1993)

SUMMARY INFORMATION FROM FORMER CONTROLLER APPLICATIONS
Applications Received by Location

Canada	1
Europe	2
Mexico	1
Saudi Arabia	5
Virgin Islands	2
Other Outside US	16
Total Outside US	4
Alaska	37
Alabama	69
Arkansas	23
Arizona	72
California	442
Colorado	16
Connecticut	39
District of Columbia	2
Delaware	3
Florida	419
Georgia	223
Hawaii	47
Iowa	17
Idaho	1
Illinois	256
Indiana	170
Kansas	67
Kentucky	47
Louisiana	41
Massachusetts	79
Maryland	67
Maine	20
Michigan	75
Minnesota	162
Missouri	101
Mississippi	21
Montana	19
North Carolina	67
North Dakota	3
Nebraska	6
New Hampshire	102
New Jersey	66
New Mexico	55
Nevada	54
New York	376
Ohio	257
Oklahoma	64
Oregon	28
Pennsylvania	107
Puerto Rico	10
Rhode Island	17
South Carolina	37
South Dakota	9
Tennessee	128
Texas	433
Utah	48
Virginia	139
Vermont	4
Washington	96
Wisconsin	11
West Virginia	16
Wyoming	3
Total Within US	4902
Total Applications	4942

SUMMARY INFORMATION FROM FORMER CONTROLLER APPLICATIONS

Year of Birth	Age	Number
1926	65	1
1929	64	8
1930	63	0
1931	62	3
1932	61	14
1933	60	17
1934	59	32
1935	58	41
1936	57	62
1937	56	66
1938	55	69
1939	54	69
1940	53	96
1941	52	124
1942	51	211
1943	50	268
1944	49	284
1945	48	308
1946	47	409
1947	46	486
1948	45	388
1949	44	337
1950	43	282
1951	42	206
1952	41	180
1953	40	141
1954	39	130
1955	38	96
1956	37	54
1957	36	23
1958	35	9
1959	34	1

Average Age 47

Office of Aviation Careers
12/17/93

As of 93 08 31

Controller workforce retirement eligibility projections through 94 01-01

Employee Count
Non supervisory 11494
Supervisory 2260

Total Employees 13756

	Retirement Eligibles Early	Retirement Eligibles Optional	TOTAL
Non supvy	993	199	1192
Supvy	644	153	797
			1989

FY-89	245	191	436
FY-90	245	181	426
FY-91	175	111	286
FY-92	93	101	194
FY 93	150	104	254
FY-94	21	16	37
CY-89*	264	198	462
CY 90*	261	174	435
CY-91*	80	53	133
CY-92*	97	101	198
CY 93	145	108	253

EXCLUDES DISABILITY RETIREMENTS

RETIREMENT DATA GS-2152
RETIREMENTS - TOWER & CENTER

*CY figures are year end actuals produced for use in Air Traffic's annual budget submission. These figures will vary slightly from roll up figures derived from the chart above due to retirement submission(s) and subsequent retraction(s)

Revised January 15 1994

Source Weaver ATZ 320

F.A.A. Finds More Errors By Air Traffic Controllers

By MARTIN TOLCHIN
Special to The New York Times



The New York Times

...creasing number of aircraft are flying too close to other planes because of errors made by air traffic controllers, the Federal Aviation Administration has reported.

The required distances of separation were breached 757 times in the 12 month period that ended last October, the agency found. That was a 5 percent increase in the number of such incidents, called "operational errors," compared with the preceding 12 months, when 720 were reported. "Operational errors" is the F.A.A.'s term for mistakes made by air traffic controllers who fail to keep aircraft separated by the required distance, which is, on average, three miles laterally or 1,000 feet vertically, sometimes both buffers are required and sometimes the distances are larger.

Some operational errors have been "relatively close," said Bill Jeffers, the F.A.A.'s deputy associate administrator for air traffic control. Dangerously close encounters between aircraft are called near-collisions.

The controllers attribute the increase in plane-separation errors to increased air traffic, overburdened airports and overworked controllers. But Federal officials say air traffic is created by only 1 percent this year, to about 7 million departures, and they contend that busy airports are adequately staffed by the controllers.

Mr. Jeffers attributes the increase to "human error and communications error" on the part of controllers.

Whatever the reason, F.A.A. officials say there is no cause for alarm. "Just because operational errors may be going up, you can't say that the quality of safety in the system is going down," said Robert Buckhorn, a spokesman for the agency. The number of collisions and near-collisions, he noted, has steadily declined.

Earlier Fatalities

Fatalities have been attributed to operational errors in the past. Air traffic controllers were blamed for a February 1991 runway collision between a USAir jetliner at Los Angeles international airport and a Skywest commuter

Air safety questions lead to a staffing debate.

plane; 46 people were killed.

Two months later, Senator John Heinz of Pennsylvania and six others were killed in a midair collision when the Senator's chartered plane collided with a helicopter over a Philadelphia suburb. Air traffic controllers had given permission for the helicopter to fly near the Senator's plane to inspect it.

Despite the increase in operational errors, the F.A.A. reports a reduction in the number of near-collisions in the air, to 292 in the 12 months that ended last October. That is down 7 percent from the 315 reported for the year ending October 1992; 363 were reported for the year ending October 1991.

Federal officials note that the last fatal accident involving a major airline occurred in March 1992, at LaGuardia Airport, but there have been several fatal accidents involving commuter planes and private aircraft.

Federal officials say that several operational errors occurred near New York City last Nov. 28, when an air traffic controller allowed several jetliners approaching New York's airports to fly too close together. The controller, who was relatively new, had asked for assistance, but his supervisor had denied the request even though help had been available.

Mr. Jeffers said: "None of the planes were less than a two mile separation. We consider the error critical, but I do not believe that the safety of the airplanes was compromised." A supervisor was suspended after the incident, officials said.

In another incident last October a jet came perilously close to a private plane at Dulles International Airport; an error also attributed to faulty air traffic control.

More controllers are needed, said James C. Morin, general counsel for the National Air Traffic Controller Association of the A.F.L.-C.I.O. "The F.A.A. says they're fully staffed, but we take issue with that," he said. "We believe they can use a lot more people in a number of busy facilities, including New York, Los Angeles and Chicago."

Last August, the Clinton Administration lifted the ban on rehiring the air traffic controllers who were dismissed by President Ronald Reagan when they went on strike in 1981. The F.A.A. contends that there is no shortage of controllers, and it plans to hire 200 to offset attrition. But the controllers association estimates that 2,000 to 3,000 new hires are needed.

The F.A.A. says it has nearly 18,000 air traffic controllers, of whom 12,000 are at the full-performance level, which means that they can handle any job assigned. In August 1981, when the strike began, there were 18,200 controllers, and 13,000 of them were at the full-performance level. Since then, air traffic has increased from 5 million departures annually to 7 million.

Despite a handful of recent incidents of aircraft mechanical problems, it is 21 months since a passenger on a major airline has died in an aircraft accident, one of the longest such periods in aviation history.

Jim Landry, president of the Air Transport Association, which represents the major airlines, gives credit for the safety record to the back up systems built into aircraft to allow them to operate safely even when things go wrong.

CONTROLLER WORK FORCE

(Full Time With Permanent Appointments)
As of December 31, 1993

CATEGORY	TOWERS	CENTERS	TOTAL
Full-Performance Level (FPL) Controllers 1*	7,019	5,639	12,658
Above numbers exclude FPL grade level controllers not yet fully certified all positions in their current facilities	809	170	979
Other Controllers	1,232	1,280	2,512
First-Line Supervisors	1,389	797	2,186
Total Operational Controllers	9,640	7,716	17,356
Developmental Pipeline 2*	136	192	330
Total Controller	9,778	7,908	17,686

SOURCE. APM-100 ISSUED 01\12\94

1* This figure includes 482 traffic management coordinators: 350 in centers and 132 in towers

2* These are individuals who have successfully completed FAA Academy initial training or equivalent university level training and are assigned to control facilities but are not yet certified on at least two positions

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APR-29-94 THU 10:04 HATCH P.06

AIR TRAFFIC TRAINING COSTS

FAA ACADEMY / OKLAHOMA CITY, OK

Enroute Controller	$30,007
Terminal Controller	35,895
	65,902
	x.5
Average Cost	$32,951

ON THE JOB TRAINING (OJT)

Enroute Controller	$155,000
Terminal Controller	71,000
	$226,000
	x.5
Average Cost	$113,000

The FAA could waive the FAA Academy requirement for former FATCO air traffic controllers.

It currently takes 3 to 5 years of OJT for a new hiree to certify as an FPL air traffic controller. The former FATCO controllers would be able to certify in a fraction of the time.

Substantial savings in the training budget would be realised.

CONTROLLER WORK FORCE

	Prestrike	Fiscal Years			
	July 31, 1981	1988	1989	1990	1991*
Controllers					
FPLs[b]	13,205	9,858	10,232	10,824	11,093
Others[c]	[d]	2,594	2,628	2,607	2,635
First-line supervisors	[d]	1,999	2,156	2,204[d]	2,297
Total Operational Controllers	13,205	14,451	15,016	15,635	16,265
Developmental pipeline	3,309[d]	1,985	1,816	1,591	1,345
Total	16,244	16,436	16,832	17,226	17,610

*As of August 31, 1991

[b]Includes traffic management coordinators.

[c]Other controllers, also referred to as operational controllers, include (1) controllers who were FPLs at their previous facility but are not yet full certified on all positions at their current facility and (2) developmental controllers who are certified to control traffic on two or more positions

[d]Data not available

[d]Prior to fiscal year 1988 supervisors were not classified

10/16/91 - CONGRESSIONAL HEARING CHAIRED BY BARBARA BOXER



Document at 21 1993

WASHINGTON ARTCC

Current Authorized FPL 382
Current Authorized TMU 21
Current Authorized Staff 16
Total Authorized 419

AREAS	A	B	C	D	E	F	TOTAL
FPL Percentage Authorized	16.33333	17	16.33333	17	16.333333	17	100%
FPL Authorized Per Area	62	65	62	65	62	65	382
Actual # of FPLS	49	50	50	51	51	49	300
Discrepancy of FPLS	-14	15	-12 -14		-11	-16	-82
Actual # TMC'S Permanent	1	3	2	2	2	1	11
Actual # TMC'S Rotation	2	2	1	2	3	1	11
Discrepancy of TMC'S							1
Actual # Staff DTLS	1	4	3	6	4	2	20
Discrepancy of Staffs							4
NATCA DTL		2					2
Actual # DEV	9	7	6	5	7	15	49
FPLS Plus DEV'S	58	57	56	56	58	64	349
Anticipated Discrepancy**	-6	-8	-6	-9	-4	-1	-33
(everyone checks out)							

*1 added to A area

**1 B dev'lar

TEL NO

* ATC DELAY COUNTS *

MONTH	SYR DEPT	ATC DLYS	% ATC	D/L DLYS	TFL DLYS	% DLY
93/01	60607	6155	9.8	1610	6965	10 2
93/02	56510	5221	9.8	1533	6751	11 9
93/03	59751	6177	10.3	1595	6770	11 3
93/04	59720	5600	9.3	1562	6262	10.2
93/05	60675	5618	9.3	1851	5861	11 5
93/06	60748	6198	10.3	1529	5694	13 1
93/07	62520	5760	9.3	964	6758	11.1
93/08	62770	6163	9.7	1091	5254	14 3
93/09	58211	5910	10.2	1582	5392	14 1
93/10	61696	5667	9.3	1699	5568	13 4
93/11	59789	6021	10 1	1935	5966	15 9
93/12	62860	6771	11 1	2351	7107	18 6
94/01	62227	6495	10 6	2376	6771	14.0
TOTAL	727975	71621	9 8	20254	77481	13.6

* ATC DELAY MINUTES *

MONTH	SYR MINS	ATC MINS	% ATC	D/L MINS	TFL MINS	% DLY
93/01	3778314	42214	11.3	12	429734	26	80260	42.8
93/02	4434647	59733	13.0	12	468892	39	118625	26.7
93/03	5734171	80360	13 9	19	602151	42	160991	27.9
93/04	4891106	57952	11.8	10	606827	43	118639	24.7
93/05	3080029	36920	11.8	10	325064	36	70886	23.7
93/06	3366883	36214	10.8	13	416669	38	90360	39 2
93/07	3011186	36020	12.0	9	279198	28	68030	31.3
93/08	3541995	43600	12.3	10	353777	32	79977	22 2
93/09	3519620	47990	10.9	17	356868	37	123450	34 5
93/10	3951931	48014	12.4	12	366679	42	109695	29.7
93/11	5004680	73099	14.6	18	675966	45	160830	32.1
93/12	5853577	81881	13.9	17	1004982	48	186263	31.8
94/01	7688915	86950	11.5	19	1152804	49	999180	49.9
TOTAL	57992260	772921	13 5	15	7986680	39	1575410	27.1

INITIAL ATC DELAY

REGIONAL ATCC DE

DATA FROM A MAJOR AIRLINE

NEW YORK ARTCC

NATIONAL NEWS A SUNDAY, MAY 23, 1993 THE MIAMI HERALD 11

More pilots are charting their own cours

New York Times Service

WASHINGTON — Bill Cotton, a United Airlines captain who flies Boeing 757 and 767 passenger jets between Chicago and San Francisco, does not usually think much of flying over Dubuque, as prescribed by the Federal Aviation Administration.

Instead, he often requests permission to fly the great circle route, a curved line that is the shortest distance between points on the globe. Sometimes, to take advantage of tail winds or avoid head winds, he flies south, over New Mexico, Utah and Nevada, or north over Wyoming and Idaho.

A growing number of pilots are charting their own courses rather than following the FAA routes, saving money, time and fuel through a program that the agency plans to expand.

Such flexibility is part of the Department of Transportation's effort to be what Transportation Secretary Federico Peña calls customer friendly — in this case by enlisting the advice of commercial pilots and giving them as much leeway as possible.

Under the program, pilots enjoy the same route-setting privileges they were allowed before striking air traffic controllers were dismissed by President Reagan in August 1981. The dismissals caused a shortage of controllers that led the FAA to force pilots to follow the agency's routes in an effort to relieve the controllers' workloads.

The National Route Program currently allows pilots of flights of at least 1,500 nautical miles flown at 37,000 feet or above to request routes that they consider more direct and efficient than those required by the FAA.

Prodded by the airlines, the agency plans to expand the program significantly.

"As soon as we see that we can expand it without creating an adverse workload, we're going to expand it by lowering the altitude and shortening the lateral requirements," Cotton said.

As for the airlines, "We like it," said Jack Ryan, vice president for air traffic management of the Air Transport Association, which represents the leading airlines. "We always wanted it to be expanded. We think this program is already saving $9 million to $10 million a year."

155-17 84th Street
Howard Beach, NY 11414
March 13, 1994

Controllers United
Bob Harris
P.O. Box 287
Selden, NY 11784-0287

Dear Bob:

I am a full performance Air Traffic Controller based at Toronto Area Control Center and have been employed by Transport Canada for over four years. I am also a former PATCO Controller with seven years experience at New York ARTCC. At Toronto, nine other PATCO Controllers from across the USA are similarly employed. Total American involvement - less than 35 Controllers.

There has been some discussion over the success/failure rate of PATCO applicants for Transport Canada positions. Here is brief synopsis of its history.

In 1988, Transport Canada decided to go ahead with its "Offshore Program", in an effort to compliment staffing with experienced PATCO Controllers. There existed some strong opposition from CATCA (Canadian Air Traffic Controllers Association). CATCA had conceded to go along with the "Offshore Program", however, a good percentage of CATCA members were vehement about the program's failure. The reason for this sentiment are varied. The natural tendencies we all possess as patriots of our respective countries, in addition to the everyday management-CATCA rhetoric, created most of the atmosphere.

The first and second classes were met with a truly different set of circumstances which resulted in many applicants leaving the program and others being deemed not qualified. Speaking with co-workers now, I have learned that only two of these PATCO Controllers were unworthy of positions due to a lack of ability and/or experience. It was an unfortunate combination of dispute and mindset, too difficult to overcome.

Subsequent classes, with the advantage of the passing of time, prove successful. Presently PATCO Controllers are making contributions in all areas. PATCO Controllers are classroom instructors. PATCO Controllers are OJI's (on the job trainers), including yours truly. Two PATCO Controllers have been appointed to supervisory positions.

Finally, with the recent hope instilled in all PATCO Controllers of once again contributing their experience/skills to the Federal Aviation Administration, the impact PATCO has made to Canada's Air Traffic Control System is a true example of the impact we could make upon our reinstatement.

Very truly yours,

Michael F. Matrone

TO: NEB
FR: JEFF BEDDOW

For Immediate Release

Contact: Joseph M. Bellino
or
Jeff Beddow
202/223-2900

FAA Reneges on President Clinton's Commitment to Re-hire Fired Controllers

WASHINGTON -- (February 17, 1994) The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has issued a series of strict restrictions on the re-hire of former PATCO air traffic controllers, rendering President Clinton's ban-lifting initiative meaningless. The union representing today's air traffic controllers, the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA), has been unsuccessful in urging the Agency to reconsider its prohibitive position on this issue.

"President Clinton took a bold and honorable step, but his desire to heal the wounds of the past have been thwarted by the FAA," said NATCA Executive Vice President Joseph M. Bellino. "The FAA has arbitrarily decided to deny the fired PATCO controllers any chance of being re-hired."

The FAA has decided to implement the following conditions on the fired PATCO controllers:

1. No PATCO controllers can be hired until at least 1995. This first re-hiring will be at least two years after President Clinton's announcement.
2. Once the hiring of PATCO controllers begins, the FAA

-- more --

02-17-1994 01:10PM FROM AFA National Office TO 15167329801 P.02

intends to limit hiring to a total of 50 over a two-year period. Approximately 5,000 fired controllers have applied to the FAA for positions.

3. Of the 50 fired controllers to be re-hired, those currently certified by the FAA as working controllers for other US Government agencies will be required to voluntarily accept a reduction in pay of $20,000-35,000.

4. Those fired controllers with seniority of five years or less will not even be considered for re-hiring by the FAA.

Since President Reagan's 1981 firing of 11,600 striking PATCO controllers, the air traffic control system remains understaffed, while air traffic continues to increase. Today's system is approximately 1500 controllers short of 1981's figures, yet traffic has increased by nearly 30 percent. Adding to the seriousness of this squeeze is aging and failing equipment, leaving the system with a declining margin of safety.

"The air traffic control system is in dire need of more controllers," Bellino said. "With the announced end of the ban, we held high hopes the American flying public could soon count on a better staffed, safer system. Unfortunately, the FAA has chosen to ignore this opportunity."

# # #

02-17-1994 01:10PM FROM AFA National Office TO 15167329601 P.03

PUBLIC EMPLOYEE DEPARTMENT
AFL-CIO

AL BILIK, *President*
JOHN F. LEYDEN, *Secretary-Treasurer*

Executive Vice Presidents

Gerald W. McEntee
Albert Shanker
John J. Sweeney
Alfred K. Whitehead
Moe Biller
Arthur A. Coia
Vincent R. Sombrotto
John N. Sturdivant

Testimony of John F. Leyden
Secretary-Treasurer
Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO
Before
The Aviation Subcommittee of the House Public Works
and Transportation Committee
March 9, 1994

Chairman Oberstar and Members of the Subcommittee, my name is John F. Leyden, I am Secretary-Treasurer, Public Employee Department, AFL-CIO, an organization representing 33 AFL-CIO international unions with membership of over 4.5 million public employees. I am pleased to have this opportunity to address this committee hearing on Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) controller staffing for 1995. All of organized labor former PATCO members, the new controller organization NATCA, the Airline Pilots Association and the Air Transport Association representing the nations major air carriers all applauded President Clinton's August 13, 1993 Executive Order lifting former President Ronald Reagan ban on rehiring controllers who struck the Federal Aviation Administration in August 1981. By his order President Clinton explicitly invited the 11,500 former Air Traffic Controllers to reapply for their jobs by October 15, 1993, and to date approximately 5,000 have done so.

815 SIXTEENTH STREET, N.W., SUITE 308, WASHINGTON, D.C. 20006 • (202) 393-2820 FAX: (202) 347-1825

Since 1981 FAA has continually painted a rosy picture of full recovery of the Air Traffic Control system. The previous conclusion that the (ATC) system was over staffed and thus could be returned to normal in a period of less than three years was as erroneous as the current FAA projection and promises to Congress for deliver of a completely automated and new Air Traffic Controll system (AAS) by at first 1993 then 1997 and now sometime after the year 2000.

Currently Air Traffic Control delays cost passengers using the system $7 billion and an additional $3 billion to the cost of operating air craft in the system.

Yet the FAA, despite its own projection that U.S. air traffic will grow 60 percent over the next ten years, and the fact that our air traffic control system currently employees 1,700 fewer controllers than in 1981 (even though the volume of air traffic is 30 percent greater than a decade ago) is making President Clinton's order nearly meaningless by refusing to rehire fired controllers.

The FAA has set a quota of rehiring a maximum of 50 fired controllers per year. If only 2,000 of those who have reapplied for certification indeed meet the stringent qualifications demanded of journeyman controllers, the FAA's policy means that President Clinton's offer would take 40 years to realize.

Further, the FAA has capped the reentry grade for fired controllers at GS-9. Hundreds of those controllers fired by President Reagan were at or above that grade level back in 1981. Rejoining the FAA would mean a significant cut in pay, even for controllers who found work in the Department of Defense (including many who served in Desert Storm) and who have been managing air traffic all during the period of the Reagan ban.

Former PATCO members and, indeed, all of organized labor were relieved and pleased when President Clinton reversed his predecessor's unjust ban. But, if the FAA persists in its policy of foot-dragging, the Clinton order will remain what is today: a hollow gesture.

At the time of the announcement of lifting the ban Secretary of Transportation Pena said the move will help to keep this nation the air traffic control system the safest in the world. Clearly implying that a number of former controllers would be returning shortly to the Air Traffic Controll profession. Eight months later not one single controller has been rehired.

Historically, FAA has under projected the number of air Traffic Controllers required to operate a safe and efficient Air Traffic Controll system. So it is not surprising that they would use budgetary constraint to thwart the intention clearly enunciated by the President when he lifted the ban. We urge you to review carefully any FAA present and future air traffic controller staffing requirements contained in budget submissions.

Prepared Statement of

Stuart G. Morse, Air Traffic Controller

New York Air Route Traffic Control Center

For

House Aviation Sub-Committee

March 9, 1994

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Stuart G. Morse. I am currently employed with the FAA at New York Center as a Air Traffic Control Specialist GS-2152-14. I was originally hired in June of 1969 at New York Center and fired as a result of the PATCO strike in 1981. I appealed my firing and won my case in June of 1986. I was ordered to be fully reinstated and started back with the FAA at New York Center on January 3, 1987.

The purpose of my testimony is to dispel questions concerning the recertification of fired controllers when they return. In my own case, when I returned, I was sent to a new area of specialization, and was fully certified on April 28th,1987, approximately four months later. All of the equipment was and still is the same as when we were fired. There have been a few computer enhancements since 1981, but they collectively took me all of a couple of hours to learn. (I am a computer illiterate). The basic technology has not changed in the center since the early 70's.

I checked around with a few of my fellow controllers who were fired, and some of the medically disqualified controllers who were recalled after the strike, and found out that most of them averaged about four weeks to recertify if they were sent back to their old areas of specialization, and about eight weeks if the went to a new area. There is no doubt in my mind that the former controllers could be recertified within a couple of months, even sooner if they returned to their old areas of specialization.

One other area I would like to touch on is our current staffing at New York Center, which I feel represents many of the hard to staff facilities around the country. On paper, we show to be fully staffed at the funded level, with a few bodies left over. The reality of the situation is that we are understaffed to a point that we have to restrict traffic. A good example is last Friday night, March 4, 1994. I work in Area B, which has a staffing profile of sixteen controllers required for the 3-11PM shift. We only had ten controllers available for duty that night. Two people had been granted annual leave and two called in sick; so as you can see we weren't even starting out with a full staffing profile. No attempt was made to call in overtime because there are no funds available! The traffic had to be restricted because we had to combine sectors. A 15 mile in trail restriction was placed on all departures out of Newark, LaGuardia, Kennedy, Philadelphia, and all the adjacent

satellite airports from 3PM until 9PM local, that were going south or southwest bound Who knows how much this cost the users because of the excessive vectoring required to establish the intrail requirements We had to pull a supervisor (GS-15) from another area to rip the strips off the printers and post then at the sectors This job was formally done by air traffic assistants (GS-7) and that position was eliminated by the FAA's down sizing program The controllers now have had to take over this function They eliminated a body, not a position A couple of times that night we had to stop all the departures and hold traffic due to sector saturation This situation is not uncommon and is going to get much worse as we go into the summer months

Our contract calls for two weeks of annual leave to be granted to each controller during the summer period , and management is very concerned that they can't meet that contractual obligation because of low staffing and not enough overtime funds The contract training firm, SRSA, has had a number of their instructors and other people quit in the middle of a training class they were conducting because of a cut in pay, and we, the controllers, have had to pick up the slack and finish up the training that they have been contracted out to do!

We are hurting badly in the major facilities for controllers and desperately need to bring back many of the fired controllers to help out I urge this committee to take a very close look at the current staffing levels and to come up with the funds to realistically staff the air traffic system A separate funding to immediately hire a large number of fired controllers could possibly ease the summer crunch that is going to happen. Thank you for your time

CHECKOUT TIMES AT ZNY

1.	Stu Morse	12 weeks
2.	Bruce Barrett	6 weeks
3.	Pete Ehrline	6 weeks
4.	Tim Rosequist	6 weeks
5.	Phil Sudano	6 Months (oceanic D boards, new Area)
6.	Walt Michalski	4 weeks (radar) 3 months ocean D boards
7.	Bob Peterson	3 weeks
8.	Carl Repetto	3 weeks
9.	Jim Brennan	4 weeks
10.	Pete Muligan	4 weeks
11.	Joe Maggio	4 weeks
12.	Bill Cripps	4 weeks
13.	Paul Fairley	[illegible] weeks (from ZBW

All of the above are still working Many of the others wh[illegible] gone (Mel C[illegible] John Orolos, Jim Palotino Matt Roulle[illegible]

* ATC DELAY COUNTS *

MONTH	SYS DEPT	ATC DLYS	% ATC	D/L DLYS	TTL DLYS	% DLY
93/01	40607	3555	8.8	1410	4965	12.2
93/02	36513	3221	8.8	1531	4752	13.0
93/03	39753	4177	10.5	1893	6070	15.3
93/04	39926	3800	9.5	1462	5262	13.2
93/05	40675	3610	8.9	1051	4661	11.5
93/06	40116	4116	10.3	1128	5244	13.1
93/07	42508	3769	8.9	969	4738	11.1
93/08	42770	4163	9.7	1091	5254	12.3
93/09	38211	3910	10.2	1482	5392	14.1
93/10	41096	3807	9.3	1699	5506	13.4
93/11	39789	4029	10.1	1935	5964	15.0
93/12	42682	4771	11.1	2331	7102	16.6
94/01	42227	4495	10.6	2276	6771	16.0
TOTAL	527075	51423	9.8	20256	71681	13.6

DATA FROM A MAJOR AIRLINE

* ATC DELAY MINUTES *

MONTH	SYS DLY MINS	ATC DLY MINS	% ATC	AVG ATC DLY	D/L DLY MINS	AVG D/L DLY	TTL DLY MINS	% DLY
93/01	377614	43332	11.5	12	42934	30	86266	22.8
93/02	443667	57733	13.0	17	60892	39	118625	26.7
93/03	576471	80360	13.9	19	80231	42	160591	27.9
93/04	489130	57952	11.8	15	60487	41	118439	24.2
93/05	300029	38920	13.0	10	32064	30	70984	23.7
93/06	336883	56718	16.8	13	41649	36	98365	29.2
93/07	301126	36020	12.0	9	27810	28	63830	21.2
93/08	354995	43600	12.3	10	35377	32	78977	22.2
93/09	359420	67990	18.9	17	55840	37	123830	34.5
93/10	395933	49012	12.4	12	56679	33	105691	26.7
93/11	500480	73099	14.6	18	87540	45	160639	32.1
93/12	585577	81261	13.9	17	104982	45	186243	31.8
94/01	768915	86926	11.3	19	112204	49	199130	25.9
TOTAL	5790240	772921	13.3	15	798689	39	1571610	27.1

INITIAL ATC DELAY

RESIDUAL ATC DELAY

WHAT A WASTE OF HUMAN CAPITAL

The former PATCO air traffic controllers could be a very valuable resource to our nation's economy. They would be able to return to duty with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and be productive almost overnight. Their re employment would provide a strong economic stimulus for the airline industry by providing the air traffic system with high calibre, proven candidates, who would assist in increasing the capacity and efficiency of the system.

This waste of human capital has been allowed to lay fallow for over twelve years. It can and should be recaptured. After all, the American taxpayer has already paid for their training and expertise. We should make use of it.

These former air traffic controllers would be welcomed back into the system by the current controllers. They would be treated as colleagues -- nothing more.

To support our contention that it makes strong financial sense to allow these individuals to reapply, we offer the following fact sheet:

- there are 1700 fewer air traffic controllers today, than there were prior to the PATCO strike in 1981;
- air traffic has increased 28% since 1981;
- it takes 100 applicants to make 1 air traffic controller;
- 56% of those hired fail to qualify as air traffic controllers;
- the average cost of training an air traffic controller, before he or she is assigned to an ATC facility, is $33,000;
- the average cost of on-the job-training (OJT) for an air traffic controller after they are assigned to an ATC facility is $113,500;
- it takes 3 to 5 years to train an air traffic controller, and,
- there is a cadre of experienced and capable air traffic controllers, who would be able to return to the system and requalify within one year.

DISCUSSION:

Our nation's air traffic control system has 1700 fewer air traffic controllers than it had in August 1981. The need is further exacerbated by a 28% increase in air traffic since that time.

If we were to consider "biting the bullet" and recruit and hire the candidates necessary to fill the shortfall, two things would become very obvious; (1) we could not afford it (considering salaries and training costs over 5 years), and, (2) system efficiency and controller morale would be adversely effected (the tremendous training commitment would keep traffic from flowing at its optimum, costing the Airlines millions of dollars a day -- at a time that they cannot afford it and controllers would be required to spend 90% of their time providing OJT).

The answer to this problem is very simple, allow the Reagan fired air traffic controllers to reapply for those needed positions. The fired controller would: (1) provide us with a greater degree of success in the training process -- many more than the current 44% would qualify; (2) become qualified much quicker -- the best estimate is that they would successfully complete the training process in one year as opposed to the 3 to 5 years required by new hires; and, (3) they would bring with them a tremendous amount of valuable experience.

AIR TRAFFIC TRAINING COSTS

FAA ACADEMY / OKLAHOMA CITY, OK

Enroute Controller	$30,007
Terminal Controller	35,895
	65,902
	x.5
Average Cost	$32,951

ON THE JOB TRAINING (OJT)

Enroute Controller	$155,000
Terminal Controller	71,000
	$226,000
	x.5
Average Cost	$113,000

The FAA could waive the FAA Academy requirement for former PATCO air traffic controllers.

It currently takes 3 to 5 years of OJT for a new hires to certify as an FPL air traffic controller. The former PATCO controllers would be able to certify in a fraction of the time.

March 8, 1994

The Honorable James L. Oberstar
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee of Public Works and Transportation
United States House of Representatives
221 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman:

When I testified before your hearings on the health of the airline industry, you struck me as a genuinely concerned, truly honorable gentleman. Since that time I have learned what a rare commodity that is. You are probably the best hope this country has to see the implementation of meaningful reform in the airline business.

KIWI International Air Lines is not alone in suffering the economic harm of a woefully inadequate air traffic control system. During our first calendar year of operation, 1993, we lost an extra $2.3 million due entirely to air traffic control delays into and out of Newark International Airport. The numbers stagger the imagination if applied across the industry.

Until the current controversy surrounding various fixes for air traffic control is resolved, I am convinced we need more and better trained controllers to deal with the existing environment. Today's system can be induced to work at much greater efficiency with the correct approach to people.

Since the President has approved rehiring the former PATCO controllers, a ready made pool of proven professionals is now available. In my opinion, we can use these people now. The former controllers need your help and we need their help.

Thank you very much for your faithful service to our industry.

Respectfully submitted,

Robert W. Iverson
Chairman, CEO
KIWI International Air Lines, Inc.

P.S. I hope you don't mind, but I have used your "veterinarian and taxidermist" joke on several speaking occasions with great success. Of course, I always give you the credit.

Hemisphere Center • U.S. 1 & 9 South • Newark, NJ 07114 • For reservations, call: 1-800-JET-KIWI (1-800-538-5494)
Executive Office: (201) 645-1133 • Fax: (201) 645-1161 • Local Calls: (201) 622-3232 • (908) 353-3232

February 21, 1994

To Whom It May Concern

We are former air traffic controllers that now work as dispatchers for a major carrier. In that capacity, it is our responsibility under the Federal Air Regulations to ensure that flights are operated safely and on schedule. Our industry has been under great financial strain. Extreme cost-cutting measures have been implemented in an effort to return our airline to profitability. Yet there is one major component that is beyond the reach of each airline-- the air traffic control system.

Dispatchers struggle with the inefficiency of the system daily. Flights are held on the ground because of flow control restrictions only to be further delayed in the air by excessive in-trail spacing and airborne holding. As NATCA suggests, an expeditious and economical remedy is to add experienced controllers to the work force. Five thousand trained controllers applied for reinstatement after President Clinton lifted the ban on their employment. In spite of continued losses by the airlines, the FAA refuses to hire a single former controller this year, claiming the system is safe and efficient. We need your assistance to have the FAA take advantage of this experienced pool of controllers.

As former controllers, we would not be interested in reinstatement. However, as employees of a major airline, we are concerned about the future of our company. In our opinion, the five thousand applicants represent one solution to a complex problem. Past history has shown rehired controllers return to their former profession in a quick and efficient manner at a great savings to the government. We appreciate your support regarding this issue.

Sincerely,

Mike Baron
Tim Cannady
Linda Gould
John Kichan
Pat Manion
Gloria Pencek
Ron Pencek
John Plowman
Jo Stoltenberg
Chris Waltenburg

February 18, 1994

To whom it may concern:

I am an airline dispatcher with United Airlines. Prior to this, I was a flight engineer for another airline.

As a crew member I saw first hand how the ATC system "gets by". The ATC's promise to the flying public is for a safe, orderly, and efficient flow of air traffic. Well, one out of three appears to be acceptable performance. The reason safety is usually maintained and why I feel comfortable operating in the system is because I know that the slightest irregularity will slow traffic down to a snail's pace and thereby manageable for the skill level of the controllers.

I don't know what current ATC staffing levels are at; but based on the efficiency of the system and using the logic that more controllers would increase safety and efficiency - then we certainly need more!

As a crewmember I saw the enroute speed restrictions and increased runway spacing being used at unpredictable times. I also became terrified when something unexpected happened -I could hear the uncertainty in the controller's voice.

As a dispatcher I see runway acceptance rates that vary for airports at "crew change" times, indicating ability and confidence problems. Also, traffic pattern configurations are often what appears to be the most comfortable for the controllers and not what is prudent for a more efficient flow of air traffic.

Most of the problems of 1981 are still apparent in the system today. My experience tells me that aside from equipment improvements, the most important decision would be to add experienced air traffic controllers to the system as soon as possible.

Thank you for you time.

Carl S Conant

Carl S. Conant
Airline Dispatcher, United Airlines 1987-present
B727 flight engineer/dispatcher 1983-87
Air Traffic Controller 1971-1981

February 19, 1994

To Whom it May Concern:

We the undersigned dispatchers of a major air carrier ask for your support. The airline industry is undergoing great financial strain. Each in its own way, is looking into every aspect of the business, trying to reduce costs. Everyone has heard the startling figures, more money lost in the last three years than all the profits earned since the beginning of commercial aviation.

CEOs throughout the industry will point to one cost with which they have little or no control: ATC Delays''''' We, as dispatchers, deal with this factor daily. We have seen our flights delayed for hours on the ground, then cleared, only to be put in holding patterns until fuel runs short and then diverted to an alternate airport.

There are factors which we all know contribute to this. Weather is one that we know we cannot control. However, one major factor which contributes to the problem can be controlled. It is the Human Factor.

President Clinton, in an effort to heal the past wounds between labor and government, lifted the ban on rehiring the controllers fired by Ronald Reagan. The president has stated the ideas of "people first" and "jobs" are priorities in his administration. Since the President lifted the hiring ban, over 5000 former controllers have applied for controller jobs with the FAA. It has been proven that, with a minimum of time and training and at a great cost savings, this source of manpower could be put to work as controllers. The current controller's union, NATCA, has implied that they are in favor of rehiring former controllers as a quick, efficient way of relieving the workload on the ATC system.

The FAA's position is "Everything is fine. We don't need them." The FAA's position is that they will not hire a single former controller this year.

This is where your help is needed. Please, do what you can to reverse this unrealistic position of the FAA. We ask you use your contacts within the government and the bureaucracy to convey your concerns about ATC and safety.

I am sure your support on this issue can bring about positive change in the world's greatest airline industry.

David Fench
Tony Sowes
Dean Hill
Thanks,
Ronald L. Lancaster
Paul Bauman
Robert J Horsch
Alan Smith
David A. Sinning
Loraine Sanchez
John W. Harrison

SENT TO CONTROLLERS UNITED VIA FAX TO 516-732-9801

March 7, 1994

AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION.

IN CARE OF: MR. BOB HARRIS, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
CONTROLLERS UNITED, SELDEM, NEW YORK.

RE. AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING

Dear Mr. Harris:

As an Airline Transport Pilot and Airline Dispatcher I would like to share with you and the Aviation Subcommittee the frustration of noticing endless air traffic delays, every day, in spite of ready solutions to the problem.

The Airline Commission assembled by President Clinton last Summer precisely stated that the outmoded air traffic control system is costing airlines and consumers billions of dollars each year in delays, and that current air traffic control equipment is out of date, overworked and incapable of providing the full range of services and efficiencies that could make our entire economy more competitive. The solution to improve the capacity, efficiency, expediency and effectiveness of our nation's Air Traffic Control system is readily available today.

Today's air traffic system does not have to wait for technological progress to improve capacity. It needs the talented former PATCO Air Traffic Controllers who are well experienced and think faster than computers. These are the Air Traffic Controllers who at the peak of the highest air traffic activity ever recorded during 1979 handled over ten thousand more aircraft per day, than today's amount of air traffic, in spite of the fact that the FAA said that air carrier operations have increased 28 percent since the 1981 PATCO strike. The count of airline traffic may have increased, but at the expense of suppressing general aviation which remained flat for the past 13 years.

It has been proven that the former Air Traffic Controllers who have been reinstated into the air traffic system have taken as little as six weeks to fully requalify on the air traffic controlling positions, compared with new controllers that take several years to qualify.

Congressman Oberstar have identified that the aviation contribution to our economy is ten percent (10%) of the Gross National Product. Several million people are engaged daily in the aviation field. If the constrains to the airspace capacity are lifted, the aviation enterprises in this country will again bloom with the resulting economic benefits for our county.

Rehiring the former Air Traffic Controllers is a solution in your hands.

Sincerely,

Alfonso Diaz del Castillo

5501 Seminary Road 815-S, Falls Church, Virginia 22041
Telephone: (703) 820-0998 Fax: (703) 820-0997

CONTROLLER WORK FORCE

(Full Time With Permanent Appointments)
As of December 31, 1993

CATEGORY	TOWERS	CENTERS	TOTAL
Full-Performance Level (FPL) Controllers 1*	7,019	5,639	12,658
Above numbers exclude FPL grade level controllers not yet fully certified all positions in their current facilities	809	170	979
Other Controllers	1,232	1,280	2,512
First-Line Supervisors	1,389	797	2,186
Total Operational Controllers	**9,640**	**7,716**	**17,356**
Developmental Pipeline 2*	138	192	330
Total Controller	**9,778**	**7,908**	**17,686**

1* This figure includes 482 traffic management coordinators; 350 in centers and 132 in towers.

2* These are individuals who have successfully completed FAA Academy initial training or equivalent university level training and are assigned to control facilities but are not yet certified on at least two positions.

SOURCE: APN-100 ISSUED 01\12\94

STAFFING REPORT #3

AIR TRAFFIC FACILITY STAFFING
SOURCE: CPMIS

*** INDIVIDUAL CENTERS
END OF: JANUARY, 1994

ON - BOARD

CENTER CODE	REGION	FPL CNTLRS	TRAFFIC MANAGMT COORDS	TOTAL FPL	DEV 10, 14	NON CERTIFIED FPL	FIRST LINE SUP	TOTAL OPER CNTRL	DEV PIPE LINE	CNTLR WORK FORCE
ZAN	AAL	100	7	107	7	2	11*	1[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
ZKC	ACE	295	15	310	32	7[illegible]	44	4[illegible]		4[illegible]
ZDC	AEA	313	15	328	47	13	48	4[illegible]		43[illegible]
ZNY	AEA	229	16	245	54	8	7[illegible]	1[illegible]		3[illegible]
ZAU	AGL	342	19	361	6[illegible]	9	44	40[illegible]		4[illegible]
ZID	AGL	270	18	288	34	6	30	3[illegible]	4	38[illegible]
ZMP	AGL	244	14	258	55	4	13	1[illegible]		17[illegible]
ZOB	AGL	335	18	353	52	10	41	4[illegible]		4[illegible]
ZBW	ANE	238	16	254	40	6	4[illegible]	34[illegible]	[illegible]	34[illegible]
ZDV	ANM	247	17	264	36	9	31	3[illegible]		3[illegible]
ZLC	ANM	171	11	182	27	5	25	2[illegible]		2[illegible]
ZSE	ANM	193	13	206	16	6	29	26[illegible]		26
ZJX	ASO	254	19	27[illegible]	6[illegible]	11	38	38[illegible]	[illegible]	400
ZMA	ASO	224	13	2[illegible]7	[illegible]7	6	55	5[illegible]		343
ZME	ASO	244	16	26[illegible]	49	7	36	3[illegible]2		[illegible]59
ZTL	ASO	33	0	33	4	8	11	[illegible]5	[illegible]	57
	ASO	357	24	381	74	8	50	5[illegible]3	1[illegible]	5[illegible]6
ZAB	ASW	256	13	269	43	5	38	3[illegible]9	[illegible]	3[illegible]3
ZFW	ASW	275	14	289	61	11	40	4[illegible]	6	40[illegible]
ZHU	ASW	247	18	265	78	8	15	3[illegible]6	2[illegible]	411
ZHN	AWP	33	0	33	0	4	7	52	0	5[illegible]
ZLA	AWP	223	18	241	76	10	33	3[illegible]6	5	365
ZOA	AWP	190	14	204	52	2	33	29[illegible]	[illegible]	313
ZUA	AWP	10	0	10	0	1	2	13		13
CFCF	AWA	0	23	23	0	0	0	23	0	23
TOTALS		5,323	351	5,674	1,075	181	784	7,714	175	7,889

10/16/91 21 BOXER HEATING

ATTACHMENT I

ATTACHMENT I

SOURCE: WEAVER, ATZ 320

REVISED: FEBRUARY 18, 1994

CONTROLLER WORK FORCE

	Prestrike	Fiscal years			
	July 31, 1981	1988	1989	1990	1991*
Controllers					
FPLs[a]	13,205	9,858	10,232	10,824	11,093
Others[c]	[d]	2,594	2,628	2,607	2,872
First-line supervisors	[e]	1,999	2,156	2,204	2,297
Total Operational Controllers	13,205	14,451	15,016	15,635	16,265
Developmental pipeline	1,039[f]	1,985	1,816	1,591	1,345
Total	14,244	16,436	16,832	17,226	17,610

*As of August 31, 1991

[a]Includes traffic management coordinators.

[c]Other controllers, also referred to as operational controllers, include (1) controllers who were FPLs at their previous facility but are not yet full certified on all positions at their current facility and (2) developmental controllers who are certified to control traffic on two or more positions.

[d]Data not available

[e]Prior to fiscal year 1988, supervisors were excluded from the definition.

[f]Includes all controllers at [illegible] BOXER HEATING

WASHINGTON ARTEC

December 21, 1993

Current Authorized FPL	382
Current Authorized TMU	21
Current Authorized Staff	16
Total Authorized	419

AREAS	A	B	C	D	E	F	TOTAL
FPL Percentage Authorized	16.33333	17	16.33333	17	16.333333	17	100%
FPL Authorized Per Area	63	65	62	65	62	65	382
Actual # of FPL'S	49	50	50	51	51	49	300
Discrepancy of FPL'S	-14	-15	-12	-14	-11	-16	-82
Actual # TMC'S Permanant	1	3	2	2	2	1	11
Actual # TMC'S Rotation	2	2	1	2	3	1	11
Discrepancy of TMC'S							1
Actual # Staff DTL'S	1	4	3	6	4	2	20
Discrepancy of Staff's							4
NATCA DTL		2					2
Actual # DEV	9	7	6	5	7	15	49
FPL'S Plus DEV'S	58	57	58	58	58	64	349
Anticipated Discrepancy**	-5	-8	-8	-9	-4	-1	-33
(everyone checks out)							

* 1 added to A area

**1 B dev fail

NEW YORK CENTER 02/03/94

FACILITY STAFFING REPORT for 02/05/94 PAGE 1

ID ENY TYPE ARTCC LEVEL 3 HOURS 0000-2400 PTS PHONE NO ( )663-3401

ATM DICK MARANOVITS AATM ARDYTH WILLIAMS RO OPS SPECIALIST C JONES MUB ZMO REGION AEA

| OPERATIONS | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | FACILITY | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |

The FAA acknowledges our groups ability to quickly check out and become productive Full Performance Level (FPL) controllers. The $100,000 savings we claim the government will save, per rehired controller, is based on the fact that our members will check-out in 2/3 months rather than 2-4 years. GAO studies confirm, that it takes 100 applicants to produce 1 FPL controller...while the rehire of 100 people from our group will produce 100 FPL controllers. Talk about re-inventing Government!

The FAA rationale for not hiring fired controllers is based on the following:

Industry air traffic is down; although the FAA projects a 4% per year growth pattern over the next 10 years. ATC delays are increasing, yet air traffic is down! The present improvement in our national economy is increasing the traffic count figures and, not surprisingly, ATC delays are doubling at one major carrier with an effect through-out the industry. The current ATC system restricts demand by flow control to meet system capacity, contrary to basic business principles of increasing capacity to meet demand Controller staffing is considered one of the principal elements of system capacity.

The attrition rate is down to 2.8% in the DOT; but likely to accelerate with the approval of the buy-out package before Congress. The buy-out is not currently targeted at the safety work-force but may include first level managers creating additional openings for more controllers. FAA staffing data provided Chairman Oberstar does not coincide with the need at the two major facilities we viewed. The buy-out package being finalized in Congress will be offered to 26,124 non-safety FAA people (11,993 in air traffic alone).

Money, the FAA claims a shortfall of $30 million; but the Aviation Trust Fund currently funds half of the FAA operation budget, with Chairman Mineta on record as allowing the use of the fund, if needed, to pay for controller salaries. DOT Secretary Pena indicates a cut of 20% of non-safety personnel is needed to protect the core safety work-force.

Controllers United calls for the immediate rehire of 2,000 fired controllers this fiscal year, with an additional 2,000 beginning fiscal '95. Historically, the FAA mission has been the safe, orderly and expeditious movement of air traffic; the NATCA statement, the increase in operational errors, air traffic delays and equipment failures have eroded confidence that the FAA is fulfilling their mission. Only by quickly addressing the NATCA warning of a *declining margin of safety* within the ATC system can the FAA begin to restore the confidence of the American People. The first quick step to maintaining and increasing that *elusive margin of safety* is to rehire people with proven ability that the system needs.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION 1993

CHAIRMAN BALILES: Mr. Iverson.

JUNE 29 1993 → MR IVERSON: If you will indulge me, I would like to make a comment on the FAA question

I spent most of my career as a pilot, operating in the highest density environment in the United States, which was in and out of this airport, Washington National, and La Guardia

KIWI CEO

I tell you that the single most important component in the air traffic control system is the controller himself. Happy, motivated, enjoyably challenged controllers, can make a difference. Most more so than imposing technology out there.

When you go in to and operate in and out of La Guardia, you are absolutely astounded at how good the controllers are. When you operate in and out of Newark, when they are in a bad mood, you can not believe how long it takes to move a quarter of the same number of aircraft.

REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: It is correct. I've always opposed the increasing percentage of the trust funds that go to operating purposes

To me, whether it's the Highway Trust Fund or the Aviation Trust Fund, those have not been operations and maintenance funds. The automobile that is going to be bought for the Regional Administrator for FAA, ought not to be coming out of the Aviation Trust Funds.

On the other hand, if it is for more air traffic controllers, for those who are on line, then they ought to be, that expense. As we increase the number of air traffic controllers, that ought to come out of the Aviation Trust Fund.

But I have always objected to the increasing percentage of funds being taken out of the Aviation Trust Fund.

Another disturbing trend I see now, in all due regard to my fine friend Chip, is to see airport operating funds being siphoned off by City Hall for their purposes.

Again, I just have some real problems with that kind of approach. So, as we see at the local level operating funds or funds generated by the airport, being funneled down to City Hall, I again feel compelled to be in opposition to this movement of taking more and more operating funds out the trust

JUNE 16 1993

REPRESENTATIVE MINETA: But the problem there is probably multi-fault. Part of it is air traffic control system. Part of it is air traffic controller. I mean, as I recall the numbers, on August 3, 1981, at the time of the strike, we had something like 16,700 air traffic controllers. Eighty five percent of them were full performance level.

Today, we probably have, I don't know, 17,500 or 18,000. Maybe two-thirds of them are full performance level.

So, even if you get into a weather problem like you are talking about, first of all, they probably relied on flow control to even leave Denver

Now that they get en route to Newark and all of a sudden, now they have a weather problem or whatever it is. They do start slowing traffic.

I experienced that when I ride jump seat, as I did two weeks ago, and found that we were 800 miles out of San Francisco, and we were already starting to slow down

So I said, "Why are we slowing down now?" to the Captain. He said, "Well, probably the Air Traffic Controller does not know about trying to deal with a 737 at 35,000 feet and me, a DC-10, at 9,000 or 37,000.

So, we were told to slow down, and all of a sudden we could see a 737 flying ahead of us

But it's not only -- it is capital equipment is related. I think what we have started in the advanced automation system in 1985, 1986 time period, is the correct way. We are unfortunately falling behind schedule on that AAS, but I think that that will help alleviate some of the problems

One of the things that was commented on, was the fact that the Eastern Plan of the FAA, one of the reasons as I recall, they are doing that, was to make sure that they separated the aircraft by capability, so that you didn't have let's say, a CASA, trying to mix the same air, space in the air, with a 757 or 767, because of their difference in capability.

So I think as they did that kind of separating the traffic, then they did start taking them into residential areas and over different paths where people didn't hear aircraft before. Now, all of a sudden, they think they are impacted.

I think the advanced automation system will have a lot to do with some of the problem

The other one I think, is the fact that air traffic controllers will have better experience levels as they stay on the job.

for aircraft certification and operation. And we're looking at ways to reduce costly delays to improve system capacity. And that's what this morning is all about, system capacity and what we can do to increase it.

MR DEL BALZO MAY 27 1993 PRESID COMM.

Our latest aviation forecasts tell us that over the next 10 years, the number of passengers in the system will increase from an average of about 1.3 million a day to over 2 million a day. If our forecasts are accurate, we can look forward to a 25 percent increase in air carrier operations to meet the demand

Today I would tell you that the top 100 of the nation's busiest airports account for 95 percent of all air carrier passengers and 92 percent of all air carrier operations.

And when you think about that kind of concentration, I think you can readily appreciate the fact that it will inevitably lead to system delays because, even with the present economic slowdown, 23 of our country's largest airports experience more than 20,000 hours of delay every year. And over the next five years, we expect serious delays will affect 13 more of our airports

MR. DEL BALZO: I think it is. I think it is promising. I don't think there's any question that we are operating today an inefficient air traffic control system that is costing the carriers money. I can't quantify for you how much that is, but there's no question that we have a system today that is not as flexible as it can be.

27 1993

I believe that today's system is as flexible as it can be given the technology that we are now using. The kinds of things that you have heard from Mr. Pollard would suggest to those of you that look at us carefully that, in fact, we are doing some creative things to take advantage of what the existing technology will allow us to do.

If you'll look ahead for tomorrow, I don't believe there's any question we need to revolutionize the air traffic control system. We need to revolutionize how we manage the airspace.

Before that revolution can take place, an advanced automation system has to be in place because all

For Fair Treatment of Former ATC's

Controllers United

Bob Harris
Executive Director

Russ Klecka
National Coordinator

Arch Bailey
Great Lakes Region

Bob Yanda, MN
Dave Parsley, WI
Bob Holocher, IN
Jim Passales, IL
Alan Thern, MI

Jim Clarry
Eastern Region

Al Spath, NJ
John Carr, MD
Rick Artis, VA
Jack Anderson, DE
Bill Cipolla, PA

Nils Moberg
Western-Pacific Region

John Palmieri, CA
Don Poore, CA
John Lichnovsky, HI
Tom Gandolph, NV
Dan Dufresne, AZ

John Shea
Northwest Region

Mike Dubesa, OR
Tom Billings, OR
Tom Thompson, CO
Larry Hagen,UT

Ken Lancaster
Southern Region

Bob DeVault, FL
Max Boyer, GA
Roy Slamaker, TN
Chuck Thackery, KY
Doug Lesser, AL
Vic Cordero, NC

Sam Scales
New England Region

Paul Cannon, MA
Carl Kertis, ME

Bob Ernst
Alaskan Region

Southwest Region

Marge & Floyd Pryor, OK
Carl Henry, AR
Shirley Hiett, NM
Sal Catalono Sr., LA

Roger Thomas,
Central Region

Robin Nelson, MO
Norb Stracker, MO

GENERAL NEWS RELEASE
CONTROLLERS UNITED, NEW YORK
FEBRUARY 17, 1994

CONTACT: BOB HARRIS
(516)- 732-9801

Controllers United, an organization representing the interests of former Patco controllers, fired by President Ronald Reagan in 1981, welcomes today's NATCA statement that "the ATC System is in dire need of more controllers " NATCA, the union representing the current controller work-force, is in a unique position to accurately report the staffing and safety situation in the National Air Traffic System The NATCA conclusion, that the rehire of former controllers will result in a safer system sends a clear signal to the FAA: Hiring of former controllers should begin immediately

While the American Air Traffic Control System may be the envy of the world regarding safety, NATCA correctly calls attention to a declining margin of safety that is evidenced by increasing numbers of operational errors caused by overburdened airports and overworked controllers. (We have all but one of the globe's twenty busiest airports). The NATCA statement further notes that increasing air traffic, failing equipment and staffing shortages in FAA facilities are contributing to a reduction in the margin of safety. Most importantly, NATCA equates the rehire of fired controllers with giving the American flying public a better staffed, safer system.

Controllers United is mindful of the severe budgetary constraints facing the FAA. Nevertheless to preserve margins of safety, we strongly recommend the immediate hiring of 2,000 former fired controllers with an additional 2,000 to be hired beginning October, 1994 The FAA rehiring of experienced controllers can begin to reduce the increasing airline delays; delays that are seriously undermining the stability of the air transport industry.

We agree that President Clinton showed both compassion and decency when he lifted the ban on August 12, 1993, but his good intentions have been thwarted by the FAA. The FAA has decided they will not hire one fired controller this fiscal year and few, if any, next fiscal year The President put people first when he removed the debarment, while the bureaucracy continues to subvert his vision of giving former controllers **a fair shot at a job.** The fired air controllers loved their profession and retain the necessary skills to become quickly productive.

Controllers United requests the appropriate Committees of the Congress examine the FAA staffing and equipment situation, along with air traffic delays caused by understaffed facilities The American People deserve no less

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FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION OPERATIONAL STAFFING IN PROPOSED FISCAL YEAR 1995 BUDGET

THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 1994

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION,
COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:46 a.m. in room 2165, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Oberstar [chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The Subcommittee on Aviation will come to order.

When we adjourned the hearing last week, we were in the midst of testimony on the Federal Aviation Administration staffing. We had a very long and extensive inquiry, but a number of questions remain, and, therefore, we had to reconvene the meeting. Of course, the session was interrupted by a number of roll call votes which were not anticipated that day, and that, of course, stretched out our hearing day and inconvenienced some witnesses, for which we apologize. We appreciate very much the returnees helping us to round out our picture of staffing of the FAA.

Mr. Broderick and associates, I appreciate your being here. I see we have a new face at the table, Mr. Jeffers in place of Mr. Pollard.

TESTIMONY OF ANTHONY T. BRODERICK, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR REGULATION AND CERTIFICATION; WILLIAM JEFFERS, ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIR TRAFFIC; RUTH A. LEVERENZ, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF BUDGET; AND JOAQUIN ARCHILLA, ACTING ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR AIRWAY FACILITIES, FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Mr. OBERSTAR. The FAA has not met its goals for staffing in the specialized workforces over the past two to three years. Would you take those point by point and go through and give us an explanation of why, what you expect to accomplish this year, and what will be different this year compared to previous years?

Mr. BRODERICK. Mr. Chairman, the basic answer to that is similar for all four of the special workforces—Airway Facilities, the safety regulation and certification folks, Air Traffic, and Security. The short answer is that the budgets are made up a couple of years in advance, with an inability to perfectly predict the relationship between a full-time equivalent staff year and the cost of that staff year.

When we have budget adjustments that are made in the intervening couple of years up and through sometimes even the beginning of the fiscal year before appropriations are finalized, we have puts and takes that are added to the budget or subtracted from the budget which generally result in a somewhat lower amount of money available to pay for the staff than we originally anticipated. So what we do is reprioritize staffing and fill only up to the number of positions that are allotted, looking ahead to the following year so that we don't add too many or too few.

So it's really a question of balancing in the final analysis, at the last half of a percent or so whatever the numbers are, the final pay raises and FERS costs and such items with the original FTE intents, and it's an inability to perfectly forecast it when we make the budget that causes the slight discrepancies at the end of the day.

Mr. OBERSTAR. What are the inputs as this budget goes? It's drafted, developed at the working level, emerges from the field offices up to headquarters, and then what?

Mr. BRODERICK. The budget comes up to headquarters, and early in the year we all get together and go through several iterations of the budget, finally preparing one for the senior executives to present to the Administrator. Once the Administrator makes his final decisions, it goes to OST where they make suggestions for modifications up or down in the various accounts. From OST it goes on to OMB and, of course, up here through the President.

Mr. OBERSTAR. We've always suspected that OMB has a rather heavy hand on these matters, and that varies from program to program. Has OMB significantly changed the recommendations that have gone forth from OST?

Mr. BRODERICK. Not really. The data is actually presented in the budget account by account, what the FAA originally recommended, what OST recommended, OMB, and then, of course, the budget reflects what OMB and the President agree to. My general experience in the last five years or so is that while they help us in general overall policy framework, they certainly don't come in and say, "You can't have an extra 300 safety inspectors," or "You've got to reduce the number of air traffic controllers."

If anything, they're very supportive, frankly, as is OST on the staffing requirements.

But when you're talking about a budget that is a $5 billion operations account that is mostly personnel compensation and benefits, a half-percent change in that account is $25 million, and that is quite a bit of money.

Mr. OBERSTAR. So the OMB interest is more in the gross numbers than in the details. You have said that budget pressures will require the FAA to rethink the traditional ways of operating and become more "business-like." Give us some specific examples of steps—first of all, what it means to be more business-like and specific examples of what you propose to do to achieve that. What does business-like mean?

Mr. BRODERICK. I think it means compared to the general way businesses operate. If you recall, the National Performance Review did some comparisons of typical Government operations with typical businesses in a lot of kind of accounting senses and number-

driven ways. They found, for example, that there were an awful lot more middle managers in Government than in a typical business, and we know in the aviation business and the other high-tech businesses that we see flattening of organizations.

So we intend to apply those kinds of principles to the FAA, not taking people off the boards as air traffic controllers or out of the technician workforce in the AF ranks or the inspector workforce in the safety or security areas, but in trying to eliminate, where possible, middle management by completely restructuring the way we manage the organization and the organization chart that goes with it.

It's something that we haven't done before, but a careful analysis using targets of something like a 10:1 worker-to-supervisor ratio or worker-to-management ratio in 1995 and something greater than that in 1999, more like the NPR recommended ratio of 15:1, has shown us great promise, and we are in the process of implementing that through a bottom-up review. That's just one example.

Mr. OBERSTAR. How has that removal of the middle management layer been accomplished? By the straightlining of FAA removing some of the regional office layering of management?

Mr. BRODERICK. It actually hasn't yet been accomplished in most organizations. Airway Facilities recently completed a streamlining of their organization, and the AT, Flight Standards and Security folks are in the process of designing new structures. AF had a couple of years' head start on us, and they were actually ahead of the National Performance Review as well.

But it doesn't directly involve removing layers in the regional offices, because we had actually done that through straightlining several years ago. What this is doing is removing layers, in my case, for example, between me and a field inspector, or in Arch's case, between him and a field technician, and those layers will come out of the middle management in a restructured business organization.

Mr. OBERSTAR. But at an en route center would not mean removing numbers of first-line supervisors.

Mr. BRODERICK. Not first-line supervisors.

Is that right, Bill?

Mr. JEFFERS. In some cases, sir, we are trying to gain some efficiencies by reducing those numbers, but we believe very sincerely that we have a system that works, we know that it works, and any reductions that we do in the supervisory levels will be done very slowly and very decidedly, making sure that we don't affect the operations at all.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I know that one of the problems in the past has been an inability or, at least, a perceived inability on the part of controllers to get their message to supervisors and on up the line. If you're keeping those lines of communication clear, that's good.

The CHAIR. Mr. Chairman, excuse me.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I yield to the Chairman.

The CHAIR. I appreciate your yielding.

We've seen a very dramatic reduction, Mr. Broderick, in terms of that division dealing with air traffic. I mean, from the peak period of 1991–1992, you're cutting dramatically by the end of 1995. What's happening to the level of service? You just said you're re-

ducing very slowly, but on the other hand, it seems to me it's a pretty dramatic drop.

Mr. BRODERICK. But not in——

The CHAIR. I mean, you can't have it both ways in terms of "Yes, we're doing this in a very slow, deliberate manner," yet on the other hand, the numbers don't reflect slow reduction. It's a pretty dramatic drop. The thing I'm concerned about is levels of service. What's happening?

Mr. BRODERICK. Service is delivered at the lowest level, and if you look at an organization chart not only in terms of Air Traffic, but Flight Standards, Aircraft Certification, Security, and Airway Facilities, we are not taking reductions in the service delivery level, the people that actually control traffic, that actually inspect airplanes, that actually repair radars and do security inspections. Where our intended reductions and streamlining are is above those, in the middle management ranks, Mr. Mineta.

The CHAIR. Okay. Maybe I misspoke in the sense that I was looking at Mr. Jeffers, and I see that Mr. Jeffers is on the air traffic side, and I guess I should have been addressing this to Mr. Archilla, who is on the airway facilities side. I guess that's the area where I've seen the dramatic drop from the peak of 1992, when it was 8,995, and the 1995 proposed is 8,200 in terms of the workforce.

Mr. ARCHILLA. Yes, Mr. Mineta. We've been involved in a strategic planning process in the Airways Facilities organization for the past three years. We've done this in partnership with the PASS union, which is the union that represents the Airways Facilities technicians. We published two strategic plans, and as part of those strategic plans, the intent has been to try and deliver service and make that delivery of service transparent to the users, which are the air traffic part of the FAA and also the flying public.

We've just completed a realignment of our headquarters contingent where, in essence, we have reduced one level of management, and that has saved us 15 percent of the GS–15 employees at the headquarters level. We're right now in the process of addressing the field realignment section. Part of the process in this realignment is being led by one of the executives in the organization who is a senior Airways Facilities division manager for the Central region. In this process of realignment, we have included every representative of the work force, including PASS, with the intent to make no impact on the technician side of the house and take savings out of the middle levels of the organization.

We should be attaining a 10:1 supervisory ratio by 1995 and hopefully a 15:1 supervisory ratio by the 1998–1999 time frame. Again, the majority of savings would come by attrition of supervisory personnel in those categories.

The CHAIR. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman from Tennessee?

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Broderick, if the FAA is turned into a corporation, and I know the final plans are not out yet, but is it likely that the required FAA staff reductions would then be eliminated because most of the staff would be within the corporation and, therefore, off budget? For instance, there have been comparisons to the Postal

Service and the fact that their employees are not counted in the 252,000 reduction. Would that same thing apply to the FAA, then?

Mr. BRODERICK. Since the statute hasn't been written that would put the corporation in place, it's awfully difficult to answer that. We're making the assumption from, certainly, my viewpoint and in the security area, and I think it's fair to say in Air Traffic and Airway Facilities as well, that we are going to organize to deliver services in the best possible way in terms of the supervisory ratios right now.

Now, if a decision is made, then, to accept the proposal of the Administration and go forward with a corporation, the rules that are laid out in the statute would apply to the corporation. I would assume that the part of the FAA that is not included in the corporation, if there is any part that is not included, would come under the same kind of management initiatives that we have right now.

Certainly, if you were to tell me today that tomorrow you are going to be managing in a corporation, not in the FAA, I wouldn't really be doing anything differently in the context of this discussion with regard to streamlining. As I said to the Chairman, we are trying to organize more like a business and take advantage of things that businesses have learned over the last few years in terms of flattening the organization and getting better communications with employees.

Mr. DUNCAN. In 1994 and 1995, the plans are to contract out, I think, 25 Level I towers in each of those years. Is that correct?

Mr. BRODERICK. In 1995, sir, yes.

Mr. DUNCAN. Are you proceeding with those plans? Can you tell me how many towers have been contracted out this year so far?

Mr. BRODERICK. Bill.

Mr. JEFFERS. Yes, sir. Good morning, sir.

Mr. DUNCAN. Good morning.

Mr. JEFFERS. So far this year, we've contracted out two towers, and we have two more to complete. These were both towers that were written into congressional language, one in Athens, Georgia, and the other in Eagle County, Colorado. We have plans to contract out 21 of our existing FAA Level I VFR contract towers, and our plans are to do that in the July/August time frame of this year.

Mr. DUNCAN. And then do you still plan to contract out 25 more next year?

Mr. JEFFERS. Yes, sir, we plan to contract 25 more in 1995, 1996, and the remainder in 1997, which will be approximately 25 each year.

Mr. DUNCAN. How many towers are there total, and after these plans are complete, what percentage, roughly, of the towers then would be contracted out?

Mr. JEFFERS. Right now we have about 418 tower facilities. Approximately 100 of those are Level I and are planned to be contracted out, which would be something slightly less than 25 percent of our existing towers.

Mr. DUNCAN. I have no objection to contracting out. In fact, I think it's a good thing to do at times if it does mean that particular services can be performed in a more economical or more efficient way. But I also have noticed at times that, particularly in the Federal Government—and I'm not aiming this at your agency, but I

have noticed that some of the bigger corporations hire people who used to work for a particular agency and who have real good contacts and connections within that agency, and then they get rip-off or exorbitant-type fees in these contracts. So sometimes the private contracts end up costing us more than if we had not done it.

Is that being watched, and are there any of these contractors that you're dealing with who have former high- ranking employees of the FAA?

Mr. JEFFERS. Right now we are in the process of going through the contracting process for the 100 towers. Up to this point, sir, we have 30 contract towers in the inventory. We've been doing this since 1983. By and large, it's small companies that have gotten these contracts. We have contracted with municipalities, airport sponsors, and they in turn have issued contracts for someone to provide the services.

We plan to issue a total of somewhere between three and five contracts that will include all of the 100 facilities to be contracted. At the present time, it will be a fully open and competitive process, and we have no knowledge at all of any high-ranking officials that might be involved in this.

Mr. BRODERICK. Mr. Duncan, I might just add that it's our estimate that, on average, each tower will result in a savings when it's contracted out of about $200,000 per year to the Government. So the whole program would look to about a $20 million per year savings when it's completed.

Mr. DUNCAN. Well, that's great. I'm certainly glad to hear that. Let me ask you this. You have mentioned that you have obtained the authority with the Office of Personnel Management to offer early-out retirements, but that you still need the buy-out authority to meet your targets. What is the difference between these two, and how many personnel do you expect—have you made estimates of the number that you feel will retire early if the buy-out bill passes or will not retire if the bill for some reason does not get all the way through?

Mr. BRODERICK. The difference between the two, sir, is that in the early-out approval, which was granted to us by OPM and just started this week, you are allowed to retire at the age of 50 with 20 years of service or at any age with 25 years, and, of course, you take a penalty for every year under 55 you are when you make that election.

The difference with the so-called buy-out legislation, which we very badly need, is that there is an additional incentive to take an early retirement. That incentive is to get a receipt of severance pay which is equal to the severance you would get if you had been terminated involuntarily, or $25,000, whichever is less. The buyout legislation has nothing to do with age. It's a combination of the monetary incentive plus early-out, so if you're eligible for an early-out retirement, you would be retiring. If you were not yet eligible for early-out, you would actually just be resigning.

We have estimated that we would—and this is a soft estimate, but we think we would increase by about 500, maybe as many as 700 or 800, middle managers the number of people that would retire and take advantage of the buy-out if that legislation were enacted.

Mr. DUNCAN. You would increase by 500 to 800 over——

Mr. BRODERICK. Something like that.

Mr. DUNCAN. From what figure are you talking about?

Mr. BRODERICK. We're averaging over the year about 100 a month, which I think is a good number for retirements, without either the early-out or the buy-out. So it's a substantial savings for fiscal year 1995 and beyond which we are counting on for this budget that we're talking about.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentleman yield?

One hundred a month? Is that FAA-wide? Is that throughout the whole of FAA?

Mr. BRODERICK. Yes. Fifty thousand people, about 100 a month is a good round number to use.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And of that amount, how many are air traffic controllers?

Mr. BRODERICK. Very few are working on the boards air traffic controllers, because we are fortunate to have, on the average, a very young workforce.

Bill, do you have any numbers on that?

Mr. JEFFERS. Yes, sir. Our attrition rate right now within the controller workforce is approximately 250 a year, and we expect it to remain that over the next several years because of the average age of our workforce.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. DUNCAN. All right. Well, my time has long ago been up, so thank you very much.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If the gentleman has further questions on this line, he's certainly welcome to continue.

The Chair is very happy to welcome to the subcommittee hearings the Chairman of the full committee, who was the Chairman for many years of this subcommittee and who maintains his very lively and active interest in our work. I appreciate that very much, and I appreciate the support of the Chairman in all of our undertakings. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California.

The CHAIR. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me thank you for the great job that you're doing on this subcommittee.

Mr. Broderick, let me ask you about something that I initiated during the time that I was chairing the Aviation Subcommittee, and that's the Pay Demonstration Program. As you will recall, we had a very difficult time trying to get people, at that time especially, to come into Chicago, and I think this has proven itself, but I see that you're working to eliminate this. That concerns me.

As you know, I ride in the jump seat a lot, and when I come through some of the more heavily trafficked TRACONs or en route centers, I wonder what's going to happen once we do away with the PDP. Why should a person who's sitting in a tower in Salt Lake City, when you're short of air traffic controllers in Chicago, volunteer to move or—it just seems that if you're afraid that this may extend into other airports or other facilities, it seems to me there's a rational way to be able to hold the line in terms of extending the pressures you may get in terms of extending it systemwide.

But it seems to me there was a rationale for the TRACONs and the centers that were picked at the time, and it really concerns me that this is being done away with at this time. I mean, I'm not con-

cerned about this because it was done during the time that I was chairing the Aviation Subcommittee. It just bothers me that, recognizing—I mean, when you listen to those fellows in Chicago or the people in Chicago, and they're giving their instructions and then they're not even waiting for a response from the plane, they're just giving out their instructions in terms of outer, inner, turn left at Fox Trot, or whatever, and they're just giving those instructions like this, and you wonder, how can a person do that day-in and day-out when they could be sitting in San Jose in the tower or somewhere where the pressures are not that great?

Mr. BRODERICK. Well, you raise some important points, Mr. Chairman. I think one approach to answering your question is to look back to five years or so ago when you first had the idea. Times were different. We were rebuilding very aggressively a workforce that was severely depleted by the strike. We had a completely different economic situation and a completely different job-related situation than we do today. We also did not have available a pool of people that the President has made available by enabling us to hire back controllers that were fired as a result of the strike.

When you look at the projected cost of this program, it's about $20 million to $22 million.

We also did not have the locality pay differential that is in place this year, and is projected to continue to try and even out the pay imbalances around the country.

So when you take all of these things into consideration, couple that with the very low attrition rate that Bill Jeffers mentioned and the very eager pool of applicants we have who are all proven and qualified controllers, we do not think that the kind of incentive package that was tailored five years ago is necessary to do a good job today.

The CHAIR. Could I interrupt you just at that point?

Mr. BRODERICK. Yes, sir.

The CHAIR. You're being driven by dollars. It seems to me if you look at the OPM management study of the FAA Program, and I quote, "The demonstration project has provided the FAA with otherwise unavailable flexibility to deal with specific critical staffing problems and a limited number of facilities. The demonstration retention allowances have been effective in producing the desired staffing improvements."

NATCA, having done a survey in terms of at the Chicago center, saying that—and this I take from Mr. Ryan's testimony, who we will hear from—saying that, again, at the Chicago center 75 percent of the controllers would retire or request transfers if the pay demonstration is ended.

Not only do we have to look at dollars, but we also have to look at morale, we also have to look at safety, which, to me, if a person is under tremendous pressure, there are safety implications in that. So it seems to me we just can't look at dollars in this thing, but we've got to be able to look at the human side of this, and it seems to me that that's where—I can understand, you're under tough pressures in terms of the resources that you have, and you're trying to do that as fairly as you can. But it seems to me there are areas where you have to treat something maybe a little more differently than something else.

I get the feeling that because of the limited dollars and because you're afraid it may be extended to other areas, I think you'll find us very supportive up here generally to say, hey, there are priorities that we have to look at. We can protect or make sure the sphere doesn't get expanded. Where the needs are the highest, we ought to direct those resources there, not sort of take a cookie-cutter approach to use the same template from the Atlantic to the Pacific and in effect throw the baby out with the bath water.

Mr. BRODERICK. Your comment sounds exactly like many of those that I heard in the debates among FAA senior management talking about what we should do about this, and I can tell you that there's not a single person in the FAA that doesn't wish that we had the ability not only to fund this kind of pay incentive, but to apply funding elsewhere. There are many pockets within the country that, if we had the ability, we would structure the resources a little bit differently. We've taken all those things into account, and we've tried to balance resources and apply them where they are needed most.

If you take a look at the budget, we have very jealously guarded the safety workforce numbers. In fact, we have increased the safety inspectors and the certification personnel because we saw a need to do so this year. We had to take $5 billion worth of needs into account, roughly speaking, when we put together the $5 billion budget, and unfortunately that was one of the things that we decided we would have to do without and that we could do without safely.

The CHAIR. Well, I know it comes from a pay grade a little higher than yours.

Maybe I could ask Ms. Leverenz, since you're out of the Office of Budget at FAA, given the pressures you are under with the total FAA budget, again, in terms of management resources from what I've heard, a lot of resources are going into the formation of the corporatization of the ATC when we ought to be putting our resources into programs like this or things like correcting the advance automation system instead of trying to take that margarine and spread it all over the piece of bread smoothly and evenly without doing some surgical fine tuning to be able to direct resources to where—I don't know, maybe it's my own myopia or something, but it seems to me that this is a little different from other kinds of budgetary pressures that the FAA is facing.

Ms. LEVERENZ. Mr. Chairman, I understand what you're saying. Actually, the 1994–1995 budget does not propose any money for the ATC corporation. That will follow after the legislation comes to the Hill, but there's no money in the 1995 budget that has any effect related to the ATC corporation.

The CHAIR. Let me ask you if the FAA is using people, let's say, in the General Counsel's Office, even though there's one line item that says X number of dollars for ATC corporatization, are there people being tasked within the General Counsel's Office? Are there people being tasked over here in the air traffic control side or wherever? Maybe what I'd like to ask is if you could submit a list of those numbers and names maybe of the people who are working on that just to give us an idea of the magnitude of the workforce. Even though, I understand, it's not budgeted as a line item.

Ms. LEVERENZ. We'll certainly be happy to provide that for the record. There is a task group that is working on the legislation, of course, and then there's a senior team with members from DOT as well as FAA and outsiders that are working on it. But we'll be happy to provide that for the record, sir.

[The following was received from Ms. Leverenz:]

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Jim Van Namee	FAA, NAS Development

The CHAIR. I just use that as an example of where some of the resources may be diverted to what I think are a little more immediate in terms of our needs. And I, again, appreciate the pressures that all of you have, but I would hope that you would take a little more careful look at where some of these needs are.

Locality pay takes care of his or her ability to buy or rent in Chicago or San Francisco or New York. It doesn't do much to compensate for the pressures of the work itself. So you take care of the rent, but what about the pressure of the individual who is at work? It seems to me that has to be compensated as compared to a person who's sitting in a tower in Austin, Texas or at the en route center in St. Paul-Minneapolis.

Well, again, Mr. Broderick, I just want to thank all of you. You do good work, but we just keep on, I guess, pushing you to look at these a little more carefully in terms of trying to make that distinction where you can so that you don't just use this 5 percent across-the-board cut, 7 percent, whatever it is. To me, we don't need people of your caliber doing that. We could do that with a lot lesser people at less pay, but we don't do that. We want good people, and we're willing to compensate you as good people in your jobs.

So I would hope that you would look at it the same way as the people on the firing line, because they're the ones who are day-in and day-out providing the safety of the system. Thank you very much.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for raising that matter of the Pay Demonstration Program and pursuing it so thoroughly.

Before I go to Mr. Ehlers, I just have a comment. I think the Chairman was very kind when he referred to the enormous amount of effort being spent within the FAA and within the Department of Transportation of spreading the margarine around on this matter of corporatizing the ATC. I would call it spreading the snake oil around, because that's really what this is, a snake oil idea, and it's a colossal waste of time, in my judgment, and the FAA and the DOT personnel need to be spending more of their time on fixing the problems within the FAA than wasting their time on ideas in search of a mission. That's really all that is.

Mr. Ehlers, welcome to the committee.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you very much.

Mr. OBERSTAR. We're glad to have you with us here.

Mr. EHLERS. Thank you. I appreciate that.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Our newest Member on the committee.

Mr. EHLERS. I just wanted to follow up the Chairman's comments very briefly in support of what he has said. I visited the air traffic control center in the Chicago area some years and also spent some time in the tower at O'Hare, and——

Mr. OBERSTAR. And you still flew? [Laughter.]

Mr. EHLERS. Yes, although I try to avoid O'Hare at this point. Many years ago, I was a private pilot, so I've always been interested in this. I was impressed, and I still am every time I fly into and out of O'Hare and listen to the chatter over the ear phones the airlines provide you when they pipe it through. It's just incredibly

busy and intense, and obviously that's high-pressure duty and high-stress duty. It's a real concern to me.

I also just wanted to comment on the reductions in staff, and I realize, as a Republican, I'm supposed to be very concerned about Government waste, fraud, and abuse and cutting staff and things of that sort, but I've always distinguished between what I call real economy and false economy, and I think we're kidding ourselves and we're kidding the public if we think we can cut every department uniformly in the Federal Government, and in particular if we're talking about substantial cuts in the air traffic control operation. I would regard much of that as false economy.

Perhaps the contracting will work. Perhaps we will save some money that way. I'm willing to be convinced on that. But I do want to register some concern about decreasing safety, increasing workloads in that area, because I know from personal experience many of these positions are very stressful, and you simply can't put anymore work on the people there, and I wanted to register that caution.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Ms. Danner?

Ms. DANNER. No comments at this time, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Collins?

Mr. COLLINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I enjoyed you taking a plug out of somebody's seat there a while ago.

In reference to touring towers, I had the opportunity to visit the tower at Hartsfield in Atlanta during the break. I also went on down to Hampton to the air traffic control facility there. But after those visits, I drove my pickup back up here. I'm kind of glad I did, because I received a letter here—I've flown several times since then, but I received a letter here from one of the controllers down there telling me about an instance that's dealing with the traffic collision avoidance system.

I do hope that we pay attention to some of the problems that we have with equipment as far as safety is concerned and work toward an enhancement of the equipment and replacing some of the obsolete equipment with your equipment. I do join millions of people flying in this Nation, especially in and out of Hartsfield, where this particular equipment is located.

Thank you. That's all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I'm very pleased the gentleman has taken the time to visit the tower, and the gentleman from Michigan has done the same to visit air traffic control facilities. It's a great education to see the enormous skill, dedication, and talent at those boards and the pressures that the controllers work under and the need for modernization of the technology that they operate to make the system work well.

That's why I'm so disappointed that the Pay Demonstration Program is being discontinued simply because somebody somewhere in the Department or FAA or OMB has said there isn't money for it. I just want to remind the witnesses, the FAA, and the Department that it was Mr. Mineta, as Chairman of this subcommittee several years ago following extensive hearings into the deficiencies in the inspection workforce, who offered the amendment on the floor, and

I was then Chair of the Investigations Subcommittee, and we had corroborated those findings, and I supported that amendment vigorously, and we prevailed, getting $10 million in additional funding for hiring of more people for the inspection workforce.

I say that to again remind our friends at the FAA that we support you. We want you to be your best. We want you to have the resources you need, and when there is a funding problem, we'll go to bat for you. I think as Mr. Broderick knows, it's been this subcommittee, under at least the past two chairmen, who have battled for additional funds for the F&E account, for the O&M account, for the AIP account, even when you were under the gun from OMB and OST not to do so or to stand pat, keep quiet, don't ask for more.

So I just don't buy the argument we can't afford to do it. We can't afford not to proceed with making this Pay Demonstration Project not a demonstration, but a permanent part of the FAA landscape. It gives you the flexibility needed to keep the workforce fresh, strong, offer opportunities for growth to better staff the most challenging facilities.

We talked a moment ago about reduction of middle managers, if you will, as part of the plan to be more "business-like." I've observed the downsizing of the iron ore mining and processing industry in my district, and just as an anecdote, one of the plants, which had 3,000 workers, kept cutting the workforce, and their costs were still high. Finally, they said, "We discovered that we had two managers for every production worker, and we started cutting the management side," and their productivity went up and their costs went down, and they achieved this not quite 10:1, but something more reasonable in terms of ratio of workers to managers.

But there comes a point where you can't effectively manage with fewer people. What is that point? What is that ratio, and does it differ from workforce to workforce within the FAA?

Mr. BRODERICK. It does differ, Mr. Chairman. When looking at the individual work force divisions in FAA, we see a generally stable number in the Airway Facilities area for the next few years. We see a similar pattern numerically in Air Traffic, but you have to remember that the Level I contract tower program is added on top of Air Traffic's figures, so that's a little bit misleading.

There's effectively quite a bit of labor left to absorb growth in air traffic when you factor out the workload that is being contracted out in the contract tower program. Security is generally stable over the foreseeable term, but the safety inspection and certification workforce is, as reflected in our budget, growing.

So it is different from workforce to workforce. It is not as if we've put a template across the board and just sliced off all the top parts of it.

Mr. OBERSTAR. On the safety inspection workforce, what are your plans for staffing for, say, the next five years in the safety workforce—numbers of people, ratio of workforce to managerial level, stationing of those personnel, and so on?

Mr. BRODERICK. I wish I could give you some detailed numbers into 1996 and beyond. We haven't yet completed a study that is under way right now to go out to about 1998 and try to plan that accurately. We are looking at, as we discussed earlier, the manage-

ment reduction and restructuring. We likely will redeploy a small portion of our workforce, probably because growth in demand, especially certification in the South, for example, has grown quite a bit over the past few years. So we're looking at what to do to address that workload.

But as a general statement, we're going to take our staffing standards as revalidated and, just as we have for 1995, apply them to 1996, 1997, and 1998, and if we have needs, we will ask for them. We don't see any major geographic restructuring of the workforce, but as I said, there may be a couple of offices that will need to be beefed up in the Southeast.

Mr. OBERSTAR. What is the number of maintenance inspection and other aspects of safety inspection work force?

Mr. BRODERICK. Bill, do you want to talk about the Air Traffic numbers, and then, Arch, you can mention what the Airways Facilities numbers are.

Mr. JEFFERS. Yes, sir. For the outyears, we're looking at modest growth in the controller work force numbers to accommodate what we believe now will be traffic growth between 5 and 6 percent between the years of 1995 and 1998. Beginning this year, we will have a 250 reduction in our requirements, based on the contract towers. Ultimately, that will involve 1,000 less CWF required to do the job. Starting in about 1996, in addition to these 250 controllers a year we'll be reassigning, we'll be adding approximately 100 a year to build the controller work force to accommodate traffic growth.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, 17,000 plus what?

Mr. JEFFERS. We don't have a specific number for the 1995–1998 timeframe yet. We think that the growth rate of approximately 100 a year in addition to the 1,000 less requirement will give us the increases that we need to accommodate the relatively moderate traffic growth.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

Mr. Archilla.

Mr. ARCHILLA. In the Airways Facilities side, Mr. Chairman, we expect a fairly stable number similar to that projected in 1995. As I mentioned earlier, the gains would be obtained through attrition in the field organization from the supervisory and managerial levels to dedicate those resources to the actual first-line work conducted by the Airways Facilities technicians.

We've also been working on one item that you mentioned earlier regarding how could we oversee the work of our personnel, and, fortunately, one of the areas that we're working in collaboration with the PASS organization is in developing a self-managed team concept that would allow more empowerment of the Airways Facilities technician and the organization to address specific issues as far as workload is concerned.

In fact, at the Airways Facilities executive board meeting that we had in Nashville last October, we got a briefing from Mr. Howard Johannssen, who's the president of PASS, on a visit that he had made to the Saturn plant in Tennessee. Some of the concepts that Saturn is using as far as empowering its work force and working as a team are some of the concepts that we plan to implement in the Airways Facilities organization.

Mr. OBERSTAR. What about the maintenance inspection?

Mr. BRODERICK. In aircraft maintenance, sir?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes.

Mr. BRODERICK. That will be part of the growth that we see certainly in the short term, in 1995, and we will be completing our study and validation of staffing standards for 1996 and beyond to see where things will go in that area.

I might just note for your information that it's in the maintenance and avionics areas that we see the large increase in requirements in the Flight Standards work force as opposed to the flight operations area. Flight operations is actually relatively good, but the increased demand is in the maintenance area.

Mr. OBERSTAR. What is that work force now? What does it total?

Mr. BRODERICK. Our estimate of the total number of Flight Standards work force is 3,534 in 1995. The 1994 end-of-year estimate is 3,303. You can see a growth in there of 230. Aircraft Certification in 1994 is 826, with a projection for 1995 end-of-year of 900.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. In the past, prior to the President's order of last summer removing from the PATCO controllers the opprobrium, did the FAA object to contract towers hiring fired air traffic controllers?

Mr. BRODERICK. Bill:

Mr. JEFFERS. No, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. But there was objection in the past to contractors who were doing training of FAA air traffic control personnel, which contractors might have had on their staff a fired air traffic controller?

Mr. JEFFERS. Yes, sir, that is correct. We did raise objections to those contractors that were providing training services within FAA facilities.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Presumably, with the President's order, there will be no such objections raised in the future?

Mr. JEFFERS. That is correct, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. But there was never an objection to a contract tower hiring a PATCO controller?

Mr. JEFFERS. To the best of my knowledge, no, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think I asked this question last week, but I just want to come back to it again. Contract towers over the next three years at the rate projected would mean a reduction of 900 people who would not actually be released from FAA, but would be moved to other positions within FAA, within the air traffic control work force, to replace retirees.

Now, if those numbers are right, you'd have over three years 900 openings for contract towers. I would think that the former air traffic controllers would be a fruitful place for contract towers to look for a work force.

Mr. BRODERICK. We have agreed to examine that.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The record will reflect that the panel is nodding yes.

Mr. BRODERICK. We have agreed to examine that, Mr. Chairman, and although today Bill Pollard is at the dedication of the Southern California TRACON, he will be looking at that, and we will be getting back to you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

Do my colleagues have any further questions? Let me recognize Mr. Clinger for a question at this point.

Mr. CLINGER. One question, if I may. Last year the General Accounting Office said that the FAA was using contractors because of the shortage of maintenance technicians. My question is, is FAA hiring contractors to deal with the shortage of maintenance staff?

Mr. BRODERICK. Arch.

Mr. ARCHILLA. Mr. Clinger, the reason that we recruit contractors to do work that would be normally performed by Airways Facilities technicians would depend on a system-by-system basis. In other words, when a system is being procured by the agency, we conduct a cost-benefit analysis, and normally the service provided by a contractor is done on an interim basis, and that would be to allow us time to train our technician work force to do the maintenance.

Now, if by any chance the system that is being procured is a system that would be considered a "throw away" system or a system whose life cycle would be fairly short, and if the cost-benefit analysis indicates that it would be cheaper to do that work by a contractor, we would do so based on a good business decision. But normally the majority of the work that we perform is conducted within our own resources.

Mr. CLINGER. Okay. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. One of the concerns that has emerged from insiders and outside observers, including a subsequent witness this morning, Mr. Ryan of ATA, is that reduction in headquarters staffing could affect progress on GPS, the global positioning satellite, on Data Link, on other such high-priority, high-visibility programs. Will those programs be affected, or how will they be affected?

Mr. BRODERICK. It's just not going to happen. We're going to add staff to the GPS program. We will have to make our commitments. As you said, and as Mr. Mineta urged earlier, we are not going to take an across-the-board approach to this. We are going to look individually at program areas and individually within those areas at individual projects to make sure that we put resources where the real need is.

To be sure, we're going to have to prioritize, and everybody's not going to get all the staff that they'd like, but you just mentioned two of the highest-priority programs in the agency beyond the safety activity that we have, and we are certainly not going to sacrifice progress in those programs.

The Data Link Program that we have, the two-way data link over the ocean, is something that we've accelerated just recently, and we have made commitments to deliver productivity savings to airlines in the Pacific through the FANS–1 package that they are investing in in 1995. We've accelerated our efforts to allow sole-means navigation in the oceanic areas using GPS, hopefully, to make that approval this year, and we are doing everything that's humanly possible to make GPS available as early as 1996 with augmented services.

So those programs are going to get the attention that they need, and we are going to try and cut out, where possible, activity that

is a much lower priority or perhaps made redundant by Government-wide streamlining.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. While we're on the subject of GPS, last year we had testimony from FAA that was just so encouraging and promising for the future that FAA is way ahead of the curve, way ahead of the regulatory curve, and clearing the decks for GPS. I think all the airline executives who testified were praising FAA for its leadership. Is there any present impediment that you know of to continuing this rate of progress with GPS? Apart from the fact that satellites didn't work on March 1. That wasn't FAA's problem at all.

Mr. BRODERICK. That story in Aviation Daily was a bit puzzling, because we have had a 21-satellite constellation up and running ever since it was declared operational. They were talking about satellites that are actually in addition to, over and above, what has been the guaranteed service. So there hasn't been even one second of interruption of the guaranteed GPS service since it was declared operational.

Mr. OBERSTAR. So that report of dysfunctional satellites was——

Mr. BRODERICK. No, the satellites that were dysfunctional weren't needed as part of the operational constellation of 21.

Mr. OBERSTAR. It did not affect the operation of GPS?

Mr. BRODERICK. No, sir, it did not. But the answer to your question is that there are no technological obstacles that we see to GPS. We, of course, haven't delivered it yet, so we may run into the normal technical glitches. Our biggest challenge is going to be to go through the procurement hoops that we have to go through to write the specifications, put the contract bid out, evaluate proposals, hopefully not have protests, but that's an unrealistic hope nowadays.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Procurement of what? Of these ground correcting stations?

Mr. BRODERICK. Of the ground stations, of the software, of the satellite uplinks, and of the augmentation services that the satellite will need to provide.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Why doesn't FAA just simply ask OMB for an exception to do the procurement that NASA does outside of the GSA rules?

Mr. BRODERICK. One of the first things we are doing right now, literally as we speak, is looking at whether the FAA Administrator or the Secretary of Transportation has that authority and whether we would need to go further. But we will be trying to take advantage of every prudent shortcut that we can to continue to deliver this service actually before it can be taken advantage of by equipped aircraft.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You'll be relieved to know I have only two more questions.

Mr. BRODERICK. Thank you, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have to ask about the New York and Washington centers. We have testimony later today that both centers are staffed at far below their current staffing standards, and that contrasts with data submitted from FAA to our subcommittee last fall. In fact, as we often do get communications, this one says, "Last week Washington center had 20 percent of its workforce in the B

area either medically disqualified or controllers on traumatic leave due to system errors. On March 4th, the A area had two system errors. Washington center has had over 160 errors or deviations during the last 30 months. We need help now, not later. Concerned controllers, Washington center."

Mr. JEFFERS. Mr. Chairman, I don't have the staffing figures for Washington center. I would like to address that in just a moment.

For New York center, the regional authorized staffing at New York center is 335. They have 352 controller work force on board, which is 17 above the regional authorized. As you know, sir, the staffing standards that are developed nationally are good at the aggregate level, they're good at the national level, and very accurate at the regional level. They're not quite so accurate when you apply them at the facility level. One of the important functions of the regional division manager is to allocate the regional resources. They know of the specific operational and personnel situations at the facilities and allocate the resources accordingly.

Washington center, as I said, sir, I don't have the on-board staffing. We have had an increase in operational errors at Washington center. We have done a quality assurance audit there and in fact will be meeting there tomorrow to determine if there's further action that needs to be taken. I was unaware of some of the information you just gave me, but we'll be happy to look into it and provide you some feedback.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I'd very much appreciate either an oral report or a written report. I think that's a very serious matter that needs to be addressed, and I'm glad you are, you said, tomorrow having a meeting on this?

Mr. JEFFERS. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Sometime next week, early next week, give us a report.

Mr. JEFFERS. I will do that, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

If there are no further questions, I thank our FAA panel for their thorough responses to our questions and urge you to continue keeping, as you have done, the air traffic control workforce at its highest level of efficiency, focusing on the personnel requirements of this intensely human involvement agency. It's not one that computers operate, it's not E-Mail, this is not voice mail. This is one system where a human has to respond and where the human response is absolutely critical—and one that we expect to operate at the highest level.

Going back to an often-repeated statement on my part, the 1958 Act of Congress establishing the Federal Aviation Administration made no fewer than six references to safety and in its opening paragraph enjoined the new agency to maintain safety not at what can be afforded, not at the lowest possible price, but at the highest possible level of safety. That's your mission, and we expect no less.

Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. I apologize, Mr. Chairman, for interrupting that, but it dawned on me that since we have the FAA leadership, most of it, in front of us, I'd like to put this question to them.

I've lived in Washington off and on for 14 years in past incarnations, and this is the first year I experienced ice, so I am very sen-

sitive now to ice on airplanes. I think an excellent suggestion has been made that there ought to be a central deicing facility in each major airport that is subjected to ice that all airlines could have. Maybe it's been asked, but I'd just like on the record to know what's FAA doing about it, because the way we're doing it now is hazardous.

Mr. BRODERICK. Well, the FAA is aware of and supports, both morally and financially, the construction of centralized multipurpose deicing facilities should that be appropriate for an airport. It turns out, though, that in the last couple of years, because of the icing hazards that exist if not properly taken care of, we have aggressively stepped up the deicing and anti-icing programs that are applied by pilots and maintenance people before takeoff.

We have had a very successful change in the way we do that business, working with the air traffic controllers, the airport operators, pilots, and maintenance folks, so that we make sure that not only is the airplane properly deiced, but that it has a very prompt takeoff after deicing so that there is no hazardous icing formed.

It turns out that it's a lot more complicated than it sounds to build a deicing facility that is capable of handling the flow of aircraft that is normally associated with a busy airport. If it's appropriate at an airport, we will be happy to work with the airport and support the construction of such a facility, but the airlines generally find that the new, quite sophisticated computer-controlled deicing trucks, coupled with a good deicing program, that are used decentralized—that is, you can place several of them around the gate area—is a more efficient way to do it. We have put together a program that makes sure that that efficiency is not obtained at the expense of safety.

We're proud of the deicing program we have today, and that's why this winter we were once again glad to see an ice-related accident-free season.

Mr. HORN. Well, one of my friends went through four deicings before takeoff, and that's what brought this to mind, and it seems to me that we've got to get away from airline parochialism on their own deicing and have a centralized service where you're going through that right before you're going down the runway. Because as we know, the pilots are not able to see the wings from the cockpit.

Mr. BRODERICK. It turns out that's why we require in some cases, depending on the airplane and depending on the time and the specific circumstances, the pilot or co-pilot or flight engineer to actually go back into the cabin and take a look at the wings to see what has happened.

When you have one central deicing facility at a rate of four to seven minutes per airplane, you obviously are going to have a flow rate of airplanes to the end of the runway that is a maximum of 15 and may be as low as something like seven or eight per hour. We really need to have a flow rate of typically 40 per hour at busy airports, and so that's why a single deicing facility is not really always the optimum solution. But it can be, and we are happy to work with airlines to help it be part of the solution.

Mr. HORN. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you. Again, we appreciate your participation last week and again this week, and we look forward to receiving the information that we have requested in the course of these two days of hearings.

Mr. BRODERICK. We appreciate your support and that of the subcommittee Members, sir. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much.

I would like to insert into the record at this point a statement from Representative Corrine Brown of Florida.

[Statement referred to follows:]

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Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

CORRINE BROWN
3D DISTRICT, FLORIDA

REPLY TO
☐ WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1037 Longworth Building
Washington, DC 20515
(202) 225-0123
FAX (202) 225-2256

DISTRICT OFFICES:
☐ 815 South Main Street
IBM Building, Suite 275
Jacksonville, FL 32207
(904) 398-8567
FAX (904) 398-8812

☐ 75 Ivanhoe Boulevard
Chamber of Commerce
Orlando, FL 32809
(407) 872-0555
FAX (407) 872-5753

☐ 401 SE First Avenue
Room 316
Gainesville, FL 32601
(904) 375-8003
FAX (904) 375-8006

☐ 250 North Beach Street
Room 80-1
Daytona Beach, FL 32114
(904) 254-4822
FAX (904) 254-4859

March 17, 1994

The Honorable James L. Oberstar
Chairman
Subcommittee on Aviation
2251 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Chairman Oberstar:

Thank you for holding today's hearing on "Implications for Federal Aviation Administration, Staffing from FY 1995 and Beyond Budget Freeze." I am hoping to join you at today's hearing.

However, I have two other hearings that are going on at the same time. If I am unable to attend today's hearing, I would appreciate it, if you would enter my statement and question for the FAA into the record.

With warmest regards, I am

Sincerely,

Corrine Brown

Corrine Brown
Member of Congress

CB:jr

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

Representative Corrine Brown
Subcommittee on Aviation
Hearing on Implications of FAA's Proposed Staffing Cuts
March 17, 1994

Statement

Thank you, Mr, Chairman for holding today's hearing. My main concern is safety of the traveling public and the aviation industry. I want to know if FAA's proposed staffing reductions are going to have an impact on safety, and lead to more dangerous skies and airports.

It is my understanding that the current staffing shortage led to two separate incidents at Tampa International Airport in February, 1994. Two newspapers have reported that airplanes were unable to land for nearly nine hours on February 12th and 13th at the Tampa Airport because there were not enough technicians available to fix equipment. More than 100 planes bound for Tampa were delayed or diverted from Tampa's Airport because "a safety device broke and no one was on duty to fix it."

Question

In light of the incidents at Tampa International Airport, can you assure Congress and the public that additional staffing reductions will have no impact on safety?

LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 2 STORIES

Times Publishing Company

St. Petersburg Times

February 17, 1994, Thursday, Tampa Edition

SECTION: NATIONAL; EDITOR'S CHOICE; Pg. 1A

LENGTH: 742 words

HEADLINE: Controllers question TIA safety

BYLINE: BILL ADAIR

DATELINE: TAMPA

BODY

Dozens of planes were delayed or turned away from Tampa International Airport over the weekend because a safety device broke and no one was on duty to fix it.

Air traffic controllers said the airport was closed to arrivals early Saturday morning for six hours and Sunday for almost two hours because of a malfunction with a device that measures visibility. Technicians for the device no longer work weekends, so hours elapsed before it was repaired.

Unions representing the controllers and technicians complained Wednesday that the Federal Aviation Administration does not have enough technicians working weekends or late at night.

"Controllers here are real skeptical about whether this equipment is reliable or not," said Joe Formoso, who heads the local chapter of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association. "I'd like decent, reliable equipment. And I'd like technicians readily available when problems occur."

The incident is part of a new debate about staff cuts as the FAA modernizes the air traffic control system. The FAA says its computers will need less maintenance.

Controllers and technicians say the agency is cutting staff too quickly. They contend that the modernization plan is years behind schedule and that more technicians will be needed.

The device that broke, the Runway Visual Range (RVR), tells controllers about visibility. They pass along that information to pilots, who must determine in foggy weather if there is enough visibility to land.

Weather at the airport was foggy over the weekend, so the RVR was crucial, controllers said. The outage primarily affected arriving flights, but many departures were delayed when visibility dropped below one-fourth of a mile.

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St. Petersburg Times, February 21, 1994

Bob Johnson, the FAA assistant division manager for airways facilities, conceded Wednesday that the agency moved too slowly to repair the device and said the FAA would try to respond more quickly in the future.

He said FAA officials have discussed the problem with the Tampa maintenance supervisor "and expressed our opinion that we should have had somebody out there earlier."

He said the schedule reductions for technicians were justified because controllers' equipment is gradually being replaced.

"The new equipment that has come on line has increased reliability and meant less maintenance," he said.

Until January, technicians were on duty for 16 hours each weekday and eight hours each weekend day, Johnson said. Now they're on duty eight hours each weekday and not scheduled on weekends.

The FAA has maintenance centers staffed 24 hours a day to take reports about broken equipment. The agency's goal is to have technicians arrive within two hours of a trouble call.

The device was broken when the airport's low visibility required pilots to get RVR readings: from 3:45 a.m. to 9:40 a.m. Saturday and from 6:55 a.m. to 8:37 a.m. Sunday.

Formoso estimated that more than 100 planes bound for Tampa faced delays or were diverted because of the problems. Some were diverted to other Florida airports. Some circled overhead until the airport reopened and some were held on the ground before they departed for Tampa.

USAir and Delta Air Lines each reported several Tampa flights with major delays or diversions.

FAA officials had no numbers about the number of flights affected, but they said the fog in Tampa would have caused some delays regardless.

The device has now been fixed, they said, and may have been broken because two wires were crossed. It has been around for years and been very reliable.

"If we have a piece of equipment that has gone for five years and not had any outage, I don't think it makes any sense to have people watching it 24 hours a day," Johnson said.

The unions disagree. "By the time some of these people get in here, you have one- or two-hour delays and it blows the whole system," said Joseph M. Bellino of the controllers' union. "Tampa is one of our major facilities and it happened two nights in a row."

Bellino said "safety and reliability will continue to take a back seat" until the FAA has the technicians work more hours.

Marvin Long, vice president of the Professional Airways Systems Specialists,

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Services of Mead Data Central, Inc.

St. Petersburg Times, February 21, 1994

the union that represents technicians, said his group has repeatedly asked Congress to approve more hours and more staff. "We think it's essential to prevent situations like this."
GRAPHIC: BLACK AND WHITE PHOTO, Times files; an air traffic controller works at his station

LANGUAGE: ENGLISH

LOAD-DATE MDC: February 21, 1994

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Mr. OBERSTAR. Our next witness is Mr. John R. Ryan, Vice President, Air Traffic Management, for the Air Transport Association.

Mr. Ryan, welcome. We're glad to have you here this morning, and a special appreciation for rearranging your schedule to be with us this week as well as last week. You sat through a fair amount of last week's hearing, and I'm sure it was beneficial for your purposes. So, again, we welcome your testimony, and you may proceed delivering your testimony in full or summarizing it, and, of course, the entire text will appear in full in the hearing record.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN R. RYAN, VICE PRESIDENT, AIR TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT, AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

Mr. RYAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure to be here. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss our views on the Federal Aviation Administration operations and staffing needs. These needs account for the largest single portion of the annual FAA budget request and represent the most important part of the FAA budget for the airline industry.

Mr. Chairman, there are two issues I wish to discuss today that concern the airline industry: number one, the termination of the FAA's Pay Demonstration Program; and the Administration's program to streamline the bureaucracy.

The DOT and FAA Pay Demonstration Project was established in 1989 to test whether retention allowances of up to 20 percent, paid as a lump sum at the end of each quarter worked, would alleviate chronic severe shortages in certain safety-related positions at 22 FAA facilities, of which nine are air traffic, in four metropolitan areas—New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Chicago. These sites were selected because of the severity of their chronic staffing problems and because of the magnitude of the effect these sites had on the National Air Transportation System.

Employees selected to receive the demonstration pay include airways facility maintenance technicians, aviation safety inspectors, computer operators, engineers, and air traffic controllers. The OPM test showed that the pay demonstration was effective in recruiting and retaining controllers and maintenance technicians. Unless this program is extended, it will terminate on June 17th of this year. We believe the program should continue because of our concern that termination of the program will have a demoralizing effect on the recruitment and retention of both controllers and maintenance technicians at key facilities in Chicago, New York, San Francisco, and Los Angeles.

In support of our position, a report was issued by the Office of Personnel Management in January of this year covering the pay demonstration from its inception in June 1989 through March 1993. OPM reports the following results:

Although a few sites still are below target levels in staffing as of March 1993, there had been an overall net increase of 9.3 percent in staffing for all pay demonstration positions since the project began. Other key points: a net increase of 11.6 percent in employees at covered facilities, a net loss of 3.6 percent in employees at flight standards facilities, a net increase of 5 percent in employees at covered airway facilities. Experience levels increased to an average of 11.3 years per employee vice 10.3 years at implementation.

Full performance or FPL-level controllers now constitute 54 percent of the workforce at demonstration sites, compared to 45 percent when the project began.

With regard to turnover rates between 1988 and 1992, overall turnover rates have declined throughout the FAA, but the decline was more dramatic at pay demonstration facilities. At the demonstration facilities, the annual turnover rate for covered positions declined from 18.8 to 8.4 percent. At the non-demonstration facilities, the annual turnover rate declined from 16.8 to 9.6 percent.

ATA recommends that the current pay demonstration project be extended for controllers and maintenance technicians for two years, while a permanent pay incentive program that addresses recruitment and retention at hard-to-staff facilities is created and tailored to meet FAA-specific needs. This program should not be allowed to proliferate beyond those facilities that have been historically hard to staff.

Incidentally, to illustrate the possible effects of pay demonstration termination on employee morale, a recent survey conducted by NATCA, the controller union, reveals that 75 percent of the controllers at Chicago center would retire or request transfers if the pay demonstration is ended. We are concerned that delays will increase for the traveling public if controller staffing is reduced.

We agree with OPM in their report where they said the most pressing difficulty with the allowances has been the direct financial outlays. However, those costs must be balanced against the alternative cost of shortages in safety-related staff at critical sites. Ultimately, the project will end, and the payments will stop, but the conditions which produced the need for the project in the first place may continue to exist or may reoccur. This presents a challenge to the agency.

Now for the airline concern about the Administration's program to streamline the bureaucracy. The FAA is going to experience difficulties in determining how to cut 6,000 personnel between fiscal year 1995 and fiscal year 1999. A Presidential Executive Order and a Memorandum have directed Government agencies to cut staff by 12 percent, which is 6,000 for FAA, by 1999, of which 4 percent, or 2,000 for FAA, must be accomplished by the end of fiscal year 1995, from a total of 52,000.

FAA is exempting certain organizations they call the safety workforce from those cuts. This safety workforce is estimated to be about 28,000 personnel, depending on FAA internal decisionmaking at any given time. This leaves about 24,000 who will be subject to the reduction of 6,000 by the end of 1999.

The challenge for FAA is to ensure that the reductions in staffing are taken in those organizations which result in the least adverse impact on all users operating under instrument and flight rules, which, of course, includes airline operations. We propose that in addition to those personnel that FAA has identified as safety workforce, that FAA personnel whose jobs are directly related to the promotion and development of increased capacity and efficiency of U.S. flight operations should also be exempted from FAA cuts.

These include headquarters personnel engaged in the development of new ATC procedures and separation standards, implementation of new technologies such as GPS and Data Link, and main-

tenance of current equipment and field engineers and technicians engaged in new equipment installations. However, these additional organizations, mostly headquarters, should be subject to reductions in mid-level management and supervision.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement, and I'd be happy to answer any questions you may have. I also have a comment, when it fits in our colloquy, as to what the FAA said about protecting positions that work on GPS and Data Link.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Please proceed with that right now. We're all ears.

Mr. RYAN. Sir, on about Monday or Tuesday of this week, there was a memorandum to all employees from the FAA Administration that said in gist that the Office of Personnel Management has approved early-out authority for all of the Department of Transportation, and it is their intention to open the early-out window effective March 14th, which they did. It says, "The attached fact sheet gives complete details on the segments of the workforce that are covered by the early-out and what the requirements are." It also talks about if buy-outs become available, they may be offered on short notice; therefore, they want to provide as much preliminary information as they can.

Now, after a number of pages here that answer likely employee questions, on page 5 it delineates who is covered, who can receive early-outs, which are effective right now, and if the buy-outs are approved by Congress and signed by the President, who would also receive them.

Now, there are two categories, generally speaking, of those who are covered, and headquarters, regional office aeronautical center, and tech center are one category, and it says workforce offered early-outs or buy-outs, if approved subsequently, and it says, "All employees, except specific exclusions in the next column," and the exclusions are central flow control, some flight standards engineers and flight inspectors, doctors in aviation standards, and F&E employees—those are the folks who install equipment at regions, which I think should not be offered early-outs or buy-outs or be RIF'd—but everybody else is subject to a buy-out, if approved, or an early-out.

What that means is that all the employees in Marty Pezeski's shop, for instance, all the employees in air traffic, except central flow, all the employees in airways facilities, except non-supervisory installers, are subject to early-outs and buy-outs. And I only have to presume that if the early-out and buy-outs do not do the job, that they'll also be subject to RIFs.

Now, if you take the arithmetic that FAA has laid down, which is the Presidential directions said that FAA needs to lose 12 percent of the workforce, which is 6,000 people, they've set aside approximately 28,000 people, which includes controller workforce, maintenance, flight inspectors, which I have no argument with. They leave 24,000 that are then subject to a 6,000 cut. That turns out to be a 25 percent cut for those who are left, and those who are left are the persons that I spoke about in my testimony who I'm concerned about who are working on GPS and Data Link. If the FAA is going to spare what I think are very important employees

from RIFs, they're now offering them buy-outs, if approved, and they're certainly offering them early-outs.

So I'm a little bit concerned that the FAA, on one hand, is saying that they're augmenting this important workforce and, at the same time, offering them incentives to leave.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, you've certainly put your finger on the nub of the issue. One of the key things that we've been getting at is FAA establishes a high priority for something and then doesn't provide it with the personnel or isn't given the funding or authority to provide the personnel to carry out that priority.

Mr. Broderick just a moment ago and last year in testimony before this committee said, "Our highest priority is getting GPS off the ground and running in the earliest possible time," and they moved ahead with the rulemaking, they tried to leap-frog all the usual obstacles, and now this buy-out may rob the agency of the most senior experienced personnel it needs to get this system up and running. That's shocking.

Mr. Clinger.

Mr. CLINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Ryan, thank you for your always helpful testimony before this subcommittee. There's been a lot of—well, just an ongoing saga with the AAS program and the assurances that everything was on track, under budget, on time, and so forth, and then finding out that that was not the case. Are you comfortable with the most recent assurance that the program is being restructured and is going to fulfill all of our expectations for it, or do you feel that maybe, as some have suggested, we should pull the plug on the whole thing and try a different approach?

Mr. RYAN. No, sir, I don't think we should pull the plug, but there are at least two FAA working committees that are presently considering the AAS funding and the schedule and how to restructure the program to get it back on track and provide the needed improvements to the ATC system that certainly the airlines are looking forward to, and that's one that the Center for Naval Analysis is doing, which will be due in April.

I understand that FAA has just put together a small group of people to look at revalidating the requirements for AAS, which I think is extremely important, because that would mean that we would be prioritizing those things we think are important and possibly deemphasizing those things that we think are less important and cost money. We're looking forward to those efforts to see what they bring about.

But, generally speaking—and we're pleased with the initiatives that Administrator Hinson has put forth to get to the core of what the problems are with AAS. But certainly, at this juncture, we're not for cancelling the program.

Mr. CLINGER. Just as sort of an overview, what is your feeling about the adequacy of the controller workforce at the present time? Do you think that it is sufficient? Are we undermanned and need to hire more?

Mr. RYAN. I'm glad that you brought that up. Although I didn't address it in my prepared statement, over the last several days and in listening to the FAA today and in thinking about it and in looking at the fact that first-level supervisors in the controller

workforce are eligible for early-outs and buy-outs, I'm now more concerned about it. Let's address the two things. One is supervisors, and the controller issue.

In the controller issue, right at this present time there are 17,665, as of January 31st, personnel in the controller workforce, and that number is going down. The end-of-year ceiling for 1993 was 17,871. That's the 1993 end-of-year. So we're down 206 from what the end-of-year ceiling is from 1993.

Now, as I understand the FAA's plan, they contract out 25 towers each year beginning in 1994. Those 25 towers produce 250 people. The 250 people now get transferred into Level II or III towers, centers, or what have you, and that 250 offsets the 250 that are going to retire that year, so it kind of zeroes out. They do this through 1997 and hire no more people than probably what the MARC Program in Minneapolis and maybe Beaver County might create, both of them maybe 75 in a year.

Now, the number of developmental people in the pipeline, for instance, at the beginning—I just happen to have the beginning of the pay demonstration, which is July 1989—was 1,700 people. There are 300 people in the pipeline now. If it takes, in round numbers, three years to hire someone and have them at some level of proficiency to be an FPL, I'm very concerned that we're hanging right on the precarious edge of having selected the scenario of 250 people that will be taken into the system by the Level I towers, assuming that project doesn't run into trouble, to offset the 250 that retire, and I'm concerned that when we run out of Level I towers to contract in 1997, in 1998 we won't have anybody there to take up the slack for the 250 or 300.

So I guess the bottom line here is I think this year we ought to be hiring 200 or 300 people, and if we're going to take even a mild traffic increase of 1 or 2 percent a year in the next four years, we're going to have between 4 and 8 percent. That's about another 10,000 operations every day. I mean, my recommendation is that FAA better start hiring some controllers in 1995 and not bet on the Level I towers.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. CLINGER. I'd be happy to.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You do not agree with the pace at which Mr. Broderick foresees growth within the air traffic control workforce.

Mr. RYAN. Well, essentially he said there's no growth. It's negative.

Mr. OBERSTAR. They're talking about 100 controllers—I mean, 250 a year, but that just happens to fit with the number of controllers they're taking out of the contract program.

Mr. RYAN. Right. If you do the Level I tower program with 25 towers at an average of 10 people apiece, and you now lose that workload for 25 and you move the 250 into other facilities, which is an okay thing—that's a good thing—but if you assume that that's going to be the offset for the retirements, I wouldn't count on that, because as he said, "Well, we have 4,800 people out there that have signed up from ex-PATCO controllers that you can count on in a second to come into the system." Well, that's fine, but they're not trained in a second. They've been gone for 13 years.

I know they like to think that they will be up to speed in six months. I'm not sure that's true. But it's going to take some time for them to do it. It's certainly going to take some time for basic trainees off the street. It's going to take three years to get them to be FPL, and I don't know that we need to gamble with what amounts to hiring 200 people or 250.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I appreciate that statement. That's very, very thoughtful and very perceptive. The PATCO controllers are kind of like a bank account. They're out there, but I look on them more as a CD. You can't take them out of that status without some penalty.

Mr. Horn.

Mr. HORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Most human organizations, be they private or public, have a tendency to grow with more management, middle-level staff people that sometimes clog the real functioning of the agency to achieve its goals. I know you're a client of FAA, and maybe you can't say it in public. Is the FAA overburdened with too much management, too many middle layers of staff that clog up rapid decisionmaking?

Mr. RYAN. I think in some particular cases that may be true, and generally speaking, outside of the controller workforce, I wouldn't argue with, according to the President's directive, going from a supervisor-employee ratio of 1:6 to 1:12. I mean, I think generally that's an okay goal in a non-operational setting.

In the case of the controller workforce where, for instance, we're trying to give incentives to lose first-line supervisors, as was done in this document that was announced this week, I don't know that they know how many they're going to lose. The ratio right now is probably 1:7 or 1:8 in operational facilities. I think going to 1:12 may be too much.

We've talked about many times and Members of the committee have talked about the importance of supervision, the oversight that supervisors provide in ensuring safety and making sure that controllers are not overworked and not overburdened. I think you better be very careful when you start reducing first-line supervision at facilities.

Mr. HORN. Let's say you listen to a lot of people in your industry, and I won't say these are the views of the Air Transport Association, but what are the main gripes you hear about FAA in terms of responsiveness in decisionmaking? Can its operations be streamlined, and if so, where?

Mr. RYAN. I think it's the slow response to initiatives that we want to get to. It's the bureaucracy. I mean, I don't want to use a hackneyed term, but it's bureaucracy. I mean, it has been argued that certainly FAA gets enough money in the budget to do the job, but the process is so arcane. I think it's mischaracterized when we say FAA doesn't get enough money, and that's one of the reasons that there should be some reform. I think it's lack of financial control.

I mean, right now the FAA is working on three budgets. I mean, they're working on the 1994. They submitted to Congress, I guess, in February the 1995, and now they have the call for estimates for 1996, and they're trying to run these all together, and it takes two years to do it. They'll do the 1996, and it will go through DOT and they'll pass it back and say, "You can't have this," and it will go

to OMB and they'll say, "You can't have that," and then eventually it will come out as a Presidential budget next January or February, but it's constant regurgitating of all of these—it's the process.

Mr. HORN. Well, but that's been true since the Roosevelt Administration and even before. But the real use of an executive budget came, as you know, from 1921 up, particularly the Roosevelt Administration. They've always overlapped, and they probably always will, unless we talk about two-year budgets. But given that, if a wand was waved by the President and you were the FAA administrator, where would you target the streamlining to be to improve FAA effectiveness?

Mr. RYAN. Well, certainly, you have to go through a litany of things, and I didn't want to get into this particular subject, but that is the litany of things that make some of us think that a reformed or corporatized FAA might be a more streamlined vehicle for doing business. There's the procurement issue, the personnel issue, one of them being exactly what we're talking about today with the pay demonstration. I mean, FAA ought to have the money to do it and go do it. That's just the way it would be. If General Motors wanted to attract people to some particular plant where they were having difficulty doing that, I think that's one of the ways they would do it, and it would be done with a stroke of the pen by a CEO.

The other one has to do with what I just mentioned, which is a lack of control over financing. It just takes too long to get things done.

Now, if you're interested in saying if I were a king, would I do a scrub of the whole FAA 52,000 personnel system as to what would I take out, that would take a little more scrutiny on my part.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I regret having to interrupt at this point. We have about four, maybe three and a half minutes left on this quorum call. The gentleman may continue his line of questioning when we return, and we'll take a brief recess.

[Recess.]

Mr. OBERSTAR. The subcommittee will resume its sitting.

Mr. Ryan, you responded to Mr. Clinger's questions about pay demonstration, and you listened to the earlier testimony. You feel it should be continued. You've had a long experience with this from your previous work at FAA in that position and left with great distinction, I might add, and regret that you did leave the agency. But in the long run, do you think that the FAA incurs higher costs to move people to backfill the slots vacated by people who would lose the differential?

First of all, before you answer that question, if the current practice—that is, the Pay Differential Program—ends, will people who were getting the differential leave those positions to go someplace else? And then in the long run, will FAA incur higher costs to fill those positions?

Mr. RYAN. Well, in answer to the first part of your question, the biggest jeopardy is that people who can retire will, because the FAA has no control over that. The FAA does have control over who transfers from O'Hare or from New York TRACON, San Francisco, Los Angeles to other facilities because they now are not getting the

20 percent that they did and, in the case of Chicago, would be getting 5.34 percent locality pay.

The FAA will probably get into a situation where they'll have what they call a release program, where you'll get on a waiting list and they'll release one-a-quarter or whatever they think they can release. But what that creates is a terrible impact on the morale of the people in that facility. As I mentioned in my testimony, NATCA had done an informal survey of controllers at Chicago center, and 75 percent of them said they'd just as soon transfer out or retire, if they were eligible to do so, if the pay demonstration is not continued.

We're concerned about, number one, the people leaving who we have no control over who might retire, who are not going to stay there, and then the demoralizing effect upon those who remain behind. In the FAA budget right now, where several years ago there were monies for several thousand permanent changes, station moves, in the current budget there's less than 200 for the whole control of air traffic. So essentially it's status quo. There will be no movement in the air traffic control system to balance facilities.

So I think we have a problem in both respects, both generated by the budget.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I appreciate that response. It was a very thoughtful one. Do you think that those staffing standards for the future are driven more by budgetary considerations than they are by realistic assessment of need based on traffic growth?

Mr. RYAN. To take you literally at what you said, the staffing standard should be oblivious to budget considerations.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That's exactly what I'm getting at.

Mr. RYAN. It ought to generate a number, and then you, as a manager, need to look at it, and you need to balance in the budget what are your priorities and how are you going to get there, given the amount of money that you have.

I have to say something about the amount of money. According to the President's budget, there was $4.6 billion in unobligated funds in the trust fund as of September 30th.

Now, with regard to the staffing standard, it seems to me—I need to make a comment on that, because for years and years it's been just impossible to nail the FAA down on just how many people they need, and there was a comment today, I think from Mr. Jeffers, about, the staffing standard, from the overall standpoint, it may not be so accurate. In other words, at one time I heard that it was good plus or minus 5 percent.

Well, I mean, if the staffing standard is plus or minus 5 percent and I've got 18,000 people, that means that it might be 18,900 and it might be 17,100. I don't think much of that staffing standard. After all, it's all built by what does Cleveland center need and what does Chicago need and what does Minneapolis need and Indianapolis, and you add those together and that's what Great Lakes needs at air traffic control centers. I mean, you start down here at the grassroots level.

So any time someone wants to get down and ask, "Well, what does the staffing standard say that you need?," FAA says it's always either in study, being analyzed, it's really not very good. I've always kind of thought, you know, there's a general rule of thumb

that will certainly get you in the ball park, which is for every sector there is in the air traffic control system—I'm talking about en route—every sector, every place where a controller team works, which is about 720 sectors, in round numbers, in the whole United States, if you divide that by two and multiply by five, which gives you two and a half people for every sector that you want working on every shift of every day, except the midnight shift—I didn't mean to get this intricate—and you multiply that by 1.6 to cover for holidays, sick leave, annual leave, it will tell you how many people you want within, give or take, 200 for the whole national system.

So I honestly think that sometimes when you and I are trying to get to the bottom of just how many controllers do they really need, there's a certain amount of hiding behind the fact that the staffing standard is still being analyzed. It's being analyzed it seems like forever, and I don't honestly think it can be that bad. There may be some in FAA who think, "If it doesn't give me the number I want, maybe it should continue to be analyzed."

I know that you have asked and certainly Mr. Carr's committee has asked for staffing numbers three years hence as to what FAA thinks staffing should be in the system, and although I haven't seen those numbers, it seems unbelievable to me that the number can go down, notwithstanding the proposed closing of 25 Level I towers each and every year for the next four years, which is not a bad thing.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You're so right about the staffing standard always being under study. Every time, it seems to me, that we've asked that question in committee, whether in this committee or in the Investigations and Oversight Subcommittee, almost panic grips them, and they look around and say, "That's under study" or "We're reviewing it" or "We're reconsidering it, and we can't give an answer now." Like you, I believe that the staffing standard is not a global number, but it's a facility-by-facility issue.

Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir. If you had the 20 air traffic control center managers here and the top 25 terminal or TRACON managers here, each and every one of them would tell you how many people they need right today. Where it gets a little bit difficult or where it becomes speculative is if a center manager says, "I think I'm going to have X number of increase in traffic next year, so what I need to do is create this extra sector, which is going to cost me, in round numbers, every day seven people, so I need to hire seven more people to do that." I mean, that becomes a little speculative, and maybe he might receive an argument from headquarters about that, or maybe he won't receive an argument and maybe it's agreed to.

But if you had them all here, all 43 of them, you would know with some assurance that that's exactly what the ATC system needs. They could tell you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. You said in response to Mr. Clinger's line of questioning that the process is so arcane, and there is a lack of control in developing standards and determining the number of personnel required for the various responsibilities in ATC. What did you mean by the process is so arcane? You were just describing, I think, some of that, but would you elaborate?

Mr. RYAN. Well, I think what I was talking about then is the budget process, I think, is arcane, where the Budget Office and FAA and all those people who need to work on projections and quarterly reviews are constantly working on three budgets at the same time. They're trying to maintain a modicum of economy for 1994 so that they don't overspend, they're now trying to get to Congress or to convince Congress of the funding for 1995, and they're now preparing the call for estimates for 1996. It essentially takes two years in this process, and there's always three of them going at one time. It just takes too long to do that.

There was some discussion today about the amount of time that's spent in FAA thinking about corporatization, which, of course, they have no choice about. They're told to do that. I'd be interested in the amount of time they spend reworking the budgets and the passbacks from DOT and OMB and trying to refine the budget to stay within it.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I think you're absolutely right. Clearly, that takes an enormous amount of time, and you've offered us a very important insight as to the process of actually working with three budgets—this year's, next year's, and the following year's—working on projections, making estimates, and then coming back and reworking those numbers for the green eyeshade people and the bean counters who are at OMB or the Office of the Secretary. It's just an enormous consumption of time, not to say waste of time.

What will be the impact on air traffic, on airline operation of reduced staffing or level staffing at key facilities throughout the system?

Mr. RYAN. Well, sir, let me mention some statistics of my own, aside from the ones I mentioned that came from OPM and NATCA in my testimony. In looking at staffing figures for July of 1989 at two terminal facilities—Chicago and New York—and comparing them with December of 1993—for instance, at New York TRACON, which in the 1988–1989 time frame was in big trouble, as far as I was concerned, in staffing, we were trying to get contractor training going in there so we could get people from the New York area to move through, and the pay demonstration had just started, and in the New York TRACON, the number of FPL controllers increased in that time period, from July of 1989 to December of 1993, by 87 percent. It went from 86 to 161. That's really dramatic. The total controller workforce went up 26 percent.

Smaller in numbers of controllers, but not certainly smaller in importance and traffic. At Chicago, the number of FPL controllers went up 86 percent from July of 1989 to December of 1993, and the number of total controllers went up 27 percent. It may be pure happenstance, but it's interesting how both of those numbers are within 1 percent of each other at those particular pay demonstration facilities.

Now, to get back to your direct question, I guess we certainly don't want to return to the days of yesteryear of 1989 and 1988, when the number of delays at O'Hare were out of sight, and they've certainly moderated over the past years. I think the delays last year totally were down about 1 or 2 percent, traffic was up about 1.8 percent, and I think there's been a trend for delays to go down every year for the last two or three years.

I think we're finally getting there, and I certainly don't want to disturb what I think is a reasonably good system now with regard to staffing at at least the two facilities that I have spoken about here, Chicago and New York, and certainly not less important at San Francisco and Los Angeles. So I'm really concerned about the effects of the loss of the 20 percent on the controllers there and exactly what's going to happen.

Mr. OBERSTAR. There will definitely be a correlation between the number of controllers and ability of air traffic to grow.

Mr. RYAN. Oh, absolutely. The number of controllers and the ability to move airplanes are directly proportional, and when the controllers go down, then you end up having to use great amounts of overtime, which is not a good way to be pressing your workforce, using overtime. I think the FAA is proud of the fact that the overtime numbers have gone down over the last several years, and I think that can be attributed to the fact that these facilities are well staffed as a result of the pay demonstration.

Mr. OBERSTAR. If FAA proceeds on the line currently planned, flat or declining numbers of air traffic controllers, and traffic grows, would FAA be forced to increase the use of central flow control to manage the system and thereby be able to claim reduced delay? But that would mean simply that they're reducing the input and the throughput in the system.

Mr. RYAN. Well, I agree with you, except to the end. It would reflect in increased delays if central flow becomes involved, which would probably be the first thing you would notice in the system if you have a reduction in controllers, that they can work less airplanes. You try to call in overtime, and you may or may not get it. You try to schedule overtime. It doesn't make for a happy workforce, especially since you just reduced a controller's pay, in Chicago's case, by 15 percent, and now you're asking him to work more time because his fellows have left.

Well, if central flow then becomes involved because there's less throughput in the system, it means delays are incurred by airplanes, let's say, going to Chicago, because they can handle less or going to New York because they can handle less, and what happens is the delays now start going up and the overtime goes up.

Those are two situations that the FAA strives almost forever to reduce, which is to get rid of the overtime because it's expensive and it's tough on the controllers, and the other one is to always look at delay reduction as a goal for FAA. It's always a delay reduction goal. Always. Forever. It's like safety, accidents, zero is where you want to go, and that's where they want to go with delays, and it's not going to happen if the controllers decide they're going to leave Chicago and New York and other places, and we're going to end up with them being demoralized, and we're going to end up with delays to passengers.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you for that insight into air traffic control and the workforce. Your message is that a reduced workforce may require increased utilization of central flow controls, but that will still mean delays within the system.

Mr. RYAN. Absolutely. That's what generally central flow is all about. The onerous part of their task is that they are to match throughput with capacity, and when the capacity goes down, they

limit the throughput. So you sit at the gate at Washington National being delayed to match the capacity at O'Hare or New York or wherever it is. If you can only run 76 airplanes at O'Hare and you've got a 100 demand, there's 24 that are going to sit on the ground for that hour somewhere.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And that adds up to delay within the system.

Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. What percent of delay is attributable to weather? Fifty percent?

Mr. RYAN. To weather?

Mr. OBERSTAR. Yes.

Mr. RYAN. I think FAA has said it's about 67 or 68 percent.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Is that constant from year to year, regardless of aberration——

Mr. RYAN. Pretty much. I think really there's a big crossover between capacity in the system and weather. I mean, the line at 67 percent, I think, is kind of wide.

Mr. OBERSTAR. There are technological advances that are helping the system to cope better with adverse weather, such as ASDE and ASR–9 and precision runway monitoring. Are those coming onstream fast enough? And I should add to that AWOS and wind shear and microburst detection systems. Are those coming on fast enough at key facilities to enable FAA and the airlines to cope with those adverse weather conditions?

Mr. RYAN. Well, I guess I'll have to go down the list of those that you mentioned, but the ASDE program, as you probably know, has been late for a long time. I don't think they have more than one or two facilities up. They've had a lot of problems with them, technological problems. They seem to be getting those solved. I think the ASR–9 problems are pretty much solved.

I think you mentioned AWOS, and we're not happy with AWOS. AWOS does not do a lot of things that we want it to do, and I'm not sure that anybody's listening when we tell them it's not doing things we want it to do. For instance, AWOS—the idea is that AWOS will eliminate a weather observer, an NWS weather observer, or it will provide weather in certain locations where there's no weather at all, which is a good thing. But we're concerned about AWOS and ASOS capabilities—ASOS being another version of the Automated Weather Observation System—for instance, there's a component of a weather observation that's called RVR—runway visual range—and it's the actual measurement of the visibility right down at the runway level by putting a device out there to measure it.

You'll see the importance of that, for instance, if you're taking the visibility from the tower, and it's two and a half miles, and the runway that you're interested in and the fog condition is a mile away, it doesn't do much good for you to be assessing what the visibility is from the tower. You need to be right down where the pilot and the airplane are. So the RVR is an important part of weather reporting sequences now that go out every hour.

Unfortunately, if I have an RVR at this airport and an AWOS at this airport, the AWOS or ASOS, either one, is not connected to the RVR. So when that automatic report goes out every hour from ASOS and is put on the teletype to all the airline dispatch offices,

the RVR information is not appended to it, and it cannot even be appended to it manually, assuming that you want to now trouble an air traffic controller who's busy enough as it is to give him some kind of a keyboard device to put the RVR in. That would mean he'd have to watch it all the time and make all the changes.

We've told the FAA several times that ASOS and AWOS reports without RVR do not meet FAR regulations and that we need them to put them on there, and that if they're eventually going to do that, that's fine, as long as the observer stays there until we get this settled. Well, I'm not sure they're going to do that, and I'm getting a little bit nervous that important information is not being appended to AWOS or ASOS reports. So much for that.

The last item I think you mentioned was the PRM, and I think we're generally happy with the one that was commissioned at Raleigh-Durham. The minimum for making approaches now with PRM is down to, I think, 200 and one-half, and I think we're happy with that, and we're going to put it at four other places, and maybe there will be some more coming on-line. So I think that equipment is good.

We may need some more money for other things you haven't mentioned which are good, which is GPS and Data Link, but I don't have the detailed FAA budget to tell you what FAA is looking for yet, so that will have to wait for Congressman Carr.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, we will have another hearing on that subject at another date, and we'll invite you back to do some thinking about those matters between now and then.

Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I have seen the PRM in operation at RDU, and I'm very impressed with what can be done with that technology, and we need to spread it around.

Mr. RYAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very, very much for your testimony, Mr. Ryan. It's been most helpful and very insightful.

Mr. RYAN. My pleasure. Thank you.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Our next panel consists of Mr. Barry Krasner, President, National Air Traffic Controllers Association; Maurice F. Connor, FAA Conference of Federal Managers; and Mr. Howard Johannssen, President, Professional Airways System Specialists.

I see that Mr. Thornton is replacing Mr. Krasner, or substituting for him. He wouldn't want me to say that you have replaced him.

Mr. THORNTON. Please don't say that.

Mr. OBERSTAR. It would cause great discomfort within the organization.

We'll begin with Mr. Thornton.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN F. THORNTON, SENIOR DIRECTOR FOR LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION, ON BEHALF OF BARRY KRASNER, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION; MAURICE F. CONNOR, FAA CONFERENCE OF THE FEDERAL MANAGERS ASSOCIATION; AND HOWARD JOHANNSSEN, PRESIDENT, PROFESSIONAL AIRWAYS SYSTEM SPECIALISTS

Mr. THORNTON. Good morning, Mr. Chairman. Thank you very much for this opportunity. Barry was supposed to be here; however, with the opening of the new Southern California TRACON, he was unable to appear today.

You have our testimony from last week. I'd ask you enter that in the record in the whole, and I'll complete that testimony today and then maybe even delve into some issues that were raised last week and earlier today.

As you know, it's been only eight short months since we last met to discuss this most important issue. At the time, we were assured, albeit reluctantly, by Deputy Secretary of Transportation Morton Downey that the FAA should perhaps be given budget flexibility for fiscal year 1995 and an unspoken number of subsequent years. Also at that time, we hoped to hear testimony as to the results of the FAA facility-by-facility analysis of its staffing, as previously directed by the House Appropriations Committee.

Unfortunately, neither hope has proven correct. The directed analysis has yet to be accomplished, and because of budget shortfalls, the FAA is now forced to make air traffic service and safety decisions based on dollars.

The FAA has characterized its budget as no-growth when in fact it is actually a budget cut. You just can't throw aside a demonstration project that, in spite of the FAA, has proven its worth, contract out 1,100 air traffic control positions, attempt to RIF 400 air traffic assistants, and sidestep a Presidential directive to hire fired PATCO controllers, and then testify that you are simply operating under a no-growth budget. There's just too much pain involved.

The FAA will tell you that it has more than enough air traffic controllers to safely staff its air traffic facilities. That is just not correct. As you know, we provided testimony earlier that controllers are going to work into the facilities short-staffed, they're not able to apply for leave that they have to their credit, shifts are starting short, and facilities are being combined in busy times. The FAA also pointed out that their use of overtime has declined. Let me tell you, Mr. Chairman, the need for overtime has not declined, just the ability to pay for it.

Earlier in my statement, I mentioned that the FAA plans to drop its very successful Pay Demonstration Project. As you know, the Pay Demonstration Project was initiated nearly five years ago to entice controllers to fit into or remain at certain hard-to-staff facilities. You know what those facilities are. After five years of success, the FAA has cut the funding for this most worthy program from its budget. I guess we should not be surprised. The agency actually found something that works; it's only reasonable for them to jettison it.

Unfortunately, while laughingly ironic, it is not that funny to the men and women who transferred to those historically hard-to-staff facilities with the understanding that they would receive an extra 20 percent for their services. I know you may be thinking that they should not have been expecting the 20 percent after five years; however, employees at these facilities were constantly reassured by the FAA that there would be no reduction in compensation. They were assured that the FAA would come up with a new program to replace the demonstration project.

Even the Federal Register, page 10,204, Volume 54, No. 46, Friday, March 10, 1989, comforted them by stating, "The purpose of the project is to test changes under controlled conditions before making commitments to put them into effect." So, you see, the project was never expected to cease after five years if it was effective.

The only question that remains is, was it a success? Last week Bill Pollard stated in response to a question that it was not a success, that it did not live up to all the intended purposes. In response to Mr. Clinger's questioning, Pollard further stated that despite the 20 percent, many controllers were still assigned to these facilities from the academy, their initial FAA assignment. What Pollard failed to relay was that despite numerous bids into those facilities, the FAA, citing lack of PCS funding, selected fewer experienced bidders than were available. It was just easier to fill them in with academy candidates than take proven controllers from other facilities.

We contend that the project was indeed an overall success. You, Mr. Chairman, better than anyone else, understand the difficulty these facilities faced trying to attract and retain qualified candidates prior to the project.

Let me give you a snapshot of these facilities as of December 1992. I apologize for not having more up-to-date figures, but we were unable to get them from the FAA. I could provide you with NATCA data, but rather than open ourselves up to argument, we'll use the FAA numbers.

Beginning with the demonstration project in June of 1989, there were 1,568 air traffic people at those facilities. In December of 1992, there were 1,742, an increase of 174, or 11 percent. The FPL status at those facilities, we began with 164 in 1989, and in December of 1992 we had 910. That's a 306 percent increase. Experience levels, we started with a 9.01 experience level, and it shot up to 10.75, an increase of 1.7 years in that short period of time.

As I said, Mr. Chairman, these numbers are not very current, but they verify that formerly hard-to-staff facilities are thriving under the program. New numbers would do nothing but reinforce our position.

What's the impact? The FAA has already testified to the reduction in delays and operational errors. At Chicago center alone since the inception of the project, operational errors have been reduced by more than 70 percent, despite a 20 percent increase in traffic. What happens when the project stops? Controllers eligible to retire probably will. Senior controllers will opt out of these facilities when able. As an example, 68 percent of the controllers at Chicago center

have indicated that they will seek reassignment. Seven percent said they will retire.

Highly qualified controllers will not fit into these facilities, which will increase overtime usage, increase the time spent training raw academy recruits, and could have a very dramatic effect on the efficiency and the safety of the system in these highly traveled areas.

As for Mr. Pollard's blase attitude of "We don't need to continue the program, we have 4,000 willing people to take their place," perhaps his memory is so short that he doesn't remember the last time that attitude was professed. Well, I certainly do, and I have to tell you, Mr. Chairman, that in my mind this was the most disturbing statement I have heard from an FAA official since the birth of NATCA. Pollard went out of his way to show the current workforce that he and the agency are blatantly indifferent to their needs.

As if that was not enough, he felt compelled to take that giant step forward and attempt to pit the current controllers against the fired controllers. "We don't need to keep this program because we have this asset out here." I heard this morning fired controllers were an asset. A year and a half ago, they were testifying that the system had passed fired controllers by. Technology changes were so rampant that they couldn't come in and do it. Now they're going to go into our busiest facilities and replace controllers. The FAA can't have it both ways.

Last week a group of fired controllers appeared before you and said, among other things, that there was a group within the FAA that would do everything possible to keep them from being able to return to the profession they so love. I watched as they testified and got the impression that some in the audience believed that they were showing signs of paranoia. I hope that these same people listened closely to Pollard's outrageous statements. If they did, they would understand that there does remain a well-fortified group within the FAA that will never willingly implement the President's directive.

The other staffing issue I would like to speak of today is the contracting out of Level I towers. As you know, the FAA's position has always been to contract out those facilities that fell below the density level for Level Is. We agreed with that position. In Anthony Broderick's statement, and echoed by Bill Pollard in response to questions posed by Members of this committee, the FAA tried very hard to infer that NATCA was a party to this decision to contract out current Level I facilities, that we in fact helped draw the conclusion that this was the best way for the future of the agency.

That, Mr. Chairman, is an outright lie. NATCA adamantly opposes this change of policy that allows the FAA to contract out current Level I facilities. We have communicated our position to Mr. Pollard many times in the past. We believe that air traffic control is inherently a governmental function and the system should remain seamless to the users. This is not possible under the current contract tower program. It is in a headlong rush to abide by the Administration's ill-advised policy that the FAA has not looked to see if these facilities could be operated in a less costly manner. We believe that this type of study must be completed prior to considering contracting out.

Mr. Chairman, I am saddened to tell you today that the air traffic organization over the years shows the same manager skills and foresight that they showed back in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Furthermore, FAA is overlooking that these facilities are excellent training opportunities for new academy recruits. They use these facilities, however, for training FAA managers. Rather than sticking them into a high-density facility as a manager, they'll send them down to the Level I facility for grooming. They don't see the worth on behalf of air traffic controllers.

Not only would this action of the agency deprive 1,100 individuals of employment opportunities, it could very well hamper the economic stability of a given community. These are decent-paying jobs, and the communities would not want to trade them for less viable and lower-paying jobs.

Mr. Chairman, there is also the question of safety, the most important question surrounding this issue. I do not want to go on record saying these facilities will be unsafe, but I will tell you that these facilities will not enjoy the same level of service or the margin of safety that they have today.

Chairman Oberstar, I know that we are not in agreement over the fixes needed to turn this agency around. I have to tell you, though, if I was not already convinced that a Government corporation was necessary for the FAA, its reaction to this latest budget crunch would certainly convince me. As long as the agency must survive within the current budget framework, it will continue to be forced to make unwise and perhaps unsafe decisions.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That concludes my statement. I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. I appreciate your testimony.

Next, Mr. Connor for the FAA Conference of Federal Managers.

Mr. CONNOR. Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name is Maurice Francis Michael Connor, and I'd like to grant you a Happy St. Patrick's Day, sir.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you.

Mr. CONNOR. Please note that my remarks are of the Federal Managers Association. Although I'm an employee of the FAA, in no way do they represent the Federal Aviation Administration.

I represent over 1,600 safety-related supervisors and managers in the air traffic system. Our testimony today will address two issues. I would like to summarize, due to the time, and ask that the complete testimony be included in the record.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Without objection, your prepared statement will appear in the record.

Mr. CONNOR. We're concerned about staffing on two levels. In response to the President's NPR and other issues in the field facilities and regional offices, there has been a move to go to a 15:1 employee-supervisor ratio. This has been viewed as a mandate by the managers in the field. The effects of that in draft reports that are available to the FAA today are quite dramatic. In certain facilities, it calls for a 50 percent reduction in first-level supervisors in certain en route facilities. That takes it, in round numbers, from 50 supervisors today to 25 in less than 24 months.

I must remind the Chairman that currently first-level air traffic supervisors are counted as the controller workforce, so every time we reduce a first-level supervisory position or we do not backfill it on any basis, we are lowering the number in the controller workforce.

I'm pleased to say that the FAA has established an office that reports directly to air traffic to review all of these plans. The plan that calls for a 50 percent reduction, I believe, is dead on arrival. It will not happen. The FAA has established a committee that currently is taking a look at first-level supervisors, what their duties are, what their numbers are, what their roles are today and what they'll be in the future. I'm pleased to report that this calls for an incisive evaluation, needs assessment, and validation of any process that is implemented throughout the system. It will take 10 to 15 years to turn over the culture of the FAA, not 24 months.

There is a direct relationship in today's air traffic system between safety, oversight, and efficiency. We believe that the current number of supervisors, some 2,200, is in direct relationship to the high safety currently enjoyed by the air traffic system. We are there to support our colleagues who work the air traffic on a daily basis.

My second portion goes for the Administration's plan for an independent FAA. I congratulate the Chairman on his call for a fixed-term administrator. In 1988, I must remind the Chairman, he introduced legislation which was specific efficiencies in reducing the number of regional offices. I believe that is still a valid concept under an independent FAA.

Procurement, we won't speak much about that. The advanced automation system may be a day late and considerably over budget. There are indications that under the new advanced automation system, the role of first-level supervisors is going to change dramatically, our duties will increase significantly, and we will become more computer operators than oversight of the operation of the air traffic control system.

One important factor in any plan I've seen on an independent FAA is congressional oversight. I would strongly ask the Chairman to call for continued congressional oversight of any new organization. I believe any new organization has to have a proven track record before the oversight can be diminished in any way.

In conclusion, I believe reforms are possible within FAA. We can meet the President's mandate to do better with what we have, reduce supervision, and be a more efficient Government.

One issue that's been discussed here before, Mr. Chairman, is pay demonstration. I'm happy to announce that the Federal Managers Association, in conjunction with Administrator McCarter during his tenure, was the first group to call for the Pay Demonstration Project. We still support the continuation of pay demonstration.

That concludes my remarks.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you very much. I certainly do recall very well the appeal of the Managers Association during the McArtor era for the Pay Differential Program, and I appreciate your continued support.

Mr. Johannssen, we're glad to have you with us this morning.

Mr. JOHANNSSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I, too, will summarize my comments and ask that my full testimony be placed in the record.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Without objection, your prepared statement will appear in the record.

Mr. JOHANNSSEN. My name is Howard E. Johannssen. I'm President of the Professional Airways System Specialists, District 6 of the National MEBA. Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today concerning the effect that the Administration's budget freeze and reinventing Government proposals will have on FAA staffing levels in fiscal year 1995 and beyond.

The PASS workforce is dedicated to supporting and to sustaining the safest and most efficient national airspace system for the flying public. I'd like to review briefly some of the NPR recommendations in relationship to the budget.

As you know, there's a major Government-wide effort now under way to transform the Federal workforce. This dramatic revolution will eventually lead to widespread changes within the Federal bureaucracy. Following the recommendations of the NPR, Congress is attempting to mandate that 252,000 Federal jobs be eliminated by 1999. Additionally, Federal management and labor have been encouraged to become cooperative partners through the formation of labor-management partnerships.

Other NPR directions would give agencies more control over hiring, job and pay classifications, organizational and individual performance and discipline, and incentive programs. I also recognize that as agencies strive to downsize, to realign, and to work more efficiently with less money, they're bound to encounter difficulties, like the buy-out legislation.

Unfortunately, the FAA is not exempt from any of the problems, and the future of the agency and the aviation industry is being challenged on many levels. As a result, the Clinton Administration, the NPR, and the FAA have begun to look at alternative ways to deliver air traffic control services outside the realm of the Federal bureaucracy.

The FAA's fiscal year 1995 budget is clearly indicative of the Administration's freeze on spending. The FAA's fiscal year 1994 enacted budget is $4.5 million. For fiscal year 1995, the agencies were kept at $4.9 million, just 4/10 of a million more than 1994. In the fiscal year 1994 budget, the FAA did not budget for locality pay raises, and consequently the agency had to absorb the $70 million price tag for locality raises which were implemented in January 1994. Unlike the 1994 budget, the FAA's fiscal year 1995 proposal appropriates $72.5 million for the locality pay and the annual cost of living raises.

Interestingly enough, as I mentioned earlier, the difference between the fiscal year 1994 and 1995 budgets is virtually insignificant. How, then, can the agency incur a $72.5 million increase in its budget and at the same time spend only 4/10 of the $1 million more than last fiscal year?

The FAA's solution is to stringently reduce travel, training, and the awards program by a total of $34.5 million. Moreover, agency-wide operations staffing reductions amount to $99.1 million and, fi-

nally, the scheduled termination of the Pay Demonstration Project to save $20 million.

On the airways facilities staffing problems, for decades the FAA has successfully managed the most complex aviation system in the world. Despite growing demands on the system, staffing levels within the AF workforce have fallen disastrously low. Clearly, there's an urgent need for training and growth within the airways facilities workforce. Currently, over 50 percent of today's system specialists will be eligible to retire in the next five years. In addition, the present staffing shortages and the budget constraints have prevented system specialists from receiving adequate training either on the job or at the FAA academy, and thus the experience level of system specialists has also dropped dramatically. Without the hiring of new specialists and the proper training of the entire workforce, any high retirement turnover in the near future could have a devastating effect on the FAA.

After analyzing the staffing levels within the FAA in light of growing demands placed on the aviation industry, the General Accounting Office recommended that for the fiscal year 1995 budget, and I quote, "A field maintenance workforce of about 11,900 will be needed, an increase of over 3,000 over the present number." Presently, there's a total of 8,348 system specialists. That's AF managers, supervisors, logistics specialists, support staff, and technical workforce. The fiscal year 1995 budget reduces that number to 8,200 total positions. Hence, instead of complying with GAO's recommendation, the FAA is moving further away from the target and will be understaffed by 3,700 positions in 1995.

Last year Congress recognized the need for more system specialists and less outside contractors and passed legislation restoring 237 staff years to the FAA's in-house maintenance workforce. Unfortunately, the FAA has allotted these positions to hire employees to design software and assist in engineering projects. No employees were hired for the field positions.

The consequence of FAA's staffing shortages are becoming more and more apparent. Last month in two separate incidents at Tampa International Airport, equipment outages and lack of available on-site maintenance technicians to repair the equipment rendered aircraft destined for Tampa unable to land for nearly nine hours. Until January 1994, AF personnel were on duty 24 hours a day in Tampa's air traffic control tower to handle any equipment problems or emergencies that arose. However, the FAA reduced the duty hours for technicians to approximately 16 hours a day on weekdays and eight hours a day on weekends. As a result, the facility is often left unattended.

Just to make a point of that, it would be interesting to hang a sign on the tower to say, "This is the weekend, and the equipment won't fail on weekends, folks, so don't worry about not having enough folks around to fix it." That's what they're doing.

The newspapers reported that on February 12, 1994, and again on February 13, more than 100 airplanes bound for Tampa were delayed or diverted from Tampa's airport because a safety device broke and no one was on duty to fix it. They also reported that FAA rationalized its decision to cut staffing hours by arguing that with the modernization of the air traffic control computer system

through the implementation of the advanced automation system, its computers will need less maintenance, yet the modernization plan has fallen years behind.

By the end of 1995, the FAA hopes that realignment will reduce the employee-supervisor ratio to 10:1, and by the end of fiscal year 1999, that ratio is targeted for 15:1. Since the inception of the strategic plan initiative, while we first welcomed FAA's decision to restructure FAA management from five layers to three layers, we have begun to notice some major flaws in the plan which, in the near future, could further compound our AF staffing problems.

Flight standards, our aviation inspectors, today the FAA employs 2,600 aviation inspectors to oversee more than 6,100 air carriers and air taxi aircraft and 4,450 repair stations, 547 pilot training schools, 177 maintenance schools, 641,500 active pilots, and 198,500 general aviation aircraft. Congress has mandated that inspectors spend a minimum of 35 percent of their time performing inspections. Still, the GAO reported last year that the FAA was not meeting this goal.

This problem can be directly attributed to the serious imbalance which exists in the ratio between the number of clerical employees and the number of inspectors. Around the country, pleas by inspectors for more administrative help are being denied by the FAA because of insufficient funds, and the staffing problems are only worsening. In order to alleviate some of the inspectors' workload or requirement for technical assistance, the FAA created a new aviation safety technician—AST—position at the GS–1802–8 level.

PASS supports the establishment of this new position. Unfortunately, however, the positive impact that the creation of this position may have had on the inspectors has so far been slight. Consequently, there are presently less than 10 AST positions filled throughout the entire flight standards branch. In fiscal year 1995, the FAA intends to increase staffing in flight standards by 305 positions. PASS definitely welcomes any increase in staffing, and we're hopeful that priority be placed on substantially increasing the number of clerical and AST positions.

On the Pay Demonstration Project, in June 1989 the FAA established the Pay Demonstration Project to enhance the agency's ability to recruit/retrain experienced, qualified employees at historically hard-to-staff facilities in many parts of the country. Under the design of the five-year test project, retention allowances of 20 percent were to be paid quarterly to certain employees at each selected facility. Demonstration pay was limited to designated positions, including airways facilities system specialists and flight standard safety inspectors, within our perspective unit.

According to the 1994 report issued by the Office of Personnel Management, the Pay Demonstration Project was proven to be quite successful. The OPM report indicates that pay demonstration allowances had a generally positive effect on improving recruitment, retention, and experience levels at the covered facilities. Moreover, and I quote, "The demonstration project has provided the FAA with otherwise unavailable flexibility to deal with specific critical staffing problems."

Despite these accomplishments, the project is slated to end in June 1994. PASS strongly opposes the termination of the pay dem-

onstration. Undoubtedly, the elimination of the Pay Demonstration Project will have a disastrous impact on the FAA and the aviation industry. With the loss of pay demonstration allowances, employee morale will surely suffer.

I would add that it comes at a very poor time with the buy-out legislation that has been discussed earlier today. There's an aspect that's not been discussed, and I'll just briefly say that there are a number of people eligible to retire who have stayed on to get the $25,000 buy-out. When they are denied the $25,000 buy-out—earlier testimony said that there were a greater number of folks to receive that. Within the bargaining units I represent, no one in those bargaining units are slated to be bought out. It won't happen. But they have been staying on for a couple of extra years in hopes that it might happen, in hopes that the pay demonstration would not go away.

For the reason of not getting a buy-out, they're going to be angry, and they'll retire without receiving the cash. They'll go anyway. They'll be losing the pay demonstration, which is further reason for them to go. The numbers of supervisors that are being reduced will create a problem, since the help that they've received from the supervisory ranks will be gone. There's no reason to stay. We've heard about three strikes and you're out. FAA is three strikes and you're out right now.

Presently, at the Chicago center, for example, where they're already experiencing staffing problems, scheduled watch coverage has been reduced from 24 hours to 16 hours for many of the units. Meanwhile, the Chicago center has had many new systems scheduled to be implemented and operational within the next few years. These systems will require a tremendous amount of preparation work. If the pay demonstration is eliminated and staffing levels are reduced, this work will fall behind, and consequently progress in every other FAA facility in the Capital Improvement Plan and the advanced automation system will also be delayed. The long-term effects of such delays and staffing shortages will far exceed any savings that may result from eliminating the pay demonstration.

Let me conclude. System specialists and aviation safety inspectors face serious obstacles as the FAA attempts to keep our airway systems operating at the highest possible safety levels with the least amount of available funds. It is crucial that the FAA increase staffing to meet necessary and realistic levels. According to our sources at the FAA, only 75 percent of scheduled AF routine work is presently being done throughout the country because of insufficient staffing. Thus, I believe it's fair to say that the budget cuts produced by reduced staffing levels in the FAA could produce a dramatically increased margin of error over the next several years.

Too often the FAA has only responded to an aviation disaster after one has occurred. Congress must take measures to prevent this from happening once again. Our recommendations are to increase system specialist and aviation safety inspector staffing levels to meet current system requirements and projected future requirements; recognize the importance of the PASS Employment Involvement Program to help us work through these many problems; make changes in acquisition, procurement, and personnel policies; reject President Clinton's proposal to decrease next year's cost of

living raise from 2.6 percent to 1.6 percent; realize the termination of the Pay Demonstration Project will adversely affect system specialists and safety inspectors; and consider all proposals, including air traffic control corporations, to restructure the FAA in a more efficient and revitalized way.

I thank you for allowing me to testify today.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Thank you for your testimony and for the very substantial degree of specificity you've provided with your testimony, as have all three of the witnesses in this panel. I greatly appreciate the contribution you've made to our better understanding of the current and future problems.

I think the most serious message that comes out of this testimony and the previous testimony is that less is less. Fewer air traffic controllers, less money, no Pay Demonstration Program means less service, less dependability, less reliability in the system, more stress within the FAA on the working personnel in each of the critical areas. Fewer supervisors, while it may mean some efficiencies, the reduction to the degree proposed by the FAA is going to mean increased stress on remaining supervisors and managers.

What is the cost of the Pay Demonstration Program above ordinary costs?

Mr. JOHANNSSEN. It's $20 million to $22.2 million, as far as I understand.

Mr. OBERSTAR. And if this were made FAA-wide, would that mean any additional increase in cost?

Mr. JOHANNSSEN. If the program were expanded, certainly there would be more costs, but I listened to testimony earlier of contracting out a lot of towers and moving folks from those towers to other facilities. Earlier testimony, by FAA's own numbers, said that it costs about $45,000 to move someone. With the contracting out of those facilities, that's about 900 folks times $45,000, and they're coming back and saying that they're still saving $200,000. I don't believe that that's a correct estimate.

I think that the pay demonstration needs to be carefully monitored so it doesn't get out of hand, but we still need a device and the ability to move folks where we need them. Without that, the system is not going to work as it should.

Mr. OBERSTAR. I'm going to ask each of the three witnesses, Mr. Connor, Mr. Johannssen, and Mr. Thornton, to think through the need for controllers facility by facility. I don't think that it's useful to say we ought to have 17,000 or 18,000 or 20,000 air traffic controllers and X-thousand specialists and X-thousand supervisors. It has some global meaning for budgetary purposes, and it's easy to simplify for a 30-second sound byte, but what is more meaningful for our purposes and your purposes is facility by facility, center by center, tower by tower, TRACON by TRACON.

I want you to think that through and submit for the committee in writing, as soon as you can do this, what the standard is, what you think it should be, and the disparity between FAA plans for those facilities. The FAA will say, "Well, the system is 98.85 percent available, even with staffing cuts and so on." That masks problems within the system. Your responses should also reflect the current policy of terminating the Pay Demonstration Program, be-

cause that will aggravate problems at certain facilities, as you well know.

Mr. Connor, you talked about the self-managed teams of controllers concept that FAA is promoting. What problems do you see in proceeding further along this line?

Mr. CONNOR. There are several things. One is the system that we work in kind of creates the system that managers and supervisors and controllers are used to. It's labor-intensive. We spend most of our time telling people to go up and down, right and left, and that creates the environment in which the FAA operates its air traffic control system. We're very directional, and we're that way because we have to be that way. There's not a lot of time to enter into big discussions about who's right and who's wrong and what are we going to do next.

So until that system fundamentally changes, I don't see a large change in culture. Until GPS and the advanced automation system, if that ever comes on line, come in and change that culture of how we deal with talking to airplanes, we're basically going to have to stay very highly directional.

Now, if we bring the technology along with the new management techniques and they come hand in hand, then, yes, we can go to self-managed teams. We have a project in one center where they've gone to semi-managed teams. It's created some confusion among the controller workforce who they're working for, where's the supervisor, who is my supervisor, where is she or he. That's some of the concerns we hear. Where there is no supervisor at all, we place a controller in charge, and depending upon the experience level, that may be a very experienced person or brand-new FPL.

So I think we need to proceed very, very cautiously, and if we don't bring the technology on with the management structure, then we need to stay the way we are for a very, very long time.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Well, Saturn would argue that their management-labor teams work very well, this is the new wave of management in industry. But you're saying that there's a different——

Mr. CONNOR. In the FAA, we have a program called Quality Through Partnership, QTP, where you have the people involved. In most cases that I'm familiar with on a regional and a national level, there are no supervisors on these committees, but we're expected to implement the policy that's decided through QTP. It is one of the biggest morale factors on first-level supervisors in the FAA today. They are not part of the communications loop as they were right after 1981. It is strictly a traditional labor-management, senior management, senior labor.

And I'm not being critical. We have not broken through that barrier and seen that there are other levels within the organization that make a major contribution to the system, and that is the first-level supervisor at airways facilities, security, air traffic system. We're subject to all kinds of rules and regulations that we have no say over.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Is there progress still to be made in this area of employee management relations, Mr. Johannssen, Mr. Thornton?

Mr. JOHANNSSEN. There's wonderful progress being made.

Mr. OBERSTAR. Are there differences between your two organizations?

Mr. JOHANNSSEN. Each organization has a program somewhat different, but nonetheless they both work very well. We've been involved since 1985 in a process called employee involvement. The NPR speaks to partnership. We've been doing what the NPR speaks to for many years now. We find that there are many efficiencies. The general level of morale and input and the ability to do things significant are amazing.

I'll give you one of the stories. The FAA's Eastern Region was about $4 million short in airways facilities coming through this last cycle as they approached August. It was a question of shut down or what do we do. We used the process, and involving the employees in a trained manner, which now becomes an everyday work style, they were able to find within FAA, as hard as it is, within a region a quick $4 million to be able to survive, and everybody applauded the effort. There wasn't an angry employer, there wasn't an angry manager, there wasn't an angry supervisor. They were pleased to take a look at how they did things and recreate, move money around, and find a $4 million savings.

And there are things going on. In fact, I just missed my airplane. I'm on my way to the Southern California TRACON, where we're going to tomorrow open it formally with the QTP process, which is NATCA started a partnership there that our process got involved with, and it's one of the finest facilities on this globe. You walk in there, and it's like walking into the 22nd or 23rd century.

Mr. OBERSTAR. That's a nice point at which to stop. I appreciate that testimony.

Mr. Thornton, I know you want to respond. We'll let you respond for the record. I'm about to miss a vote. While you may get a second plane, I don't get a second chance at this vote, and this is a good point at which to conclude the hearing.

We greatly appreciate the testimony provided here. This is not the end. It's the beginning of our continuing ongoing review of FAA operations, and we greatly appreciate your contributions today.

Mr. OBERSTAR. The subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:50 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned, to reconvene at the call of the Chair.]

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED

BY WITNESSES

STATEMENT OF MAURICE F. CONNOR

CHAIRMAN
OF THE
FAA CONFERENCE
OF THE
FEDERAL MANAGERS ASSOCIATION

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
OF THE
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND
TRANSPORTATION

MARCH 17,1994

Good Morning Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee:

I am Maurice Connor, National Vice President of the Federal Managers Association and Chairman of the FAA Conference. I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing today and for giving me the opportunity to present the views of the Federal Mangers Association.

Please note that my remarks today are exclusively those of the Federal Managers Association and do not necessarily reflect the official opinion of the Federal Aviation Administration.

The FAA Conference of the Federal Managers Association represents nearly 1,600 first-level air traffic and airway facilities supervisors and managers at FAA facilities throughout the nation. The members of our conference are responsible for the daily supervision and management of controllers and technicians who help to keep our Nation's skies safe.

Our testimony today will address FAA staffing cuts proposed in the President's FY 1995 budget and Administration plans to corporatize Air Traffic Control (ATC).

Reductions In FAA Staffing Must Be Tied To Restructuring Of Jobs and Administrative Process.

FMA is concerned about the size of reductions in FAA staffing proposed in the President's FY 1995 Budget. Supervisors in Air Traffic Control, Airways Facilities, Flight Standards, and Security Personnel must be protected from efforts to reduce the overall size of the FAA.

The overall goals of the Administration to reduce the FAA can only be accomplished in the context of a comprehensive restructuring. Without meaningful restructuring staffing cuts could have a devastating affect on FAA's core safety related workforce and the safety of our country's 400 million air passengers.

I will focus my remarks today on two aspects of the reductions proposed by the Administration. The first aspect concerns current draft proposals by air traffic facilities and regional air traffic divisions to increase the supervisor to employee ratio. The second aspect relates to proposed corporate restructuring efforts and their long-term impact on the air traffic system.

In November of 1993, air traffic facilities began to respond to President Clinton's mandate to increase the ratio of employees to supervisors. These efforts involve first and second line air traffic supervisors and staff personnel. The bulk of the proposed cuts would occur within the ranks of first line supervisors.

Currently, there are approximately 2,200 first-line air traffic supervisors in towers, enroute centers and flight service stations. I want to stress the important role first line supervisors play in the controller work force count (CWF). The first line supervisor is operationally current and is on site to support and assist air traffic controllers who operate the system on a daily basis. If the draft plans to reduce first line supervisors are carried out, the CWF numbers will be cut.

Draft plans circulating within the FAA call for a 50% reduction in first line supervisors at certain facilities. The negative effects of these reductions would be compounded by restrictions on replacing lost positions. Agencies are currently only able to replace one worker for every two positions abolished. In addition, these cuts are forecast to be completed at some facilities within two to three years.

Part of the Administration's downsizing initiative calls for facilities to move from the current highly directive management style to self-managed teams. In order for the self-managed team concept to succeed, extensive training and adjustments to the work culture of facilities, regions and the entire air traffic system must occur. Self-managed teams would be empowered with more responsibility for determining how to carry out their mission.

A plan currently under consideration by the FAA, would require a period of six to ten years for the FAA to evolve from our current management approach to self-managed teams. The plan would reduce supervision and eliminate meaningless supervisory duties in a controlled manner with specific benchmarks. The plan would also require evaluation and validation procedures. The goal of the plan is to create a more efficient workforce while maintaining a high degree of safety.

I recently discussed the plan to bring empowerment and self-managed teams to the FAA with a leading expert on total quality management. His frank assessment of this proposal was that it would be extraordinary if FAA could make such a transition within six years. The leading expert suggested that such a change in FAA's culture and work methods would require at least ten to fifteen years. I believe the draft plans are unrealistic in projecting a transition to self-managed teams in just two to three years.

I am pleased to state that FAA headquarters has established an office to review all restructuring plans. It is my hope that this review mechanism will prevent implementation of plans which are unrealistic and which could impact the controller work force in a negative manner.

FMA believes that the unique nature of the work and demands for service within the

air traffic control system leads to a direct correlation between SUPERVISION, OVERSIGHT, EFFICIENCY AND SAFETY. Air traffic control is a critical government function which cannot be changed without involving all segments of the air traffic service. The current nature of air traffic control necessitates a highly directional management style. Efforts to evolve to team-management must address training, revising procedures and introducing new technology. As long as air traffic remains labor-intensive, there will be a need to keep the current management structure in some form.

Regardless of what management changes are made at the FAA, on-going extensive training is required to insure the safety of the flying public. I find agency forecasts for future training budgets completely unrealistic. Steadily declining training budgets have already lead to a serious decrease in morale among first line supervisors, fear about loosing their jobs and frustration with having to do a considerable amount of new work with less resources. In fact, I know of many first line supervisors who have resigned due to the long hours they must put in at work and the poor quality of their professional and family life. These poor working conditions for supervisors are product of: inadequate training budgets, lack of resources, ineffective communication, and an absence of meaningful participation in making the decisions which affect daily operations.

The administration's plans to cut training budgets have made a dramatic impact on air traffic supervisors. Should critical and skilled individuals be counted as supervisors and managers in other agencies? Should safety related supervisors such as ATC supervisors be granted an exemption due to their critical role in maintaining aviation safety?

Mr. Chairman, supervisors with critical safety related skills within the FAA such as,

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL, AIRWAYS FACILITIES, FLIGHT STANDARDS AND SECURITY PERSONNEL, must be treated in a different manner. To reform management, we must establish a needs assessment plan, address the training issue, test reengineering concepts, and evaluate and validate reorganization efforts before they are implemented on a system wide basis.

CONCERNS ABOUT ADMINISTRATION PLANS FOR AN INDEPENDENT FAA.

FMA share's some of the Chairman's concerns about the Administration's proposal to corporatize Air Traffic Control. An FAA governing body composed of airline representatives as the Administration proposes, would not have the same incentive to place passenger safety above profits as would a Presidentialy appointed FAA Administrator. I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for including a provision in H.R. 2739 to provide for a Presidentialy appointed FAA Administrator to serve for a term of 5 years. The long history of lacking continuity in leadership has often caused our agency to drift and stagnate. As an agency charged with insuring the safety of the American flying public we can ill afford to have leaders which only stay on the job an average of 2 to 2 1/2 years.

FMA strongly supported the Administration's goal of an independent FAA in the past and will continue to support an independent FAA in the future. The independent FAA, however, should be run by a Presidentialy appointed administrator and advised by a body which represents the interests of airline passengers, airlines, general aviation, and FAA management and staff.

Funding

FMA believes that all segments of aviation should participate in funding the FAA

corporation. Revenues should be collected on a direct benefit basis and their use restricted to operating the air traffic control system and related safety function. Several methods are possible in establishing fees and care should be exercised that a massive structure is not required to collect and determine the amount owed. The present structure of the aviation trust fund presents a suitable model for financing a corporate FAA.

Procurement

Presently the Capital Investment Plan (CIP) within FAA calls for constructive phases to introduce new procedures and technology. An office of procurement needs to be established, with revised methods of obtaining new technology. Great savings could be achieved by wisely investing in ground-based, space-positioned, and airborne systems. Significant efficiencies and improvements to users is possible with new technology. However, these systems must be brought on line in a systematic manner and within a clearly delineated time frame.

Delays such as the FAA is experiencing with the advanced automation system are unacceptable and are characteristic of the problems associated with our current procurement program. The present procurement rules are cumbersome and inefficient and outdated.

The technology for the advanced automation system was developed over ten years ago and will likely be obsolete by the time the system becomes fully operational. The FAA may not realize any returns on the substantial investment it has made in the advanced automation system. Newer technologies such as satellite and global positioning systems will obviate the need for much of the advanced automation system. While hindsight is 20/20, the obvious failings of the AAS project clearly indicate a need for procurement reform.

Oversight

Congressional oversight will be required to restructure the FAA. FMA believes public safety concerns must require congressional oversight of the new FAA to include the following elements: hearings on the budget; setting of rates; allocation of funds; borrowing practices; and other major management functions. FMA also believes the FAA Administrator should be subject to congressional confirmation. Once the new agency has an opportunity to demonstrate that its operating practices are effective, FMA would support a reassessment of congressional oversight needs.

Conclusion

Reforms are possible within the FAA. However, these reforms must be carefully crafted, evaluated and validated prior to wide spread implementation. FMA strongly supports the President and Vice President in their efforts to make government work better and cost less. In this process, each governmental function needs to be viewed as unique with dedicated and skilled professional managers and supervisors. Managers and supervisors will lead reform efforts and create the systems of tomorrow.

As the FAA seeks to restructure, I ask you, Mr. Chairman, to take the lead in insuring that safety related skills within FAA are viewed as unique and vital to the national safety mandates of aviation. Air safety should not be compromised by reducing the ratio of Air Traffic Control supervisors to workers merely to satisfy a broad mandate to increase the average ratio of supervisors to workers from 1:7 to 1:15 in the government. FMA believes that a government-wide ratio of 1 supervisor for every 15 workers may be possible. However, efforts to change the ratio of supervisors to workers must be mission driven and not applied as a cookie cutter solution to the government's problems. Clearly, safety concerns dictate that changes in the management of Air Traffic Control need to be well thought out before they are

implemented.

Again, Mr. Chairman, let me surmise FMA's main concerns.

- FMA supports making government work better and cost less.
- FMA believes that Air Traffic Control safety requirements present unique factors which must be taken into consideration when deciding what the future ratio of supervisors to workers will be within the FAA.
- FMA believes that the FAA can be downsized and made independent through the process we've outlined.

Mr. Chairman, thank you for inviting me to present FMA's views before your committee. This concludes my prepared remarks, I will now be happy to answer any questions you may have.

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PROFESSIONAL AIRWAYS SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS

Administrative Office
1220 North University Drive
Plantation, FL 33322
Phone: (305) 424 7577
FAX: (305) 424 9377

Legislative Office
1150 17th Street, Suite 702
Washington, D.C. 20036
Phone: (202) 293 7277
FAX: (202) 293 7727

Howard E. Johannssen, *President Chairman*
Marvin E. "Bud" Long, *Vice President Vice Chairman*
District No. 6 – PASS/NMEBA (AFL-CIO)

STATEMENT OF HOWARD E. JOHANNSSEN, PRESIDENT

PROFESSIONAL AIRWAYS SYSTEMS SPECIALISTS
DISTRICT NO. 6 - PASS/NMEBA (AFL-CIO)

BEFORE THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

MARCH 9, 1994

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Good Afternoon. My name is Howard E. Johannssen, and I am President of the Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS) - District No. 6 - NMEBA (AFL-CIO). Thank you for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you today concerning the effect that the Administration's budget freeze and reinventing government proposals will have on FAA staffing levels in FY 1995 and beyond.

Since 1977, the Professional Airways Systems Specialists (PASS) has provided exclusive representation for the Technical and Aviation Systems Specialists working for the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Presently, the PASS bargaining unit consists of over 10,000 FAA employees, including: Airway Facilities (AF) employees, Flight Standards Aviation Safety Inspectors (FS), and Office of Aviation Standards employees (AVN). PASS also represents a growing number of Department of Defense employees (DOD). The PASS work force is dedicated to supporting and to sustaining the safest and most efficient National Airspace System for the flying public.

On a daily basis, **FAA Airway Facilities** and **DOD Systems Specialists** install, repair, maintain, operate, and certify the entire realm of electronic, electro-mechanical, and environmental systems used in air traffic control and national defense. **Flight Standards Aviation Safety Inspectors** oversee and inspect every aspect of the commercial and general aviation industry. **Office of Aviation Systems Standards Specialists** are responsible for the maintenance of the National Airspace System (NAS) through flight inspection, flight procedures development, flight data collection and navigational systems quality analysis. Additionally, PASS represents support staff within each of these FAA organizations. Without a doubt, PASS members perform safety critical tasks for the FAA and DOD and are an integral component of the aviation community.

REVIEW OF THE NPR RECOMMENDATIONS

As you know, there is a major governmentwide effort now under way to transform the federal work force. Spawned by Vice President Gore's ***Report of the National Performance Review***, this dramatic revolution will eventually lead to widespread changes within the federal bureaucracy. For instance, following the recommendations of the NPR, Congress is attempting to mandate that 252,000 federal jobs be eliminated by 1999. Additionally, federal management and labor have been encouraged to become cooperative partners through the formation of Labor-Management Partnerships. Other NPR directions would give agencies more control over hiring, job and pay classification, organizational and individual performance and discipline, and incentive programs.

While I praise Vice President Gore and the National Performance Review for these timely and ambitious proposals, I also recognize that as agencies strive to downsize, to realign, and to work more efficiently with less money, they are bound to encounter difficulties. Today, for example, given the impasse of "buyout" legislation (HR 3345) that would have encouraged federal workers to resign or to retire early with incentive payments, agencies are being forced to consider Reductions in Force (RIFs). Unfortunately, the FAA is not exempt from these problems, and the future of the Agency and the aviation industry is being challenged on many levels. As a result, the Clinton Administration, the NPR, and the FAA have begun to look at alternative ways to deliver air traffic control services outside of the realm of the federal bureaucracy.

In a recent speech, FAA Administrator David Hinson commented, "As it exists today, the FAA, caught in a triangle of federal regulations, cannot easily sustain the new growth which will be necessary to meet the future demands of the [aviation] industry."[1] I wholeheartedly agree with the Administrator that there is an urgency for change within the FAA. Although the NPR recommendations begin to address many of these necessary changes, they do not solve current FAA problems, such as staffing shortfalls, nor do they address the changes needed in acquisition, procurement, and personnel policies and practices. Thus, I must conclude that most facets of the NPR proposals are designed to meet the needs of administrative agencies, not technical agencies, like the FAA, which are forced to operate 24 hours a day, seven days a week.

THE FY 1995 FAA BUDGET PROPOSAL

If the goals of the NPR are to be met and budget cutbacks are to be accomplished, federal agencies will be forced to do more with less money. The FAA's FY 1995 Operations budget is clearly indicative of the Administration's freeze on spending. The FAA's FY 1994 enacted budget is $4,580.5 million dollars; for FY 1995, the Agency has requested $4,580.9 million dollars. This represents a net change of only + $0.4 million dollars.

In FY 1994, the FAA did not budget for locality pay raises, and, consequently, the Agency had to absorb the $70 million price tag for the locality raises which were implemented in January 1994. Unlike the FY 1994 budget, the FAA's FY 1995 proposal apportions $72.5 million dollars for locality pay and annual cost of living raises. Interestingly, as I mentioned earlier, the difference between the FY 1994 and the FY 1995 budgets is virtually insignificant. How, then, can the Agency incur a $72.5 million dollar increase to its budget and, at the same time, spend only $0.4 million dollars more than last fiscal year?

The FAA's solution is to stringently reduce its travel, training, and awards programs by a total of $34.5 million dollars; moreover, agency-wide operations staffing reductions amount to $99.1 million dollars; and, finally, the scheduled termination of the Pay Demonstration Project is to save $30.0 million dollars. Unfortunately, the FAA is planning to eliminate essential funding in FY 1995; without a doubt, the effects of these spending cuts will have a resounding impact on members of the PASS bargaining units and on FAA staffing levels as a whole.

AIRWAY FACILITIES STAFFING PROBLEMS

For decades, the FAA has successfully managed the most complex aviation system in the world. A large part of this success can be attributed to the dedicated and skilled Airway Facilities Systems Specialists. Surely, the constant advent of new telecommunications and satellite-based technologies has profoundly affected FAA operations by increasing overall system capacity. Despite these growing demands on the system, staffing levels within the AF work force have fallen disastrously low.

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[1] David Hinson's remarks are taken from a January 25, 1994, speech to the Aero Club of Washington, D.C.

In 1982, our AF profession consisted of over 11,600 Systems Specialists who were responsible for maintaining 19,000 FAA facilities. Today, our work force has been reduced to under 6,000 trained, partially trained, or untrained Systems Specialists while the number of facilities and complex electronic systems now exceeds 29,000. Although the Secretary of Transportation has indicated that safety-related positions within the FAA would not be adversely affected by the governmentwide downsizing, the FY 1995 FAA budget proposes to reduce the end-of-year staffing level by 148. Ironically, the FAA is decreasing its in-house maintenance staff in an apparent attempt to save money, while, at the same time, the Agency is requesting an additional $20.4 million dollars in FY 1995 to fund outside contract maintenance.

Clearly, there is an urgent need for training and growth within our AF work force. Currently, over 50% of today's Systems Specialist will be eligible to retire within the next five years. In addition, the present staffing shortages and budget constraints have prevented Systems Specialists from receiving adequate training, either on-the-job or at the FAA Academy; thus, the experience levels of Systems Specialists has dropped significantly. Without the hiring of new Systems Specialists and the proper training of the entire work force, any high retirement turnover in the near future could have a devastating effect on the FAA.

After analyzing staffing levels within the FAA, in light of the growing demands placed on the aviation industry, the General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended that by FY 1995, "a field maintenance work force of about 11,900[2] will be needed -- an increase of 3,000 over the present number." Presently, there is a total of 8,348 AF managers, supervisors, logistical specialists, and support staff personnel in the field. The FY 1995 budget reduces that number to 8,200 total positions. Hence, instead of complying with the GAO's recommendations, the FAA is moving further away from the target and will be understaffed by 3,700 positions in FY 1995.

Rather than confronting and rectifying the staffing problems that the GAO cited, the FAA instead resorted to contracting out. Last year, Congress recognized the need for more Systems Specialists and less outside contractors and passed legislation "restoring 237 staff years to the FAA's in-house maintenance work force." Unfortunately, the FAA used these allotted positions to hire employees to design software and to assist in engineering projects. No employees were hired for field positions!

The consequences of the FAA's staffing shortage are becoming more and more apparent. Last month, in two separate incidents at Tampa International Airport, equipment outages and the lack of available on-site maintenance technicians to repair the equipment, rendered aircraft destined for Tampa unable to land for nearly nine hours. Until January 1994, AF personnel were on-duty 24 hours a day in Tampa's Air Traffic Control Tower to handle any equipment problems or emergencies that arose. However, the FAA reduced the duty hours for Tampa technicians to approximately 16 hours a day on weekdays and 8 hours a day on weekends. As a result, the facility is often left unattended.

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[2] This figure represents Systems Specialists, as well as managers and support staff. According to the FAA's own data, the current number of "hands on" certified or training to become certified Systems Specialists is less than 6,000. PASS recommends that the number of full performance Specialists be increased by 3,000 by FY 1995.

Both the *St. Petersburg Times* and *The Tampa Tribune* carried lead articles on this incident, drawing public attention to the matter. The newspapers reported that on February 12, 1994, and again on February 13, 1994, more than 100 planes bound for Tampa were delayed or diverted from Tampa's Airport because "a safety device broke and no one was on duty to fix it."[3]

Adding to this manpower shortage is the fact that all of the routine maintenance checks and procedural shutdowns that were previously performed by AF Systems Specialists during off-peak morning hours must now be performed during periods of high air traffic volume. Surely, the safety of the flying skies is jeopardized since air traffic controllers must not only struggle to deal with such outages and maintenance checks but, at the same time, they are expected to handle a high volume of incoming and outgoing air traffic.

According to the newspaper reports, the FAA rationalized its decision to cut staffing hours by arguing that, with the modernization of the air traffic control computer system through the implementation of the Advanced Automation System (AAS), its computers will need less maintenance. Yet, the modernization plan has fallen years behind schedule. Just last week, FAA Administrator Hinson indicated that modernization is not proceeding as planned, and he replaced the top managers assigned to the contract for the AAS. On March 4, 1994, *Aviation Daily* stipulated that Hinson's actions came in response to an interim review which showed that the "costs [of the AAS] could reach $7.3 billion and additional delays of up to 31 months could be incurred."

Originally, the AAS was scheduled to be operational by October 1996; a 31-month delay would carry into May 1999. Undoubtedly, the FAA had not anticipated such complications; nevertheless, as staffing levels continue to plummet, the frequency of similar outages occurring at other facilities has been greatly enhanced. Obviously, the FAA is cutting its safety-related and technical staffing levels far too quickly to meet current system requirements. Hence, each time a tower or a facility is left without 24 hour on-site maintenance personnel, the safety and the reliability of the air traffic control system will be jeopardized.

AF REALIGNMENT

Approximately three years ago, management personnel within the Airway Facilities organization embarked upon a Strategic Planning Initiative to streamline the maintenance functions of the AF system. Because the FAA is top heavy with management personnel, the goal of this endeavor is to reduce the employee to supervisor ratio through the consolidation and realignment of a number of the FAA regional field offices. Interestingly, the NPR has also since found the FAA to have too many bosses and not enough workers, and it too supports a "flattening" of the organization.

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[3] Adair, Bill. "Controllers Question TIA Safety." ***St. Petersburg Times*** (February 17, 1994, 1A).

According to the FAA's data, the implementation of regional realignment is to begin in FY 1995, with a targeted completion date of January 1, 1998. The Strategic Planning Committee has proposed that the FAA introduce three levels of organization within AF: the division, the sector, and the work center. Moreover, by the end of FY 1995, the FAA hopes that realignment will reduce the employee/supervisor ratio to 10:1; by the end of FY 1999, this ratio is targeted to be 15:1.

Since the inception of this Strategic Planning Initiative, PASS has had representatives involved at every level -- local, regional, and national -- to ensure that regional realignment would not be adversely consequential to our AF bargaining unit. While we first welcomed the FAA's decision to restructure AF management from five layers to three layers, we have begun to notice some major flaws in the plan which, in the near future, could further compound our AF staffing problems.

Unfortunately, by design, there are large numbers of managers involved with the realignment, and many of these managers seem to be more interested in protecting the salaries which a management pay grade affords them than they are with streamlining the AF. Thus, they are creating new "non-supervisory" management positions. As a result, safety-related positions are being left shorthanded.

At the Fort Worth ARTCC, for instance, staffing levels authorize 87 positions; in FY 1995, staffing will be reduced by 3 to 84 positions. As in many centers, there is no specification as to how many of the Fort Worth positions should be safety-related and how many should be managerial. During the last several years, safety-related positions have repeatedly been replaced with management positions, with the manager also performing technical work. Once realignment is implemented, though, management at the Fort Worth ARTCC, and at centers throughout the country, will be streamlined.

As you can see, the problem with the FAA's realignment, then, is that there is no consideration being given to the number of safety-related positions that managers have filled. Although many supervisory positions will be abolished, the amount of work to be done will remain the same or will increase. Consequently, the already overburdened Systems Specialists will face enormous challenges as they attempt to handle more tasks with less assistance.

Since AF realignment will produce reduced staffing levels at many lower level facilities, general aviation and corporate aviation communities across the country will incur unfair maintenance delays. We believe that the major hubs and centers will be serviced while the rest of the system will be maintained only as time and conditions permit. Obviously, then, current realignment efforts surely do not fulfill the intentions of the Strategic Planning Initiative, nor do they meet the goals of the NPR. Certainly, if realignment proceeds in this fashion, the outcome will be disastrous for staffing levels within the Systems Specialist work force.

FLIGHT STANDARDS AVIATION SAFETY INSPECTORS

Today, the FAA employs approximately 2,400 Aviation Safety Inspectors to oversee more than 6,100 air carrier and air taxis aircraft, 4,450 repair stations, 547 pilot training schools, 177 maintenance schools, 641,500 active pilots and 198,500 general aviation aircraft. These Inspectors are the only FAA employees with "Safety" as their middle name.

Since 1983, the FAA has doubled its Safety Inspector work force, and Congress has mandated that Inspectors spend at the minimum of 35% of their time performing inspections. Still, the GAO reported last year that the FAA was not meeting this goal. Why do Inspectors still remain unable to complete the required 14 hours per week of inspections? This problem can be directly attributed to the serious imbalance which exists in the ratio between the number of clerical employees and the number of Inspectors.

Currently, on average, for every eleven Inspectors in most Flight Standards District Offices (FSDOs) there is only one clerical staffer available to offer assistance. Yet, FAA Inspectors have reported, from personal observation and experience, that about 30% to 35% of the work executed in a FSDO is clerical. As a result of this lack of clerical staff, each Aviation Safety Inspector spends about 25% of his/her time performing the following clerical duties: typing; filing; preparing mailing lists; managing files and records; revising Advisory Circular, FAR, and FAA Technical Orders; and answering telephones.

Around the country, pleas by Inspectors for more Administrative help are being denied by the FAA because of insufficient funds, and the staffing problems are only worsening. One PASS Inspector from the Salt Lake City FSDO recently reported to us that his office is desperately in need of Administrative Personnel. He writes,

> "We have Inspectors answering telephones every day of every week in the mornings. We have $25 per hour Inspectors performing a $5-$8 per hour job function. It is a tremendous waste of time and money. The worst part about this is that we could be out in the field doing some of our primary work functions, namely inspecting, investigating, and certifying airman. In Operations-Certificate Management, we have one administrative person to work with fourteen Inspectors. That is not enough! If an efficiency expert came into the FAA to study how we conduct business we would flunk."

Given the Administration's emphasis on cost containment and budget restraints, not to mention the NPR's commitment "to do more with less," how can the FAA justify that GS-13 and GS-14 level Inspectors spend so much time performing the functions that should be carried out by a GS-6 or GS-7 clerk?

In order to alleviate some of the Inspectors' work load requirements for para-technical assistance, the FAA created a new Aviation Safety Technician (AST) position at the GS 1802-08 level. PASS applauds the establishment of this new position; unfortunately, however, the positive impact that the creation of this position may have had on the Inspectors has so far been slight. By FAA guidelines, any positions that are established must be filled within current position and resource allocations and must be in line with any freeze restrictions. No additional positions or PC & B are now available to support creation of these positions, and there is no requirement that these positions be established in any office. Consequently, there are presently less than 10 AST positions filled throughout the Flight Standards branch.

For FY 1995, the FAA intends to increase s ● fing in Flight Standards by 305 positions. To date, the Agency has not formally stated what positions it intends to increase. PASS definitely welcomes any increase in staffing, and we are hopeful that priority be placed on substantially increasing the number of clerical and AST positions.

Although the number of Safety Inspectors is relatively stable right now, it is very important that the FAA also hire new Inspectors. Currently, the average Inspector is close to 50 years old; the work force is mature and will likely experience a relatively high rate of retirement in the foreseeable future. Because a journeyman Inspector must be trained for a minimum of two years, the FAA must begin hiring sufficient numbers of Inspectors to offset the attrition rates expected in the upcoming years.

LABOR-MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIPS AND THE EMPLOYEE INVOLVEMENT PROCESS

As I mentioned earlier, one of the major goals of the National Performance Review is to enhance labor-management relationships within the federal government. To date, President Clinton has already taken positive steps to implement this recommendation, issuing Executive Order 12871 entitled "Labor-Management Partnerships." Among other things, this Executive Order established the National Partnership Council which is responsible for advising the President on the status of labor-management partnership efforts and for proposing legislative changes related to labor relations, staffing, classification and compensation, and performance management.

For the last nine years, PASS and the FAA -- through a highly praised Employee Involvement (EI) program -- have made significant progress in enhancing labor-management relations, operational efficiency, and productivity. Organized in 1985 as a two-year pilot program in the Eastern Regional AF Division, EI was expanded in 1988 to include all 9 regional AF Divisions and each of their respective sectors.

The EI program is Airway Facilities' commitment for a system-wide organizational change to total quality management through joint problem solving and collaborative decision making. Under the designs of this program, employees are encouraged to offer the FAA input on issues such as staffing allocations, regional budgets, job classification, equipment acquisition and installation, work schedules, and employee training. I think it is fair to say that without the establishment of the EI program, the Airway Facilities organization and the National Airspace System would not function as they do today.

To date, the PASS/FAA EI program has helped to alleviate and to avert many problems; the significant decrease in the number of employees filing grievances is just one indication of this success. Additionally, PASS has been provided with greater opportunities to participate in AF endeavors. For instance, thanks to the relationship that PASS and the FAA have fostered through EI, AF management at the highest levels insisted that PASS be made a partner in the FAA's Strategic Planning Initiative to realign the AF.

As you can see, EI has been the bedrock for improved governmental operations within the Airway Facilities unit; the NPR, as well as other federal agencies, could surely learn many valuable lessons from the PASS/FAA EI program. Unfortunately, given the FAA's decreased funding for operations, as well as the increased reliance on contract maintenance, PASS is worried that the accomplishments we have made through EI will be endangered and future developments will be threatened.

CONCLUSION

Without question, Systems Specialists and Aviation Safety Inspectors face serious obstacles as the FAA attempts to keep our airways system operating at the highest possible safety levels with the least amount of available funds. What I have tried to emphasize to you today is the importance of staffing; it is crucial that the FAA increase staffing to meet necessary and realistic levels. Otherwise, the consequences for the aviation industry and the flying public could be severe.

According to our sources at the FAA, only 75% of scheduled AF routine work is presently being done throughout the country because of insufficient staffing. The maintenance time needed to phase in new equipment or to respond to outages, such as the one at Tampa International, are not factored into this equation. Thus, I believe it is fair to say that the budget cuts produced by reduced staffing levels in the FAA could produce a dramatically increased margin of error over the next several years. Too often, the FAA has only responded to an aviation disaster after one has occurred. Congress must take measures to prevent this from happening once again.

Unless this Subcommittee and the FAA recognize and address the staffing problems that we have presented in this testimony, PASS resolutely asserts that a crucial opportunity to make a change and to achieve the goals laid out by the Administration and the NPR will be lost. Ultimately, we are all interested in achieving the same result -- the safest and most efficient airspace system in the world. To this end, PASS recommends that Congress:

- Increase Systems Specialist and Aviation Safety Inspector staffing levels to meet current system requirements and projected future requirements after attrition. Moreover, it is essential that Congress again acknowledges that the use of contract maintenance is not a cost efficient alternative to utilizing in-house staff; if the contracting out budget was reduced, the savings could be redirected to hire needed personnel in the field.

- Recognize the importance of the PASS/FAA EI program and instruct the FAA to support and to fund the current AF program and to initiate similar programs within its Flight Standards and Office of Aviation Standards units. Without an EI program, these two units will never function as efficiently as they could or should.

- Investigate the AF Realignment Strategic Planning Initiative to ensure that the NPR's goal to flatten the managerial hierarchy does not escalate into an expensive scheme to fatten "non-supervisory" management positions.

- Make changes in acquisition, procurement, and personnel policies since the existence of arbitrary personnel ceilings, civil service requirements, and the lack of competitive pay make it unnecessarily difficult to attract and to retain a talented and sophisticated work force.

- Reject President Clinton's proposal to decrease next year's cost of living raise from 2.6% to 1.6% and to discontinue funding for locality pay raises in 1995. Last year, Congress disagreed with the President on this issue and implemented locality pay; in 1995, we urge you to fund the 2.6% national raise and to continue locality pay raises.

- Realize that the termination of the Pay Demonstration Project will adversely affect Systems Specialists and Safety Inspectors working in the Chicago, New York, Los Angeles and Oakland centers, causing them a tremendous loss of income The Pay Demonstration Project is a needed incentive to retain employees in these hard to staff areas. We urge Congress to pass legislation to fund the Pay Demonostration Project beyond June 1994.

- Consider all proposals, including the Air Traffic Control corporation, to restructure the FAA into a more efficient, revitalized organization. As a government corporation, the FAA would be free from the budget enforcement act, Title 5 personnel prohibitions, and archaic acquisition and procurement rules. For economic and competitive reasons, Congress and the FAA must now think, act, and respond to global airspace developments so as to rebuild a stronger National Airspace System.

At this time, I would like to thank you again for allowing me the opportunity to testify before you. I would now be glad to answer any questions you may have.

Statement of John R. Ryan
Vice President - Air Traffic Management
Air Transport Association of America
Before the House Committee on
Public Works and Transportation
Subcommittee on Aviation
FAA's Operations and Staffing
March 17, 1994

My name is John R. Ryan, I am Vice President - Air Traffic Management for the Air Transport Association of America, which represents U.S. scheduled carriers. I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss our views on the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) operations and staffing needs. These needs account for the largest single portion of the annual FAA budget request and represent the most important part of the FAA budget for the airline industry.

Today we will comment on the program that makes all of the others possible; programs supporting the people. Without adequate personnel resources and support, the United States' air transportation system will not be world's best.

Mr. Chairman, there are two issues I wish to discuss today that concern the airline industry:

- The termination of the FAA's pay demonstration program
- The Administration's program to streamline the bureaucracy

Termination of FAA's Pay Demonstration Project

The DOT/FAA (Department of Transportation/Federal Aviation Administration) pay demonstration project was established in 1989 to test whether retention allowances of up to 20 percent, paid as a lump sum at the end of each quarter worked, would alleviate chronic, severe shortages in certain safety-related positions at 22 FAA facilities (9 air traffic) in 4 metropolitan areas; New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Chicago. These sites were selected both because of the severity of their chronic staffing problems and because of the magnitude of the effect these sites had on the national air transportation system. Employees selected to receive the demonstration pay include airway facilities maintenance technicians, aviation safety inspectors, computer operators, engineers, and air traffic controllers. The test showed that the pay demo was effective in recruiting and retaining controllers and maintenance technicians.

Unless this program is extended, it will terminate on June 17th of this year. We believe the program should continue because of our concern that termination of the program will have a demoralizing effect on the recruitment and retention of both controllers and maintenance technicians at the key facilities in Chicago, New York, San Francisco and Los Angeles.

In support of our position, a report was issued by the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) in January of this year covering the pay demonstration from its inception in June 1989 through March 1993. OPM reports the following results:

Although a few sites still are below target staffing levels, as of March 1993, there had been an overall net increase of 9.3 percent in staffing for all pay demo positions since the project began. Other key points:

- A net increase of 11.6 percent in employees at the covered air traffic facilities
- A net loss of 3.6 percent in employees at the covered flight standards facilities
- A net increase of 5 percent in employees at the covered airway facilities
- Experience levels increased to an average of 11.3 years per employees from 10.3 years at implementation
- Full performance level controllers now constitute 54 percent of the workforce at demonstration sites, compared to 45 percent when the project began.
- Turnover Rates: CY 1988-1992 - Overall, turnover rates have declined throughout the FAA, but the decline was more dramatic at pay demo FAA facilities. At the demonstration facilities, the annual turnover rate for covered positions declined from 18.8 percent to 8.4 percent. At the non-demonstration facilities, the annual turnover rate declined from 16.8 percent to 9.6 percent.

ATA recommends that the current pay demo project be extended for controllers and maintenance technicians for two years while a permanent pay incentive program that addresses recruitment and retention at hard to staff facilities is created and tailored to meet FAA's specific needs. This program should not be allowed to proliferate beyond those facilities that have been historically hard to staff. Incidentally, to illustrate the possible

effects of pay demo termination on employee morale, a recent survey conducted by NATCA, the controller union, reveals that 75 percent of the controllers at Chicago Center would retire or request transfers if the pay demonstration is ended. We are concerned that delays will increase for the travelling public if controller staffing is reduced.

We agree with OPM in their report where they said, "The most pressing difficulty with the allowances has been the direct financial outlays. However, those costs must be balanced against the alternative cost of shortages in safety-related staff at critical sites. Ultimately, the project will end and the payments will stop, but the conditions which produced the need for the project in the first place may continue to exist or may recur. This presents a challenge to the agency."

The Administration Program to Streamline the Bureaucracy

The FAA is going to experience difficulties in determining how to cut 6,000 personnel between FY 1995 and FY 1999. A Presidential Executive Order and a Memorandum have directed government agencies to cut staff by 12% (6,000 for FAA) by 1999 of which 4% (2,000 for FAA) must be accomplished by the end of FY 1995 from a total of approximately 52,000 employees. FAA is exempting certain organizations they call the "Safety Workforce" from those cuts. This Safety Workforce is estimated to be about 28,000 depending on FAA internal decision-making at any given time. This leaves about 24,000 who will be subject to the reduction of 6,000 by the end of FY 1999.

The challenge for FAA is to insure that the reductions in staffing are taken in those

organizations which will result in the least adverse impact on all airspace users operating under Instrument Flight Rules (IFR). This includes all airline operations.

We propose that in addition to those personnel that FAA has identified as the "safety workforce," that FAA personnel whose jobs are directly related to the promotion and development of increased capacity and efficiency of U.S. flight operations should also be exempted from the FAA's cuts.

These include Headquarter's personnel engaged in the development of new ATC procedures and separation standards, implementation of new technologies such as GPS and data link, maintenance of current equipment and field engineers and technicians engaged in new equipment installations. However, these additional organizations, mostly Headquarters, should be subject to reductions in mid-level management and supervision.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

(Presented by John F. Thornton, Senior Director for Legislative Affairs, NATCA)

STATEMENT OF

BARRY KRASNER, PRESIDENT

NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION,

AFL/CIO

BEFORE

THE AVIATION SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

HOUSE PUBLIC WORKS AND TRANSPORTATION COMMITTEE

ON

THE STAFFING IMPACT OF THE FAA'S FY 95 BUDGET

MARCH 9, 1994

NATIONAL AIR TRAFFIC CONTROLLERS ASSOCIATION MEBA/AFL-CIO

Suite 701 • 1325 18th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036 • 202/223-2900 • Fax 202/659-3991

Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. My name is Barry Krasner and I am the President of the National Air Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA). NATCA, as you know, is the exclusive representative of the nation's more than 14,000 air traffic controllers. These dedicated men and women operate the FAA's air traffic control towers, TRACON's and air route traffic control centers -- 24 hours per day, 365 days per year.

NATCA welcomes the opportunity to meet with you this afternoon to discuss staffing problems within the FAA, and the effects that the FY'95 budget proposal will have on this issue.

Mr. Chairman, it has only been eight short months since we last met and discussed this most important issue. At the time, we were assured -- albeit, reluctantly by Deputy Secretary of Transportation Morton Downey that the FAA should, perhaps, be given budget flexibility for FY 1995 and an unspoken number of subsequent years. Unfortunately, that hope has not proven correct. Because of budget shortfalls, the FAA is now forced to make

air traffic service and safety decisions based on dollars.

The FAA has characterized its budget as "No-Growth"-- when, it is actually a budget cut. You just can't throw aside a demonstration project that has more than proven its worth, contract-out 1100 air traffic control positions; attempt to R-I-F 400 Air Traffic Assistant (ATA) positions, and ignore a Presidential Directive to hire fired PATCO controllers, then testify that you are operating with a "No-Growth-Budget". There is just too much pain involved.

The FAA will tell you it has more than enough air traffic controllers to safely staff its air traffic control facilities. That is just not correct. As of November 1993, the FAA employed 14,387 air traffic controllers Yet, we still receive complaints that controllers are unable to obtain leave when requested; shifts are being started with less than optimal staffing; and positions are being combined during busy hours because of staffing shortages. The FAA, to prove its point, will cite the decline in overtime hours used. But, Mr. Chairman, let me tell you -- the need for overtime has not declined; only the ability to pay it has declined.

Earlier in my statement, I mentioned that the FAA plans to drop its very successful Pay Demonstration Project (PDP). As you know, the PDP

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was initiated nearly five years ago to entice controllers to bid into or remain at certain hard to staff facilities. Those facilities selected were; NY TRACON, NY Center, O'Hare Tower & TRACON, Chicago Center, Bay TRACON, LA Tower & TRACON, and Coast TRACON. After five years of success, the FAA has cut the funding for this worthy program from its budget. I guess we should not be surprised. The Agency finally stumbled onto something that works -- it is only reasonable then to expect them to jettison it.

Unfortunately, it's not that funny to the men and women who transferred to these historically hard to staff facilities with the understanding they would receive an extra 20% for their services. I know you are thinking they should not have been expecting the 20% after five years, since the PDP was always slated to cease after five years. However, employees at these facilities were told over and over again by the FAA there would be no reduction in compensation. They were assured that the FAA would come up with a new program to replace the PDP. Even the Federal Register (p.10204, Vol.54, No. 46, Friday, March 10, 1989) comforted them by stating, "The purpose of the project is to test changes under controlled conditions before making commitments to put them into effect."

So, you see, the PDP was never expected to cease after five years if it was effective. The only question that remains is, was it a success? We certainly think so. Mr. Chairman, you, better than anyone else, understand the difficulty these facilities faced in attracting and retaining qualified candidates prior to PDP. Let me give you a snapshot of these facilities, as of December 1992. I apologize for not having more up to date figures; but, we are unable to obtain them from the FAA. I could provide you with NATCA numbers, but, rather open ourselves up to an argument, we'll use the FAA numbers.

	BEGIN 6/89	12/92	CHANGE
Staffing Levels	1,568	1,742	+174/+11%
FPLs	604	910	+306/+50.6%
Experience Levels	9.01	10.75	+1.74/+19%

As I said, Mr. Chairman, these numbers are not very current; but, they verify that formerly hard-to-staff facilities are thriving. New numbers would do nothing but reinforce our position.

What happens when the PDP stops? Controllers eligible to retire, probably will. Senior controllers will opt out of these facilities, when able. Highly-qualified controllers will no longer bid into these facilities -- which

will increase overtime usage, increase time spent training raw recruits from the Academy, and could have a very dramatic effect on the efficiency and safety of the system in those highly-traveled areas.

The other staffing related issue that I would like to touch on is the contracting-out of Level I VFR Towers. As you know, the FAA's position has always been to contract-out those ATC facilities that fall below the minimum density of a Level I VFR Tower. We fully agreed with this policy. However, since this latest budget-crunch, the FAA has widened its net of facilities to be contracted-out and is seeking bids on Level I facilities that are well within the core density of a Level I facility. NATCA strongly opposes this change in policy. Our air traffic control system should be seen as seamless.

In its headlong rush to abide by the Administration's ill-advised policy, the FAA has not looked to see if these facilities could be operated in a less costly manner. We believe that this type of study must be completed prior to considering contracting-out.

Furthermore, the FAA is overlooking the excellent training opportunity these facilities provide to new recruits. They provide new controllers with an excellent seasoning arena, prior to rising up to the more demanding

facilities.

Not only will this action deprive 1100 employees of employment opportunities, but it could very well hamper the economic stability of a given community. These are decent paying jobs and the communities would not want to trade-them-in for less viable and lower paying jobs.

Then, Mr. Chairman, there is the question of safety -- the most important question surrounding this issue. I do not want to go on record as saying that these facilities will be unsafe; but, I want to assure you that they will not enjoy the same margin of safety that they have today.

Chairman Oberstar, I know we disagree with the fixes needed to turn this Agency around. I have to tell you, though, if I was not already convinced that a government corporation was necessary for the FAA, its reaction to this latest budget-crunch would convince me. As long as the Agency must survive within the budget framework, it will continue to be forced to make unwise and perhaps unsafe decisions.

This concludes my testimony. I look forward to any questions that you or the subcommittee may have.

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ADDITIONS TO THE RECORD

AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL STAFFING NEEDS

Statement of Geraldine Frankoski, Director
Aviation Consumer Action Project

before the

Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Public Works and Transportation

Washington, DC
9 March 1994

On behalf of the Aviation Consumer Action Project, I would like to thank you for the invitation to speak today on staffing needs within the air traffic control work force.

Founded in 1971, ACAP in the only non-profit consumer organization working full-time on aviation issues, and it is funded by contributions from the public. ACAP has long been concerned with the safe and effective functioning of the air traffic control system.

Since the PATCO strike in 1981, we have been concerned that the FAA's optimistic plan for full recovery of the air traffic control system has never been fully realized. In the immediate aftermath of the strike, then-FAA Administrator J. Lynn Helms testified to Congress that the system could be returned to normal over a period of two or three years. This projection was based on the FAA conclusion that the pre-strike system was not overloaded, but was instead overstaffed. This conclusion led us today to an air traffic control system which, despite the best efforts of controllers, is overburdened and unable to efficiently handle the current level of traffic. As a result, the travelling public is experiencing delays and longer flight times, and is concerned about a deterioration in the margin of safety built into the system. In fact, carriers have increased the scheduled block-to-block time for many flights to reduce the number of delayed flights tallied in the Department of Transportation on-time performance statistics.

In assessing the current system, it is important to note that many problems stem from a decrease in both the quantity and the experience level of full-performance level controllers, who are qualified to work any position in the tower or center. The formula used to determine staffing requirements today differs significantly from the formula used prior to 1981. Before the strike, terminal staffing standards were determined based on the 90th percentile day, from which one can estimate that, barring any extraordinary growth or decline in air traffic, the number of regularly-scheduled controllers will be adequate 90 percent of the time.

Today, terminal staffing standards are based on the 50th percentile day, or the average day for terminal activity. This fundamental change in staffing philosophy virtually guarantees that overtime is built into the system. The General Accounting Office (GAO) testified to Congress in 1986 that, under the new staffing formula, the FAA assumed that "overtime would be used to cover traffic peaks, prime annual leave periods and other special requirements." This assumption was borne out, when investigators found that as many as 72 percent of controllers and supervisors in two New York centers were "expected or required" to work overtime ("Serious Problems Concerning the Air Traffic Control Work Force", GAO-RCED 86-121).

In addition to reductions of staffing standards, training requirements to achieve full-performance level status after the strike were reduced from four to five years to about half that time to compensate for staffing shortages.

In the wake of President Clinton's lifting of the ban on hiring the fired PATCO controllers, we are considering again a question that has concerned the airline industry and the travelling public over the last 13 years: are these staffing and training standards an accurate reflection of real needs within the system?

In many important areas, the answer is no. In 1993, operational errors in air traffic control, which result in a violation of minimum aircraft separation,

increased five percent over the previous year. In November, for example, several jets approaching New York City came too close together under the watch of a new controller whose requests for assistance were denied. Operational errors such as this can be a prelude to a catastrophic error, as in case of the 1991 runway collision in Los Angeles which killed 34, or the mid-air collision two months later which killed Sen. John Heinz of Pennsylvania.

Yet we hear the system has "fully recovered", as reported on a Department of Transportation fact sheet distributed the day the hiring ban was lifted. The FAA estimates the controller work force is near target levels, while industry experts say the system needs at least 2,000 more controllers to maintain adequate staffing levels in the face of increased traffic. Aircraft activity has increased nearly 28% over the past decade, while during the same period the percentage of full-performance level controllers decreased by 12%, comprising about 70% of the work force of over 17,700.

What price is the travelling public being asked to pay for increase demand on an already overburdened system? Last year, at the FAA Aviation Forecast Conference, then-FAA Acting Administrator Joseph Del Balzo said the agency estimates that:

> "...overall, air traffic delays cost passengers $7 billion each year and add $3 billion to the cost of operating aircraft. If the current trends continue, these costs will go up another 50 percent within the next ten years."

In other words, the current air traffic control system is unable to efficiently meet the needs of the airlines and their passengers, putting additional strain on an industry already in financial crisis.

It is important to note that we are not criticizing the efforts or dedication of the current crop of air traffic controllers. Instead we are saying they cannot and should not be asked to carry the load by themselves. We need to get experienced

controllers in the tower as quickly as possible; one way to achieve this goal is to take advantage of former controllers whose training and experience has already been bought and paid for by taxpayers.

In the interest of a more safe and efficient air traffic control system, ACAP urges the FAA to accelerate controller recruitment, upgrade training requirements, and bring additional experienced controllers immediately into the system.

I appreciate the invitation to testify and will be happy to answer your questions.

GEORGE J. HOCHBRUECKNER
1ST DISTRICT, NEW YORK

COMMITTEES
ARMED SERVICES

MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3201

229 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-3201
(202) 225-3826

DISTRICT OFFICES

3771 NESCONSET HIGHWAY
SUITE 213
CENTEREACH, NY 11720
(516) 689-6767

BAGSHAW OFFICE BUILDING
437 EAST MAIN STREET
RIVERHEAD, NY 11901
(516) 727-2162

STATEMENT BY CONGRESSMAN
GEORGE J. HOCHBRUECKNER

BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION

MARCH 9, 1994

Mr. Chairman, I commend you for allowing former fired air traffic controllers to testify before your committee today on solutions to aid with repairing and improving our nation's air traffic control system.

As you know, President Clinton's decision last summer to lift President Reagan's 1981 debarment of former PATCO controllers from employment with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) opened the door for former controllers to reapply for their jobs. This long-awaited decision sent a signal to the citizens of our nation that PATCO members should not continue to be unjustly ostracized by the federal government.

Unfortunately, since the time of the President's decision to lift the ban, the door has been slammed shut in the faces of thousands of former controllers who have contacted the FAA expressing their desire to return to their jobs. The current hiring freeze at the FAA and continuing federal budget constraints are the latest hurdles preventing former PATCO controllers from rehire. The controllers pursuit of their former positions is particularly frustrating because

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they are desparately needed to resolve chronic staffing shortages in my state of New York and elsewhere.

I strongly believe that former controllers can and should be a part of the solution to save the government money and to aid with system efficiency and safety. As you know, while it takes over two years to fully certify a controller, recertification of former controllers could be accomplished in less than six months, saving the government thousands of dollars in training costs. Furthermore, rehire of former controllers can help the FAA address chronic shortages in the number of experienced full performance level controllers who are qualified to operate all positions within a facility.

Mr. Chairman, I urge your committee to help make the return of former controllers become a reality. We must not allow this important resource go to waste. They are needed to handle our nation's air traffic control system and they want to return. Equity and fairness dictates that former controllers be rehired as soon as possible.

GEORGE J. HOCHBRUECKNER
1st District, New York

Committees
ARMED SERVICES

MERCHANT MARINE
AND FISHERIES

229 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515-3201
(202) 226-3826

District Offices
3771 Nesconset Highway
Suite 213
Centereach, NY 11720
(516) 689-8787

Bagshaw Office Building
437 East Main Street
Riverhead, NY 11901
(516) 727-2182

Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515-3201

March 9, 1994

The Honorable Jim Oberstar
Chairman
Subcommittee on Aviation
2251 Rayburn HOB
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Jim:

I respectively request that the attached statement on the rehire of former air traffic controllers by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) be placed in the record during your committee's consideration of the affect of the FAA's budget on the air traffic control system.

I apologize that I am not able to personally testify before your committee. However, I commend you for allowing former air traffic controllers fired in 1981 by President Reagan to testify on their continuing quest for rehire. I know that you agree that the unprecedented twelve year ban of these federal employees for rehire by the federal government was unjust and that they should be allowed to return to their jobs as quickly as possible.

Bob Harris, who is from my district, is testifying before you today. He is the head of Controllers United, which has organized former controllers from across the country who still care about servicing our nation's air traffic control system. Bob has dedicated himself to the issue of rehire, volunteering hundreds of hours on the topic. Bob continues to work toward the goal of rehire on behalf of thousands of former controllers because he believes that it is the right thing to do. So do I.

Thank you again for allowing former controllers to testify today on how they can make our nation's air traffic control system safer, more efficient, and cost-effective.

Sincerely,

George J. Hochbrueckner
Member of Congress

Enclosure

PRINTED ON RECYCLED PAPER

March 6, 1994

Honorable James Oberstar
Chairman, Aviation Subcommittee
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman,

Enclosed is a letter to the Committee on Public Works and Transportation for you to convey. It would be appreciated if this could be made part of the Congressional record during the hearings being conducted by you for the Aviation Subcommittee - March 9, 1994. Sir, the enclosed letter is an urgent appeal for intervention.

Below is my perspective as an air traffic controller, an employee for nearly 20 years at Washington Center and one who commutes frequently in the air traffic control system: I think this system is a disaster(s) waiting to happen.

The system has multiple deficiencies - staffing, training, equipment, controllers not properly placed according to skills, air traffic controller trainees training other air traffic controller trainees and an authoritarian-style management with little if any human relations skills. Definitely, the FAA is an agency with little vision, as they would have defused (not encouraged) the strike in 1981 and the system would not be what it is today.

The future is presenting a workforce that is steadily burning out. Within the Washington Center, the cancer rate is extremely high, and there is an increase in stress-related ailments. The burnout rate is progressively worse than pre-strike levels as individuals workloads have doubled (and in some cases tripled) by assigning one-person sectors which requires a person to work several positions at a sector. This would equate to a pilot flying a commercial aircraft (B727/B737/ MD80, etc.) by themselves. Prior to the strike, the FAA tried to mandate one-person sectors, however, PATCO intervened as safety was not to be jeopardized. Prior to the strike, it was very rare that a supervisor would resign. Several months ago, five supervisors at Washington Center resigned as well as forty-seven nationwide. The supervisor's schedule to be implemented at Washington Center will be a degradation to a fragile system. Additionally, individuals who would like become a supervisor or a temporary supervisor will not because of the current management's constraints. Even NATCA would penalize a controller on seniority for becoming a temporary supervisor.

These problems are only a few; however, the overall situation is STAFFING and safety has repeatedly been compromised and the expeditous flow of traffic has been derogated. After the Los Angeles crash - one would believe that drastic improvements would have been enforced immediately. I hope that Congress has not become desensitized.

Sir, we are on a collison course for a mid-air. And as a controller at Washington Center stated, if this facility was equipped with a transponder code - it would be CODE 7700. In layman terms, EMERGENCY.

The sad truth is that the entire air traffic control system is in a state of emergency.

Respectfully,

Deborah Ann Katz Pueschel
408 Maple Court
Herndon, VA 22070

March 5, 1994

To The Committee on Public Works and Transportation

Dear Representatives

The air traffic control system has progressively been deteriorating since August 3, 1981. Even some of the supervisors are agreeing that the system is to the point of no return.

Last week, Washington Center had twenty percent of its workforce in the B-Area either medically disqualified or controllers on traumatic leave due to system errors. Yesterday, March 4th, the A-area had two systems errors. Today, March 5, the D-Area had a system error. Washington Center has had over 160 errors/deviations during the last 30 months.

We need help now, not later.

Respectfully,

The concerned controllers at Washington Center:

Douglas Newman
Martin W. Taylor
Larry McMc Clenny
Maynard Eik Fodden

David [illegible]
[illegible]
F AREA
~~Deborah J. [illegible]~~ Puelschel (F-AREA)
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

March 5, 1994

To The Committee on Public Works and Transportation

Dear Representatives

The air traffic control system has progressively been deteriorating since August 3, 1981. Even some of the supervisors are agreeing that the system is to the point of no return.

Last week, Washington Center had twenty percent of its workforce in the B-Area either medically disqualified or controllers on traumatic leave due to system errors. Yesterday, March 4th, the A-area had two systems errors. Today, March 5, the D-Area had a system error. Washington Center has had over 160 errors/deviations during the last 30 months.

We need help now, not later.

Respectfully,

The concerned controllers at Washington Center:

Charlene L. Adamski (C Area)

Dan [illegible] (C Area, Harris)

[illegible] (F Area)

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] F Area

[illegible]

[illegible] F Area

[illegible]

[illegible]

March 5, 1994

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Respectfully,

The concerned controllers at Washington Center:

Martin Cole GA — C.R. Meyer Jr. — GC

Kelly Yaiger — [illegible] — [illegible]

Barry P. Frazier — [illegible] — [illegible]

Robert Bean — M.S. Drew Jr. — [illegible]

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Respectfully,

The concerned controllers at Washington Center: Lacy J. Brown, Rick Varela, Edward Mudett, Deborah Fay, Ted Hartung, Kimberly Rouse, Don Shanghai, Rebecca Bowman, Michael S. Wills, Joyce A.C. Fulipiak, Mike Shanhatzer

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Respectfully,

The concerned controllers at Washington Center:

Brian Downs
Clifton H. Mac Dill
Michael Cahill
Diane E. Zimmermann

March 5, 1994

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Respectfully.

The concerned controllers at Washington Center:

March 5, 1994

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Dear Representatives

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Last week, Washington Center had twenty percent of its workforce on the D-area either medically disqualified or controllers on traumatic leave due to system errors. Yesterday, March 4th, the D-area had two systems errors. Today, March 5, the D-Area had a system error. Washington Center has had over 160 errors/deviations during the last 30 months.

We need help now, not later.

Respectfully

The concerned controllers at Washington Center:



STATEMENT OF CONGRESSMAN GEORGE E. SANGMEISTER
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AVIATION
MARCH 9, 1994

I want to thank Chairman Oberstar for calling this most timely hearing. As the annual budget debate heats up, it is of the utmost importance that the subcommittee consider the implications of the President's budget proposal for the Federal Aviation Administration.

Last fall, I made one of the toughest votes of my career when approving the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act. A difficult vote, but I feel very strongly that we did the right thing, and the economy seems to be responding positively.

As we can all recall from that debate, there was no shortage of tough rhetoric about belt-tightening, sacrifice and priorities. Well, today this subcommittee gets its first dose of post-OBRA medicine. Namely, a freeze in FAA spending.

For FY 1995, the President has proposed holding the line on FAA's budget. Although this does not come as a surprise to this Member -- I had expected as much when we froze discretionary funds last year -- it does raise some serious questions.

- o How does FAA adapt to a funding freeze and staffing cuts?
- o How will the FAA insure that safety and maintenance will continue to be held to the highest standard?
- o And, finally, what are the implications of this budget for Air Traffic Control personnel?

On this last point, I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses and would like to make some brief comments. I represent many controllers in the Chicago area and believe more needs to be done to bolster the controller workforce. As many here know, if you talk to FAA about controller staffing you will often get a much

rosier scenario than if you talk to the controller on the job. Mr. Chairman, as the possibility of an Air Traffic Control "Corporation" looms, I hope this subcommittee will not overlook the staffing and pay issues that confront the air traffic control system right now. As you know, Mr. Chairman, I have been active on this front for some time and hope hearings on pay, recruitment and retention issues can be scheduled as soon as possible.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, I want to touch on the Pay Demonstration Program. I believe the record on PDP is clear: it has been a success, and our hard-to-staff facilities are running smoother than we had hoped. OPM has reaffirmed this. The question now becomes: Should we continue the program or abandon it?

I know that the Appropriations Committee has already held the funeral for PDP, but I believe we need to consider the consequences of this decision. I talk with Chicago-area controllers virtually every week, and want to warn everyone here that we may be facing the same scenario we faced before PDP if it is phased out: low morale; ballooning turnover and retirement rates; and, once again, staffing shortages at our busiest facilities. FAA may dispute this, but I have yet to hear any compelling arguments from that camp. PDP works -- it is accomplishing its goals at these busy facilities. Controllers are satisfied and FAA has the flexibility it needs to address critical staffing needs. Considering its success, does it make sense for us to say "O.K., lets eliminate the program"? As we review FAA's $4.5 billion budget, I believe a modest $20 million investment in PDP makes a lot of sense.

Again, thank you Mr. Chairman. I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses.

U.S. Department
of Transportation

Federal Aviation
Administration

Office of the Administrator

800 Independence Ave., S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20591

MAY 20 1994

The Honorable James L. Oberstar
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation
Committee on Public Works and Transportation
House of Representatives
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

As promised during the Subcommittee hearing on staffing, we have examined the issues of staffing levels, traumatic leave, and operational errors at New York (ZNY) and Washington (ZDC) Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC). We have found that full-performance level staffing at both ZNY and ZDC are at an all-time post-strike high. New York ARTCC is just 9 controllers below its 357 controller work force (CWF) authorized level. This equates to 97 percent of its authorized CWF staffing. Washington ARTCC is 100+ percent of its authorized CWF staffing with 1 person more than its 431 authorized level.

In examining the last 6 months of traumatic leave use at both centers, ZNY was found to have isolated instances of traumatic leave use which were not considered problematic. The last 6 months of traumatic leave use at ZDC does concern us because of 26 separate requests for trauma leave. Sixty-one percent or 16 of these requests were related to operational errors. At one point there were as many as 7 controllers in one area on trauma leave. Although CWF staffing is above authorized levels, this creates somewhat of a strain on staffing which has been maintained in all areas impacted by any sick or traumatic leave. Some of these leave requests are from different controllers associated with the same operational error or deviation. Even so, we are concerned with this trend in both traumatic leave and operational errors.

The Office of Air Traffic System Effectiveness facility statistics on operational errors in the last 6 months at ZNY have identified a significant increase in operational error rates over the same time period last year. The ZNY management is aware of these figures and is continuing to improve quality assurance procedures to reduce this rate. Statistics at ZDC have also identified an increase in operational errors.

Management has initiated plans which include assigning additional personnel to its quality assurance office to furthe support this function, conducting an airspace study to evaluat options and procedures, and assessing the impact of the curren transition from seven areas to six areas. Operational error reduction and quality assurance are always a top priority whether trends are increasing or decreasing.

Across-the-board commitments on the part of management, the union, and all facility personnel are required to facilitate resolution of the leave and operational error issues that have been identified. We are currently using our Quality Through Partnership (QTP) processes in each facility for a team centered approach to identify problems, causes, and solutions. We know this will involve additional QTP and quality assurance resources which have been committed to this endeavor. I will continue to track our progress on these issues and keep you apprised.

Sincerely,

David R. Hinson
Administrator

FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM
EQUIPMENT AND SERVICE AVAILABILITY
(NATIONAL AVERAGE)
1991 - 1993

Fiscal Year	Equipment and Service Availability
1991	99.84%
1992	99.85%
1993	99.85%

Comparison of FY 1993 Controller Staffing Standard to Actual on Board as of 9/30/93

								Supplemental Controller Resources							
REG	FACID	LOCID	LVL	FY93 STAFFING STANDARD RESOURCE REQUIREMENT	ACTUAL ON BOARD CONTROLLERS TOTAL	AOB 9/93 FPL TOTAL	S9 vs. AOB	AOB 9/93 Traffic Mgmt Coord. (TMC)	AOB 9/93 ATA	AOB 9/93 ATCS/ATA & TMC TOTAL	S9 vs. AOB w/ATA & TMC	FY93 Est. CWF* Overtime Hours	Overtime in Controller Years	Colocated Split Facilities	Delays
AGL	CLEVELAND ARTCC	ZOB	3	400	403	333	3	18	24	445	45	5,177	2.48		614
ASO	ATLANTA ARTCC	ZTL	3	389	457	349	68	28	21	504	115	2,758	1.32		496
AGL	CHICAGO ARTCC	ZAU	3	379	434	329	55	20	23	477	98	8,674	4.15		0
AEA	WASHINGTON ARTCC	ZOC	3	361	367	305	6	22	11	400	39	5,554	2.66		299
ACE	KANSAS CITY ARTCC	ZKC	3	360	356	298	-4	15	22	393	33	603	0.29		122
ASW	FT WORTH ARTCC	ZFW	3	342	360	268	18	14	11	385	43	1,743	0.83		1
AGL	INDIANAPOLIS ARTCC	ZID	3	321	336	263	15	15	20	371	50	2,975	1.42		147
ASO	JACKSONVILLE ARTCC	ZJX	3	319	348	254	29	17	24	389	70	808	0.39		118
AWP	OAKLAND ARTCC	ZOA	3	305	268	189	-37	16	20	304	-1	7,946	3.81		29
ASW	ALBUQUERQUE ARTCC	ZAB	3	296	310	249	14	13	10	333	37	1,262	0.60		3
AWP	LOS ANGELES ARTCC	ZLA	3	294	320	221	26	19	15	354	60	2,482	1.19		62
ASO	MEMPHIS ARTCC	ZME	3	286	309	237	23	16	27	352	66	1,868	0.89		154
ANM	DENVER ARTCC	ZDV	3	284	312	234	28	15	14	341	57	154	0.07		10
ASW	HOUSTON ARTCC	ZHU	3	276	358	241	82	14	10	382	106	926	0.44		20
AEA	NEW YORK ARTCC	ZNY	3	252	311	220	59	18	23	352	100	10,054	4.82		16
AGL	MINNEAPOLIS ARTCC	ZMP	3	250	328	230	78	17	24	369	119	3,700	1.77		98
ANE	BOSTON ARTCC	ZBW	3	235	290	234	55	13	12	315	80	741	0.35		19
ASO	MIAMI ARTCC	ZMA	3	191	304	226	113	14	26	344	153	1,280	0.61		67
ANM	SALT LAKE CITY ARTCC	ZLC	3	173	207	173	34	9	11	227	54	547	0.26		21
ANM	SEATTLE ARTCC	ZSE	3	173	218	183	45	14	10	242	69	275	0.13		0

Offshore en route facilities not included. These facilities do not have a staffing standard: Anchorage ARTCC, Guam CERAP, San Juan CERAP, and Honolulu CERAP.

* Overtime accounting at some facilities is combined (i.e., tower/TRACON), but staffing standard and on board is split.

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AEA	NEW YORK TRACON	N90	5	159	186	157	27	11	12	209	50	4,454	2.13		2
ASO	MIAMI INTL ATCT	MIA	5	85	82	60	-3	5	5	92	7	3,266	1.56		5397
ASO	ATLANTA HARTSFIELD ATCT	ATL	5	84	85	76	1	4	8	97	13	1,266	0.61		19014
ASW	DALLAS-FT WORTH TRACON	D10	5	83	88	71	5	4	7	99	18	1,110	0.53	DFW	124
AGL	CHICAGO-O'HARE TRACON	C90	5	81	77	62	-4	1	6	84	3	12,989	6.22	ORD	0
ASW	HOUSTON INTERCONTINETAL ATCT	I90/IAH	5	72	67	61	-5	5	12	84	7	572	0.27		2445
AWP	OAKLAND BAY TRACON	O90	5	69	76	52	7	4	2	82	13	5,369	2.57		0
ASO	CHARLOTTE ATCT	CLT	5	67	64	60	-3	4	3	71	4	1,088	0.52		2112
AEA	PHILADELPHIA INT'L ATCT	PHL	5	66	59	45	-7	4	1	64	-2	2,574	1.23		14364
AEA	WASHINGTON NATIONAL ATCT	DCA	5	61	60	35	-1	1	1	62	1	758	0.36		3091
AEA	PITTSBURGH INTL ATCT	PIT	5	61	67	50	6	4	7	78	17	3,384	1.62		3024
ASO	ORLANDO INTL ATCT	MCO	5	59	60	58	1	3	5	68	9	562	0.27		1572
AEA	DULLES INTL ATCT	IAD	5	57	56	35	-1	3	1	60	3	676	0.32		2057
ASO	TAMPA INTL ATCT	TPA	5	56	61	58	5	0	8	67	11	36	0.02		922
ANM	DENVER TRACON	D84	5	52	49	28	-3	6	3	58	6	862	0.41	DEN	26
ASO	PENSACOLA TRACON	P31	5	49	33	30	-16	0	7	40	-9	170	0.08	PNS	0
AGL	DETROIT TRACON	D21	5	48	46	35	-2	3	12	61	13	1,287	0.62	DTW	27
AWP	COAST TRACON	NZJ	5	46	54	48	8	5	0	59	13	2,633	1.26		0
AWP	SACRAMENTO TRACON	MCC	5	45	36	34	-9	0	3	39	-6	83	0.04		0
AWP	PHOENIX TRACON	P50	5	45	41	39	-4	2	3	46	1	760	0.36		0
AGL	CHICAGO-O'HARE INT'L ATCT	ORD	5	45	49	35	4	0	0	49	4	*	*	C90	41387
ASW	DALLAS-FT WORTH ATC TOWER	DFW	5	42	43	31	1	3	9	55	13	*	*	D10	26686
AGL	MINNEAPOLIS TRACON	M98	5	42	44	30	2	0	4	48	6	1,500	0.72	MSP	0
ACE	ST LOUIS TRACON	T75	5	42	52	47	10	4	7	63	21	147	0.07	STL	0
AWP	LOS ANGELES TRACON	L56	5	42	59	42	17	4	0	63	21	3,556	1.70		0

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AWP	LOS ANGELES INT'L ATCT	LAX	5	39	38	29	-1	3	0	41	2	982	0.47		6943
ANE	BOSTON TRACON	A90	5	39	38	32	-1	4	0	42	3	800	0.38		0
AWP	SAN DIEGO TRACON	NKX	5	39	40	32	1	2	2	44	5	2,089	1.00		0
ANM	SEATTLE/TACOMA TRACON	S46	5	37	51	34	14	3	1	55	18	1,000	0.48	SEA	0
AWP	ONTARIO TRACON	O40	5	36	43	37	7	2	0	45	9	2,206	1.06		0
AWP	BURBANK TRACON	B90	5	32	44	31	12	3	0	47	15	1,832	0.88		0
ANM	DENVER-STAPLETON ATCT	DEN	5	31	39	29	8	0	0	39	8	*	*	D84	20029
AEA	NEWARK INTERNATIONAL ATCT	EWR	5	28	28	17	0	3	2	33	5	934	0.45		36927
AWP	SAN FRANCISCO INT'L ATCT	SFO	5	26	33	30	7	1	0	34	8	457	0.22		10119
AEA	LA GUARDIA ATCT	LGA	5	25	29	19	4	4	6	39	14	252	0.12		14104
AEA	JOHN F KENNEDY INT'L ATCT	JFK	5	22	35	28	13	3	1	39	17	238	0.11		12079
													0.00		
AWP	LAS VEGAS McCARRAN ATCT	LAS/L31	4	61	50	42	-11	0	4	54	-7	448	0.21		178
ASO	MEMPHIS INTL ATCT	MEM	4	55	46	44	-9	0	7	53	-2	1,014	0.49		372
ASO	GRTR CINCINNATI INTL ATCT	CVG	4	51	56	48	5	0	4	60	9	378	0.18		2117
AWP	HONOLULU INT'L ATCT	HNL	4	50	37	23	-13	1	0	38	-12	2,351	1.13		46
ASW	SAN ANTONIO ATC TOWER	SAT	4	49	42	41	-7	0	4	46	-3	284	0.14		42
ASO	DAYTONA BEACH ATCT	OAB	4	49	47	39	-2	0	5	52	3	622	0.30		19
ASO	NASHVILLE METRO ATCT	BNA	4	48	53	42	5	0	5	58	10	1,540	0.74		1070
ACE	KANSAS CITY INTL ATCT	MCI	4	47	45	38	-2	0	5	50	3	348	0.17		255
ASO	RALEIGH-DURHAM ATCT	RDU	4	47	51	44	4	0	5	56	9	942	0.45		682
AGL	INDIANAPOLIS INT'L ATCT	IND	4	46	44	30	-2	0	7	51	5	1,400	0.67		151
AGL	PORT COLUMBUS INT'L ATCT	CMH	4	45	42	33	-3	0	7	49	4	250	0.12		57
AEA	NORFOLK INTN'L ATCT	ORF	4	44	45	32	1	0	8	53	9	332	0.16		31
ASO	JACKSONVILLE INT'L ATCT	JAX	4	43	41	34	-2	0	7	48	5	186	0.09		151
ASW	OKLAHOMA CITY ATCT	OKC	4	42	33	31	-9	0	0	33	-9	67	0.03		51
AGL	DAYTON INTL ATCT	DAY	4	42	41	30	-1	0	3	44	2	1,380	0.66		39

* Overtime accounting at some facilities is combined (i.e., tower/TRACON), but staffing standard and on board is split.

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AGL	CLEVELAND-HOPKINS ATCT	CLE	4	42	44	32	2	0	7	51	9	489	0.23		708
ASO	PALM BEACH INTL ATCT	PBI	4	39	33	24	-6	0	1	34	-5	802	0.38		169
ASW	LUBBOCK ATC TOWER	LBB	4	38	29	27	-9	0	0	29	-9	148	0.07		36
AGL	MILWAUKEE-MITCHELL ATCT	MKE	4	37	38	31	1	0	6	44	7	1,200	0.57		84
ANE	PROVIDENCE ATCT	PVD/G90	4	36	41	25	5	3	1	45	9	140	0.07		145
AEA	BALTIMORE TRACON	B95	4	34	35	29	1	3	0	38	4	1,082	0.52	BWI	0
AWP	FRESNO ATCT	FAT	4	33	24	24	-9	0	0	24	-9	228	0.11		27
ANM	SALT LAKE CITY TRACON	S56	4	32	29	26	-3	2	0	31	-1	630	0.30	SLC	0
AWP	ORANGE COUNTY ATCT	SNA	4	30	27	25	-3	0	0	27	-3	79	0.04		368
ANE	BOSTON-LOGAN ATCT	BOS	4	30	29	24	-1	0	0	29	-1	550	0.26		18912
AWP	PHOENIX INT'L ATCT	PHX	4	29	26	24	-3	2	1	29	0	152	0.07		1879
ANE	YANKEE TRACON (Bradley)	Y90	4	27	30	22	3	3	0	33	6	500	0.24	BDL	122
ACE	ST LOUIS/LAMBERT INTL ATCT	STL	4	27	30	25	3	0	0	30	3	*	*	T75	8684
AWP	HIGH DESERT TRACON	E10	4	27	31	19	4	0	1	32	5	4	0.00		0
AWP	OAKLAND ATCT	OAK	4	26	26	25	0	0	0	26	0	571	0.27		338
AGL	DETROIT METRO TOWER	DTW	4	26	30	24	4	0	0	30	4	*	*	D21	4931
AGL	MINNEAPOLIS-ST PAUL TOWER	MSP	4	25	28	19	3	0	0	28	3	*	0.00	M98	3400
AWP	TUCSON TRACON	U90	4	24	20	20	-4	0	0	20	-4	583	0.28	TUS	0
AAL	ANCHORAGE TRACON	A11	4	24	30	25	6	0	0	30	6	572	0.27	ANC	0
ANM	SEATTLE-TACOMA INT'L ATCT	SEA	4	23	21	15	-2	0	0	21	-2	*	*	S46	2030
ANM	PORTLAND TRACON	P80	4	23	25	24	2	2	2	28	6	338	0.16	PDX	0
ATCT	**LEVEL 4 & 5 RADAR**			**3,263**	**3,311**	**2,657**	**48**	**124**	**226**	**3,661**	**393**	**79,502**	**38.08**		**269,545**
Total	**ARTCC**			**5,886**	**6,596**	**5,036**	**710**	**325**	**358**	**7,279**	**1,393**	**59,527**	**28.51**		**2,296**
Grand	**Total**			**9,149**	**9,907**	**7,693**	**758**	**449**	**584**	**10,940**	**1,786**	**139,029**	**88.58**		**271,841**

* Overtime accounting at some facilities is combined (i.e., tower/TRACON), but staffing standard and on board is split.

Comparison of FY 1992 Controller Staffing Standard to Actual on Board as of 9/30/92

								Supplemental Controller Resources							
REG	NAME	FACID	LVL	FY92 STAFFING STANDARD RESOURCE REQUIREMENT	ACTUAL ON BOARD CONTROLLERS TOTAL	AOB 9/92 FPL TOTAL	SS vs. AOB	AOB 9/92 Traffic M'gmt Coord. (TMC)	AOB 9/92 ATA	AOB 9/92 ATCS/ATA & TMC TOTAL	SS vs. AOB w/ATA & TMC	FY92 CWF Overtime Hours	Overtime in Controller Years	Colocated Split Facilities	Delays
SO	ATLANTA ARTCC	ZTL	3	395	447	318	52	27	24	498	103	3,093	1.48		72
GL	CLEVELAND ARTCC	ZDB	3	384	413	312	29	17	27	457	73	5,033	2.41		573
EA	WASHINGTON ARTCC	ZDC	3	368	391	295	23	21	14	426	58	4,659	2.23		282
GL	CHICAGO ARTCC	ZAU	3	360	458	291	98	9	26	493	133	7,174	3.44		37
CE	KANSAS CITY ARTCC	ZKC	3	351	348	285	-3	13	32	393	42	1,161	0.56		134
SW	FT WORTH ARTCC	ZFW	3	340	373	259	33	15	19	407	67	1,770	0.85		0
GL	INDIANAPOLIS ARTCC	ZID	3	317	330	244	13	13	21	364	47	2,871	1.38		154
WP	OAKLAND ARTCC	ZOA	3	312	* 267	166	-45	14	22	303	-9	7,544	3.61		4
SO	MEMPHIS ARTCC	ZME	3	310	316	220	6	17	31	364	54	2,010	0.96		60
NM	DENVER ARTCC	ZDV	3	309	309	224	0	18	18	345	36	325	0.16		29
SO	JACKSONVILLE ARTCC	ZJX	3	307	344	226	37	12	27	383	76	1,632	0.78		117
WP	LOS ANGELES ARTCC	ZLA	3	307	336	190	29	18	15	369	62	8,232	3.94		48
SW	ALBUQUERQUE ARTCC	ZAB	3	301	298	226	-3	10	32	340	39	1,279	0.61		79
SW	HOUSTON ARTCC	ZHU	3	281	367	234	86	11	23	401	120	941	0.45		22
EA	NEW YORK ARTCC	ZNY	3	250	309	198	59	19	37	365	115	9,510	4.55		11
GL	MINNEAPOLIS ARTCC	ZMP	3	242	342	224	100	12	26	380	138	3,770	1.81		117
NE	BOSTON ARTCC	ZBW	3	229	301	212	72	13	10	324	95	1,400	0.67		73
NM	SEATTLE ARTCC	ZSE	3	205	238	175	33	16	12	266	61	257	0.12		1
SO	MIAMI ARTCC	ZMA	3	204	318	208	114	13	29	360	156	1,421	0.68		17
NM	SALT LAKE CITY ARTCC	ZLC	3	187	209	156	22	8	10	227	40	690	0.43		1
				No staffing standard: Anchorage ARTCC, Guam CERAP, San Juan CERAP, and Honolulu CERAP..											

* Overtime accounting at some facilities is combined (i.e. tower TRACON), but staffing standard and on board data is split.

Comparison of FY 1992 Controller Staffing Standard to Actual on Board as of 9/30/92

								Supplemental Controller Resources							
REG	NAME	FACID	LVL	FY92 STAFFING STANDARD RESOURCE REQUIREMENT	ACTUAL ON BOARD CONTROLLERS TOTAL	AOB 9/92 FPL TOTAL	SS vs. AOB	AOB 9/92 Traffic Mgmt Coord. (TMC)	AOB 9/92 ATA	AOB 9/92 ATCS/ATA & TMC TOTAL	SS vs. AOB w/ATA & TMC	FY92 CWF Overtime Hours	Overtime in Controller Years	Colocated Split Facilities	Delays
EA	NY TRACON	N90	5	158	184	141	26	11	16	200	42	11,435	5.48		0
SO	MIAMI INTL ATCT	MIA	5	84	82	53	-2	3	10	92	8	2,644	1.27		7,181
SO	ATLANTA HARTSFIELD ATCT	ATL	5	82	81	75	-1	4	10	91	9	2,023	0.97		14,137
GL	CHICAGO O'HARE TRACON	C90	5	81	71	55	-10	1	7	78	-3	13,492	6.46	ORD	21
SW	DALLAS-FT WORTH TRACON	D10	5	81	74	69	-7	7	13	87	6	1,108	0.53	DFW	166
WP	OAKLAND BAY TRACON	O90	5	67	73	49	6	5	2	75	8	5,711	2.74		0
SO	CHARLOTTE ATCT	CLT	5	66	63	55	-3	4	6	71	5	1,256	0.60		2,890
EA	PHILADELPHIA INTL ATCT	PHL	5	65	60	47	-5	2	3	63	-2	3,216	1.54		13,232
EA	WASHINGTON NATIONAL ATCT	DCA	5	60	57	34	-3	2	2	59	-1	684	0.33		3,309
EA	PITTSBURGH INTL ATCT	PIT	5	59	63	44	4	3	7	70	11	3,110	1.49		3,023
SO	ORLANDO INTL ATCT	MCO	5	58	57	51	-1	2	6	63	5	1,093	0.52		2,693
EA	DULLES INTL ATCT	IAD	5	56	59	35	3	3	2	61	5	1,035	0.50		2,175
SO	TAMPA INTL ATCT	TPA	5	55	61	59	6	0	7	68	13	117	0.06		958
NM	DENVER TRACON	O84	5	52	42	22	-10	3	8	50	-2	916	0.44	OEN	0
SW	HOUSTON TRACON	I90	5	51	46	42	-5	5	13	59	8	572	0.27		0
SO	PENSACOLA TRACON	P31	5	49	33	32	-16	0	7	40	-9	201	0.10	PNS	0
GL	DETROIT TRACON	O21	5	47	47	30	0	5	11	58	11	1,477	0.71	DTW	46
GL	CHICAGO (O'hare) ATCT	ORD	5	45	42	34	-3	0	0	42	-3 *		8.00	C90	39,851
WP	COAST TRACON	NZJ	5	45	58	50	13	4	0	58	13	3,656	1.75		0
WP	SACRAMENTO TRACON	MCC	5	44	38	30	-6	0	3	41	-3	156	0.07		0
WP	PHOENIX TRACON	P50	5	44	47	42	3	2	3	50	6	1,761	0.84		0

* Overtime accounting at some facilities is combined (i.e. tower TRACON), but staffing standard and on board data is split.

Comparison of FY 1992 Controller Staffing Standard to Actual on Board as of 9/30/92

								Supplemental Controller Resources							
REG	NAME	FACID	LVL	FY92 STAFFING STANDARD RESOURCE REQUIREMENT	ACTUAL ON BOARD CONTROLLERS TOTAL	AOB 9/92 FPL TOTAL	SS vs AOB	AOB 9/92 Traffic Mgmt Coord. (TMC)	AOB 9/92 ATA	AOB 9/92 ATCS/ATA & TMC TOTAL	SS vs. AOB w/ATA & TMC	FY92 CWF Overtime Hours	Overtime in Controller Years	Colocated Split Facilities	Delays
WP	LOS ANGELES TRACON	L56	5	42	58	35	16	7	0	58	16	4,665	2.23		189
CE	ST LOUIS TRACON	T75	5	41	45	40	4	5	8	53	12	420	0.20	STL	0
GL	MINNEAPOLIS TRACON	M98	5	41	35	27	-6	0	4	39	-2	1,788	0.86	MSP	26
SW	DALLAS-FT WORTH ATCT	DFW	5	41	29	29	-12	0	0	29	-12	*	*	D10	23,829
NE	BOSTON TRACON	A90	5	39	34	30	-5	3	0	34	-5	1,872	0.90	BOS	0
WP	SAN DIEGO TRACON	NKX	5	38	38	30	0	1	2	40	2	1,591	0.76		1
WP	LOS ANGELES INTL ATCT	LAX	5	37	35	28	-2	4	0	35	-2	3,984	1.91		14,888
NM	SEATTLE TACOMA TRACON	S46	5	36	50	38	14	2	4	54	18	1,009	0.48	SEA	0
WP	ONTARIO TRACON	040	5	35	43	34	8	1	0	43	8	3,984	1.91		0
WP	BURBANK TRACON	B90	5	31	39	29	8	3	1	40	9	4,706	2.25		0
WP	SAN FRANCISCO INTL ATCT	SFO	5	25	32	21	7	2	0	32	7	1,016	0.49		13,423
EA	LAGUARDIA ATCT	LGA	5	24	26	17	2	3	8	34	10	670	0.32		19,451
EA	J.F. KENNEDY INTL ATCT	JFK	5	22	33	25	11	0	3	36	14	1,100	0.53		13,605
WP	LAS VEGAS INTL ATCT	LAS/L30	4	58	49	41	-9	0	4	53	-5	1,195	0.57		134
SO	MEMPHIS INTL ATCT	MEM	4	54	50	42	-4	0	8	58	4	1,119	0.54		421
SO	GRTR CINCINNATI INTL ATCT	CVG	4	49	54	41	5	0	7	61	12	1058	0.51		1,796
SO	DAYTONA BEACH ATCT	DAB	4	49	43	38	-6	0	5	48	-1	756	0.36		15
WP	HONOLULU INTL ATCT	HNL	4	49	29	21	-20	1	0	29	-20	3,770	1.81		83
SO	NASHVILLE METRO ATCT	BNA	4	48	48	40	0	0	6	54	6	1,942	0.93		1,020
SW	SAN ANTONIO ATCT	SAT	4	48	51	45	3	0	4	55	7	283	0.14		49
CE	KANSAS CITY INTL ATCT	MCI	4	46	41	36	-5	0	6	47	1	185	0.09		327
SO	RALEIGH-DURHAM ATCT	RDU	4	46	47	36	1	0	6	53	7	1,208	0.58		918
GL	PORT COLUMBUS INTL ATCT	CMH	4	45	37	34	-8	0	5	42	-3	226	0.11		54
GL	INDIANAPOLIS INTL ATCT	IND	4	45	42	30	-3	0	5	47	2	1,950	0.93		564
EA	NORFOLK INTL ATCT	ORF	4	44	40	30	-4	0	8	48	4	217	0.10		126
SO	JACKSONVILLE INTL ATCT	JAX	4	43	43	32	0	0	7	50	7	549	0.26		133
GL	CLEVELAND HOPKINS ATCT	CLE	4	42	42	30	0	0	7	48	7	675	0.32		427
SW	CORPUS CHRISTI ATCT	CRP	4	42	31	29	-11	0	1	32	-10	283	0.14		5
GL	DAYTON INTL ATCT	DAY	4	41	42	32	1	0	3	45	4	1,794	0.86		97
SW	OKLAHOMA CITY ATCT	OKC	4	41	36	31	-5	0	3	39	-2	72	0.03		15
SW	Tulsa Intl	TUL	4	39	32	30	-7	0	1	33	-6	322	0.15		40

* Overtime accounting at some facilities is combined (i.e. tower TRACON), but staffing standard and on board data is split.

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Comparison of FY 1992 Controller Staffing Standard to Actual on Board as of 9/30/92

								Supplemental Controller Resources								
REG	NAME	FACID	LVL	FY92 STAFFING STANDARD RESOURCE REQUIREMENT	ACTUAL ON BOARD CONTROLLERS TOTAL	AOB 9/92 FPL TOTAL	$$ vs. AOB	AOB 9/92 Traffic M'gmt Coord. (TMC)	AOB 9/92 ATA	AOB 9/92 ATCS/ATA & TMC TOTAL	$$ vs. AOB w/ATA & TMC	FY92 CWF Overtime Hours	Overtime in Controller Years	Colocated Split Facilities	Delays
SO	WEST PALM BEACH INTL ATCT	PBI	4	38	34	28	-4	0	2	38	-2	638	0.31		249
SW	ALBUQUERQUE ATCT	ABQ	4	37	31	25	-6	0	2	33	-4	137	0.07		154
SW	LUBBOCK ATCT	LBB	4	37	28	27	-9	0	3	31	-6	148	0.07		27
GL	MILWAUKEE MITCHELL ATCT	MKE	4	36	35	24	-1	0	6	41	5	1,434	0.69		211
EA	BALTIMORE TRACON	B95	4	34	32	28	-2	4	2	34	0	799	0.38	BWI	0
WP	FRESNO ATCT	FAT	4	33	22	20	-11	0	0	22	-11	396	0.19		75
NM	SALT LAKE CITY TRACON	S56	4	31	28	24	-3	0	4	32	1	1,081	0.52	SLC	0
NE	BOSTON LOGAN ATCT	BOS	4	30	31	24	1	0	1	32	2	1,154	0.55	A90	18,044
NM	DENVER ATCT	DEN	4	30	34	22	4	2	0	34	4 *		*	D84	11,969
WP	ORANGE COUNTY ATCT	SNA	4	30	32	31	2	0	0	32	2	43	0.02		204
WP	PHOENIX INTL ATCT	PHX	4	29	27	26	-2	2	1	28	-1	275	0.13		4,273
EA	NEWARK ATCT	EWR	4	28	29	20	1	4	2	31	3	750	0.36		31,371
WP	HIGH DESERT TRACON	E10	4	27	28	16	1	0	1	28	2	285	0.14		0
CE	St Louis Intl	STL	4	26	27	25	1	0	0	27	1 *		*	T75	7,766
GL	DETROIT METRO	DTW	4	26	26	23	0	0	0	26	0 *		*	D21	4,074
NE	YANKEE TRACON (Bradley)	Y90	4	26	31	23	5	3	0	31	5	535	0.26	BDL	81
WP	OAKLAND ATCT	OAK	4	26	27	23	1	0	0	27	1	1,273	0.61		117
GL	MINNEAPOLIS	MSP	4	25	27	21	2	0	0	27	2 *		*	M98	2,426
NE	PROVIDENCE TRACON	G90	4	25	31	23	6	3	0	31	6	83	0.04		607
NM	SEATTLE TACOMA ATCT	SEA	4	24	21	21	-3	0	0	21	-3 *		*	S46	5,014
WP	TUCSON TRACON	U90	4	24	21	21	-3	0	0	21	-3	673	0.32	TUS	0
NM	PORTLAND TRACON	P80	4	23	25	22	2	1	2	27	4	396	0.19	PDX	0
AL	ANCHORAGE TRACON/INTL	A11	4	22	31	31	9	0	0	31	9	762	0.36	ANC	0
NM	SALT LAKE CITY ATCT	SLC	4	20	23	19	3	0	0	23	3 *		*	S56	1,515
SW	HOUSTON INTL ATCT	IAH	4	20	18	18	-2	0	0	18	-2 *		*		2,733
SW	Dallas (Love)	DAL	4	19	23	22	4	0	1	24	5	79	0.04		237
								0		0					
ATCT LEVEL 4 and 5 Radar				3,356	3,314	2,657	-42	117	281	3,595	239	111,014	53.17		272,465
Total ARTCC				5,959	8,714	4,683	755	296	455	7,465	1,586	64,972	31.12		1,831
Grand Total				9,315	10,028	7,320	713	413	736	11,060	1,745	175,986	84.28		274,296

* Overtime accounting at some facilities is combined (i.e. tower TRACON), but staffing standard and on board data is split.

Staffing Data Notes

1. Staffing standards provide guidance to regional air traffic division managers and their staffs in the distribution of resources among individual facilities. The application of standards is intended to be flexible. Since regional air traffic division managers and their staffs have first-hand knowledge of local operations and needs, they are in the best position to allocate assigned staffing rather than depend on rigid application of the standards.

2. This list of enroute and level 4 & 5 radar facilities compares the staffing standard to the number of actual-on-board controllers as of the end of FY 1992 and FY 1993. It is important to note that as of the end of FY 1993 there were 759 more controllers than the staffing standard calls for. This does not include the 449 traffic management coordinators (TMC) and the 584 air traffic assistants (ATA).

3. There are some facilities that are over the staffing standard and some that are under. This illustrates the importance of not applying the staffing standards too rigidly. For example:

   - Almost all enroute facilities are over the staffing standard. This is largely the result of the preparation for the installation the Initial Sector Suite System (ISSS).

   - Pensacola TRACON is 16 under the staffing standard. The air traffic division manager of Southern region has made a careful analysis of the staffing requirements of Pensacola and has determined that the appropriate level of staffing there is 36 controllers. In addition the facility has 7 ATA's to perform functions that would otherwise be performed by controllers such as the flight data function.

   - Honolulu TRACON is 13 controllers below the staffing standard. The air traffic division manager of the Western-Pacific region has determined that the appropriate level of staffing there is 42 controllers. The region has recently selected 4 new controllers for Honolulu and they will be reporting before the end of the year. Honolulu is a difficult facility to staff because of the high cost of living in Hawaii.

4. We will be willing to meet and discuss these data if there are any questions.

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